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8 Chapter 1 
Since 1950, the Chinese government has been building and rebuilding a healthcare sys-
tem to improve the health status of the Chinese population. The accomplishments are 
significant. Some communicable diseases such as tuberculosis and malaria have been 
largely controlled. Average life expectancy at birth increased from 42 years (1950) to 73 
(2009) (Ministry of Health of China 2010). The infant mortality rate fell from about 200‰ 
(1950) to 19‰ (2005) (Ministry of Health China 2007). 
With the devastation resulting from World War II and the Civil War1 as a starting point, 
the Chinese government has over the past 60 years built a three-layer healthcare net-
work that includes (i) rural area primary clinics and (since 2007) urban community health 
centers, (ii) county and city hospitals, and (iii) tertiary hospitals. Before the mid-1980s, all 
Chinese hospitals were public, owned by the central or local government, and financially 
dependent on governmental subsidies. Since then, China has gone through a series of 
market-oriented and open-economy reforms that have had great impact on almost all 
aspects of society. In the healthcare sector, the government dramatically decreased 
governmental subsidies to public hospitals with the goals of “pushing the hospitals to 
the market” and enhancing efficiency. Along with a soaring economic development, the 
Chinese healthcare system encountered serious problems. Affordability and accessibil-
ity have been two major complaints since the late 1980s (Ge 2005). Since the mid-1990s, 
the central and some local governments have been reorganizing and establishing health 
insurance schemes and taking better control of the public hospitals. After more than 10 
years of healthcare reform, however, criticism remains. In 2004, private expenditure on 
health as a percentage of total health expenditure (THE) was as high as 62%, with the 
government shouldering 38%. And of the private share, the percentage of out-of-pocket 
(OOP) payment was 87% (WHO 2008). 
Calls for a fundamental healthcare reform have been increasing. In April 2009, the 
central government stated in a blueprint for healthcare reform that an additional €85 
billion would be invested in the healthcare sector over the next three years (State 
Council of China 2009): one-third would go toward subsidizing public hospitals and 
health institutes, and two-thirds to broaden and deepen health insurance. More than 
three years later, it is still too early to evaluate the reforms. Contradictory policies have 
been observed and it may therefore be time to consider a consistent and fundamental 
direction for healthcare reform. 
The many ways to organize a healthcare system depend on culture, history, political 
will, and the broader economic environment in a setting. In addition the functioning of 
healthcare systems is related to some specific characteristics of healthcare. Therefore, let 
us first look at the economic characteristics of healthcare systems. 
1.  The Chinese Civil War (1927-1950) was between the KMT (Chinese Nationalist Party) and the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
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1. LACK OF EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY IN A FREE HEALTHCARE MARKET
1.1 Characteristics of healthcare 
A free healthcare market fails to fulfill almost all the assumptions of a perfect market 
(Culyer, Newhouse 2000): symmetric information, cost-free searching, marketable risk, 
no monopoly power, and no entry/exit barriers. Healthcare service has certain charac-
teristics that further distinguish it from general market products.
Uncertainty. Consumers are uncertain about their future health status and needs for 
healthcare. And once they need healthcare services, it is hard to predict the extent or 
volume of the products they will have to purchase. The need and demand for healthcare 
is thus irregular and unpredictable. 
Uncertainty has another implication in the healthcare market that sets it apart from 
ordinary markets: consumers usually do not know the utility of the product they pur-
chase without a physician’s guidance. The expected outcome of healthcare services is 
also uncertain. Even physicians cannot tell with certainty the exact consequences of a 
certain treatment due to the complexities of medical science. 
Uncertainty leads to a demand for certainty, and insurance is the most common way of 
providing it. In a healthcare market, besides supply (providers) and demand (patients), 
a third party fulfills the insurance function. The party could be an insurance company 
(organization), the government, employers, or even physicians. 
Information asymmetry. We assume that physicians know more about how to treat 
patients than the patients themselves. Physicians also know the quality of healthcare 
services better than patients. That means the supply side of a healthcare market has 
certain power over the demand side. In other words, information asymmetry exists 
between physicians and patients.
In a normal market, information asymmetry is often addressed by an agent who acts 
on behalf of the information-deficient party. In a healthcare market, physicians normally 
work as such agents for patients. Physicians are, however, at the same time the market’s 
suppliers. When agents work as suppliers, their interests are different from their custom-
ers’. Under some payment schemes, the physicians may have incentive to over-supply 
healthcare services to achieve their own interests. That leads to the problem of “supplier 
induced demand” (SID). 
Altruistic preferences and social justice. In the context of healthcare, a caring individual 
might be one who derives utility – external benefit – from seeing another person receive 
healthcare (Culyer 1980). Individuals with altruistic preferences prefer having others 
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with health problems treated and are prepared to sacrifice resources to ensure the oth-
ers’ treatments. 
Social justice (or equity) is not considered an individual preference; rather it derives 
from a set of principles concerning what a person ought to have as of right or entitle-
ment. Rawls (1971) has suggested that people act behind a “veil of ignorance” when 
setting up principles of social justice. 
The application of altruistic preferences and social justice to the healthcare sector 
translates to “equity in healthcare”, given that redistribution policies cannot achieve 
equal health. Andersen (1975) suggests that an equitable distribution of healthcare 
is one in which the amount of healthcare received correlates highly with indicators of 
need and is independent of variables such as income. Equity in healthcare is further 
divided into two parts: equity in healthcare finance, and equity in healthcare delivery. 
A widely accepted definition of equity in healthcare is Marxist: “from each according to 
ability to pay, to each according to need for healthcare” (Culyer, Newhouse 2000).
Equity is usually considered an important policy goal in the healthcare sector, a char-
acteristic that sets it apart from other products. Its byproducts are a large proportion of 
non-profit organizations and governmental control of healthcare. 
1.2 Consequences of healthcare characteristics 
Moral hazard. When the insurance function is fulfilled by an entity, an insured person 
does not pay the full price of the healthcare services they receive. In extreme cases – a 
“start from $0” health insurance scheme – an insured person pays no out-of-pocket 
(OOP) payment at the point of service. Such a price insensitivity may lead to an ex-ante 
moral hazard in which the insured have little incentive for preventing disease and an 
ex-post moral hazard in which the insured have incentive to use healthcare services for 
insignificant benefit, i.e., the marginal benefit is merely greater than zero.
Supplier-induced demand (SID). SID or, in this case, physician-induced demand, exists 
when a physician influences a patient’s demand for care against his interpretation of the 
patient’s best interest (Culyer, Newhouse 2000). SID is a direct consequence of informa-
tion asymmetry and uncertainty. It may be influenced by physicians’ payment systems, 
variations in the constraint of medical ethics, and physicians’ target incomes. 
Risk selection. Risk selection occurs when actions of economic agents exploit unpriced 
risk heterogeneity and break pooling arrangements, resulting in insurance inequities 
(Newhouse 1996). Risk selection exists on either the demand or supply side of the health 
insurance market.
Assuming that the insurance function of the healthcare market is undertaken by 
several competing and unregulated insurance companies, the price of the premium 
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will be equal to the expected medical cost of the potential insured; i.e., the insurer will 
charge those at high risk high premiums. When the risk rating is no longer profitable for 
insurers, they may engage in “risk selection”. The insurers might add a high loading fee 
above the premium to protect themselves from the financial risks of an abnormal pool-
ing, refuse to cover some pre-existing conditions, or set up an initial “waiting period” 
during which health costs are not covered. In some countries, “community rating” and 
“open enrollment” are enforced by the government. Explicit and implicit risk selections 
are the direct consequences of these governmental regulations. 
Adverse selection occurs when a potential subscriber hides her disease history from 
the insurer to obtain insurance at a lower-than-market price. 
Escalating medical costs. When the demand for insurance is fulfilled in the healthcare 
market, the financial risk that people confront when seeking healthcare services is 
largely absorbed by insurers. Under a fee-for-service payment scheme, physicians have 
incentive to over-supply healthcare services to patients for their own interest (Van de 
Voorde, Van Doorslaer & Schokkaert 2001). With low price sensitivity for both patients 
and physicians, overall medical costs in a society escalate. Such an escalation is not an 
efficient societal welfare allocation. 
If medical costs are so high that they endanger accessibility to healthcare services of 
the less healthy population, the ideology of equity is also endangered. 
1.3  Conclusion 
In a freely competitive healthcare market, it is difficult for patients to purchase healthcare 
services efficiently because they cannot obtain sufficient price and quality information. 
It is also difficult or even impossible for those at high risk to purchase necessary health 
insurance because of insurers’ risk rating and selection. 
Because achieving both equity and efficiency in an unregulated competitive health-
care market is not possible, an entity that represents individual consumers toward 
achieving such social goals is required. Usually that entity is the government.
2. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHINESE HEALTHCARE SYSTEM SINCE 1950S
The Chinese Communist Party announced the establishment of the Peoples’ Republic 
of China on October 1, 1949. The development of Chinese healthcare system started in 
1950 and since then can be divided into three stages. 
From the 1950s to early 1980s, the Chinese government engaged in building a 
network of state-owned healthcare facilities to solve the accessibility problem for the 
population. The government heavily subsidized the facilities and set the user fees of 
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healthcare services much lower than the actual costs. Various health insurance schemes 
were also developed. In urban areas, government officers, teachers, university students, 
soldiers (and the dependents of all groups) were covered by province- or city-based 
Governmental Insurance Schemes (GIS). Employees, retirees, and their dependents were 
covered by employer-based Labor Insurance Schemes (LIS). Both schemes’ co-payments 
were near zero. In rural areas, most farmers (90% at the peak of the scheme) were cov-
ered by “Collective Medicine”, which had a co-payment (Liu, Rao 1998). 
From the early 1980s to 2000, the market-oriented economic reform brought major 
changes to the healthcare sector. First, the government decided to push healthcare 
facilities to the front-line of the market with the intention of improving efficiency 
and shrinking governmental subsidies. Hospitals were left to themselves to pay staff 
bonuses in lieu of salaries that were lower than the basic living standard. Local govern-
ments often took the financial performance of the hospitals as an important indicator 
of the performance of the hospital directors. Such judgment often had influence on the 
directors’ prospects of “climbing the management ladder” within the government. Thus, 
the hospitals were given strong incentive to be profitable. Supplier-induced demand 
and a medical arms race were observed in the Chinese healthcare sector. Second, the 
bankruptcy of many state-owned enterprises in the market-oriented reform broke up 
the enterprise-based insurance pools of LIS. Many employees and their dependencies 
went without (effective) health insurance. Third, “Collective Medicine” in the rural areas 
was also broken up with the collapse of the community economy. Medical costs became 
unaffordable for many people.
Beginning in 2000, the Chinese government rebuilt and enlarged the Urban em-
ployees’ Basic Health Insurance Scheme2 (UEBHI) in urban areas. The health insurance 
schemes for employees were also expanded to include those who worked in the infor-
mal economy. In rural areas, “New Cooperative Medicine”3 (NCM) was organized to cover 
farmers with increasingly heavy subsidies from both the central and local governments. 
Since early 2007, the Urban Residents’ Basic Health Insurance Scheme4 (URBHI), a volun-
tary scheme for unemployed urban residents, was used experimentally in some cities 
and has expanded to the whole country.
2.  “Urban Employee Basic Health Insurance Scheme” is also known as “Basic Medical Insurance 
Scheme”.
3.  “New Cooperative Medicine” is also known as “New Cooperative Medical Scheme” or “New Rural 
Cooperative Medicine System”.
4.  “Urban Residents Basic Health Insurance Scheme” is also known as “Urban Residents’ Scheme”.
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3. PROBLEMS IN THE CURRENT CHINESE HEALTHCARE SYSTEM
3.1 Unaffordability
Inflation of medical costs has been causing attention in many countries for decades. 
Unlike other markets, high medical costs do not naturally lead to high quality care. 
Explanations for this include asymmetric information, agency problems, the role of third 
party payers, and SID. In most developed countries, inflation in healthcare costs leads to 
a heavy financial burden for the government because basic health insurance is normally 
regarded as social insurance. In China the story is somewhat different. 
From 1979 to 2009, China’s GDP increased by an average of 9% per year. During the 
same period, the average yearly increase in Total Health Expenditure (THE) was 12%. In 
2005, THE was 4.73% of GDP (Zhao, Wan & Ying 2007). Although not high compared to 
many developed countries, the component of THE in China is heavily skewed to OOPs, 
which was 52% of THE in 2005. At the same time, the percentage of governmental ex-
penditure on health was only 18% of THE; the rest was financed by other social entities. 
Most of the financial burden accompanying the inflation of healthcare costs fell on the 
shoulders of individuals. 
Results from the 3rd National Health Service Investigation of China showed that only 
51% of those reporting illness in a two-week period sought help from a healthcare facil-
ity, among those who did not do so, 38% of them failed to do it because of financial 
problems. Among people who reported in-patient care, 43% elected to be discharged 
without physician approval and 64% of them did so due to financial problems. Among 
those who reported a physician’s referral for in-hospital care, 30% refused, and 70% of 
them did so for financial reasons (Statistic & Information Center of Ministry of Health 
China 2005). Such figures demonstrate that a significant portion of the population did 
not receive healthcare because of cost.
More explicitly, the average costs of an out-patient visit in 2003 were ¥120 (overall)5, 
¥219 (urban areas) and ¥91 (rural areas). Average cost per admission for in-patient care 
were ¥4,123, ¥7,606, and ¥2,649, respectively, which roughly equaled the average an-
nual income of a Chinese citizen (Statistic & Information Center of Ministry of Health 
China 2005). Indexed increases in out-patient and in-patient costs from 1993 to 2003 are 
shown in Table 1. 
The problem of unaffordability has been aggravated by the lack of (sufficient) health 
insurance for a large share of population. In 2003, 30% of the urban population was 
covered by UEBHI, 4% by the Government Insurance Scheme, 5% by the Labor Insur-
ance Scheme, 6% by some kind of commercial health insurance; 44.8% were uninsured. 
Worse than that in the urban areas, 79% of the rural population was uninsured. At the 
5.  €1.00 ≈ ¥10.00 (2008). 
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same time, the Chinese government found it difficult to organize geographical cross-
subsidization (Statistic & Information Center of Ministry of Health China 2005). Although 
social health insurance schemes have experienced significant progress in the last 10 
years in terms of enrolled population, the government cannot afford comprehensive 
health insurance for all and many are under-insured (World Bank, 2005).
Hospitals’ organization and incentives also worsen the affordability problem. With 
shrinking government subsidies, healthcare providers use information asymmetry 
to increase revenue. Because of its small ownership shares, the government has little 
power over public hospitals’ control of SID behavior. Individual consumers have scarce 
information about the quality and price of the hospitals. They judge quality by the 
hospitals’ “stars” or reputation, both of which are often based on the level and amount of 
high-tech equipment they own. Competition among hospitals is thus mainly focused on 
their ability to make profits and their stock of high-tech equipment. 
3.2 Problem of inefficiency
In 2006, China had 19,246 hospitals, which comprised 1,045 tertiary (top) hospitals, 
5,151 secondary hospitals, more than 10,000 primary hospitals, and various other medi-
cal facilities (Ministry of Health China 2007). Although primary hospitals have the largest 
share of total medical facilities, their quality of care and that of the higher-level hospitals 
are unknown for many people. People then tend to choose higher-level hospitals be-
cause they assume higher-level hospitals provide higher quality health care. In 2006, 
only 26% of the patients in urban areas sought health care services in primary hospitals: 
55% chose tertiary and secondary hospitals. Even in the rural areas where tertiary hos-
pitals are scarce and secondary hospitals are usually far away, 39% of the people sought 
care from at least secondary hospitals. The percentage of patients seeking care from 
higher-level hospitals has been increasing in the last decade. The utilization rates of hos-
pital beds for tertiary and secondary hospitals in 2006 were 91% and 51% respectively 
(Ministry of Health China 2007). Because many patients go without health insurance and 
even for the insured OOP is substantial, individual patients without sufficient quality 
and price information are the actual purchasers of care. This leads to over-crowding in 
higher-level hospitals, and a waste of resources in primary hospitals. 
Table 1 In- and out-patient costs index for 1993, 1998 & 2003 (adjusted for inflation)
1993 1998 2003
Average out-patient visit cost index 100 117 220
Average per-admission in-patient cost index 100 150 250
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4. HEALTH CARE REFORM IN CHINA
The current healthcare reform in Chinais at a crossroad. Although the Chinese govern-
ment is aware of the problems in an unregulated (or not properly regulated) healthcare 
market, the government also knows clearly about the problems in the previous health-
care sector, where no competition existed at all. The government has strong willingness 
to initiate a healthcare reform that will address the current problems of inefficiency and 
unaffordability. However, there is no clear clue of how to invest in the healthcare system, 
though there has already been heavy investment in expanding social health insurance 
coverage. 
Governments can be involved in a healthcare market in various ways. At one extreme, 
it directly provides healthcare services for free or at any affordable price to its residents. 
At the other extreme, the government only acts as a regulator who sets the rules of 
the game. It could also take a role in between, for example, act as an insurer and allow 
healthcare providers to compete with each other. 
The Chinese government is currently facing several options. If it decides to heavily 
subsidize the supply side (e.g., public hospitals), the system will move toward the first 
extreme of government provision of healthcare. If it decides to heavily subsidize the 
demand side (e.g., insurers), at least two options for the government exist: (i) to act as 
an insurer or (ii) to regulate the market and allow insurers to compete with each other.  
In its 2009 blueprint of reforming the Chinese healthcare system, market mechanism, 
which in most official documents in China has the same meaning as competition, was 
frequently mentioned (State Council of China, 2009). There are several options for 
competition in a healthcare sector: it might take place among healthcare providers; it 
might take place among health insurers; or it might take place among both. Therefore, 
to indicate the potential options of the future Chinese healthcare reform, we will use a 
categorization of healthcare systems based on whether or not there is price competition 
among healthcare providers and insurers (Table 2, van de Ven, Wynand P.M.M, Schut & 
Rutten 1994).
Table 2. Models in organizing a healthcare system
Providers 
Price competition No price competition 
Insurers
Price competition 1 3
No price competition 2 4
Source: van de Ven, W.P.M.M., Schut, F.T., and Rutten, F.F.H., “Forming and reforming the market for third-party 
purchasing of health care”, Social Science & Medicine, 1994, 39(10): 1405-1412
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Model 1: Consumers have choices among both insurers and providers. Market failure 
may result from characteristics of healthcare services. Efficiency and equity can hardly be 
achieved in this model if no entity regulates the system. The possibility of success in this 
model thus heavily depends on the capability of the regulating entities. The regulated 
competition model, typically represented by the current models in the Netherlands, 
Israel, and Switzerland, falls within this category. The government should be an active 
regulator that sets the rules of the game.
Model 2: Health insurers do not compete, but healthcare providers do. Examples include 
the Canadian National Health Insurance (NHI) model, the post-reform UK model, and 
some employer-based traditional health insurance schemes in the US. The current Chi-
nese healthcare system is close to this type: price competition is allowed among private 
hospitals and to a certain extent allowed among public ones. The performance of this 
model relies on the incentives given to non-competing insurers to act as prudent and 
efficient purchasers of care. The government in this model has two important roles: to 
regulate the competitive healthcare provider market and to act as a prudent purchaser 
of care on behalf of the citizens.
Model 3: Health insurers compete; healthcare providers do not. Although theoretically 
speaking, insurers are motivated to “shop around” for efficient care on behalf of their en-
rollees, their ability to act as prudent purchasers is seriously undermined by healthcare 
provider monopolies. The model has the disadvantages of competition among insurers, 
such as unaffordable insurance, numerous forms of risk selection, etc, while its structure 
blocks its advantages, such as responsiveness to consumer preference, innovation, etc. 
The model is therefore impractical and will not be discussed further.
Model 4: Neither health insurers nor healthcare providers face price competition. The 
Chinese healthcare system before the 1980s was a typical example of Model 4, the 
classic pre-1990s NHS model in the UK is also an example of this model. Whether the 
healthcare system could achieve social goals heavily depends on the performance of 
the government, which is the provider of healthcare for all citizens. It is difficult for the 
government to plan accurately for the needed amount of care in the society. In addition, 
bureaucracy of the government might also lead to inefficiency of the system. Govern-
ment failure is thus a potential problem of this model. 
The current Chinese healthcare system is currently close to model 2: the governmental 
branches of health insurers do not compete, but there is some room for price competi-
tion among healthcare providers. The various benefit packages of the existing social 
health insurance schemes are major sources of inequity in terms of finance and acces-
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sibility of care. Furthermore, public hospitals do not compete based on price because of 
poor product classification and poor quality information, among other things. 
According to our classification of Table 1-2, China might be moving to model 4 by 
removing competition in the health provision sector, or to model 1 by allowing competi-
tion among health insurers and further encouraging provider competition. It can also 
move even closer to model 2, by changing the current fragmented health insurance 
schemes and improving necessary regulations for a more effectively competitive health-
care provision sector.
Choice between model 2 and 4 as potential options for China’s coming healthcare re-
form are under fierce debate among the public and academia. Model 1 is also mentioned 
in a government statement (State Council of China 2009). Models 1, 2, 4 are therefore 
relevant to this dissertation.
5. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The central research question of this dissertation is: “What are the prospects of competi-
tion in China’s healthcare reform?”
To answer this research question, two parts compose the backbone of the thesis: 
5.1 Part I: international experience of healthcare reforms in three countries
Before the Chinese government makes the decision on the option for the current/future 
reform, it is crucial to understand two issues: first, what are the advantages and disad-
vantages of the relevant prototype models (model 1, 2, and 4); and second, what can 
be learned from the international experience/lessons of healthcare reforms (transitions) 
aiming at the relevant models.
Three countries, namely England, Netherlands, and Russia are selected for further 
research in this thesis. England has a National Health Service (NHS) system. The tradi-
tional NHS in England before the 1991-reform is characterized by health care services 
funded through general taxation, provided predominantly by government facilities, and 
free at the point of services. Such a system was very close to model 4 in Table 1-2, and 
close to the previous healthcare system in China during 1950-1980. In 1991, the British 
government implemented the internal market reform, aiming at a “regulated competi-
tion” among health care providers. The major measure was to split the responsibility of 
purchasing care from providing care. With this reform, the British government aimed to 
transit its healthcare system from model 4 to model 2. 
Similar to England, Netherlands also had a model 4 healthcare system between 1940s 
and 1990s. During 1970s and 1980s, the Dutch healthcare system was characterized 
by strict price and capacity regulation in the health provision market and regional-
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monopolized non-competing sickness funds. The Dutch government has considered a 
fundamental change towards model 1 since late 1980s. Price and capacity regulations in 
the health provision market were gradually loosened during the past 20 years. In 2006, 
a Health Insurance Act came into force, obliging individual consumer to buy health 
insurance from a private health insurance company, and allowing yearly free consumer 
choice among the companies. Since then, competition in the health insurance market 
has increased. The Dutch healthcare system has experienced a transition from model 4 
to model 1, and the transition is still an on-going process.
Before the market-oriented reforms in 1980s, Russia and China were similar in many as-
pects, for example the political system and social forms. Both of the countries had heavily 
regulated health provision sector, which relied mostly on governmental subsidization. 
Health care was regarded as social welfare. Governments acted as both providers and 
purchasers of care. The healthcare systems in Russia and China are categorized as model 
4 before the reform. Despite all these similarities, Russia and China experienced different 
paths in their healthcare reforms since 1980s. Russia underwent an abrupt change in 
legislation from model 4 to model 1 in 1993. In this reform, the Russian government 
copied many organizational elements from the Dutch healthcare system. However, 
contradictory to what has been achieved in the Dutch healthcare system (increasing 
competition in both the health insurance and health provision market), competition has 
never been achieved in the Russian healthcare system during the past decades. This 
suggests that the Russian healthcare system failed in making the transition from model 
4 to model 1. 
Analyzing the experience in these three countries contributes to figure out the 
advantages and disadvantages of model 1, 2, and 4, and the important pre-conditions 
that need to be fulfilled for either model 2 or 1 to achieve efficiency and equity in a 
competitive healthcare system.
5.2 Part II: investigation of whether three selected pre-conditions for a competitive healthcare system are 
fulfilled in China
Among the pre-conditions for a competitive healthcare system analyzed in part I, three 
pre-conditions are considered as most important and/or relevant to the Chinese context.
• Competition policy. Effective competition law/policy is important for both a com-
petitive health provision market and a competitive health insurance market. Thus, 
competition policy is relevant for model 1 and 2. Chinese government issued its 
first anti-monopoly law in 2008, however, this law is currently not applicable in the 
healthcare system. The room for competition in the current Chinese hospital sector 
and key competition policies needed for a competitive hospital market are analyzed 
in this thesis.
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• Consumer information. Sufficient consumer information is essential to facilitate 
consumers to make reasonable individual choice among insurers and/or healthcare 
providers. Therefore, this is also relevant for model 1 and 2. Moreover, this has been a 
neglected issue in the debate about the Chinese healthcare reform. In this thesis, the 
level of consumer information about health insurers in China will be investigated.
• Risk equalization. As discussed before, competing insurers have incentives for risk 
rating and/or risk selection. One way to remove these incentives from insurers is 
to equalize the insured risks. In other words, an adequate risk equalization scheme 
should compensate the insurers with high risks according to the predicted high ex-
penditures, and take the profit away from the insurers with low risk profile. Although 
risk equalization is only relevant for model 1, this concept is brand new in China. If 
the Chinese government chooses to go for model 1 (with competitive insurers), risk 
selection and eventually inaccessibility to basic health insurance for high risks are 
very likely to happen without an effective risk equalization scheme. Therefore, we 
also choose risk equalization as a pre-condition for in-depth investigation.
6. OUTLINE OF THE THESIS
Part I composes chapter 2 to 4. In chapter 2, advantages and disadvantages of model 1, 
2, and 4 are analyzed based on the experiences of the pre- (model 4) and post-reform 
(model 2) English healthcare system and the present Dutch healthcare system (model 1). 
Their relevancy for the current Chinese healthcare reform is also discussed in this chapter. 
In chapter 3 and 4, experiences in Russia (“failed” reform from model 4 to 1) and the 
Netherlands (“successful” reform from model 4 to 1), and their relevancy for China is 
analyzed. Pre-conditions for model 1 are summarized. 
Part II composes chapter 5 to 7. 
International experience of enforcing competition law in the healthcare sector, and 
the enforcement of anti-monopoly law and other competition policies in the Chinese 
healthcare sector are analyzed in Chapter 5. In this chapter, focus is put on competition 
regulations for a competitive health provision market because these aspects of compe-
tition regulations are currently highly relevant in China. Current room for hospital com-
petition in China is examined, and proper regulations needed for competitive health 
provision market, especially competition law are discussed.
Chapter 6 is an empirical analysis of the level of consumer information about health 
insurance in Nanjing, the capital city of Jiangsu Province. 
In chapter 7, potential ways of introducing consumer choice among insurers are 
proposed. Methods to avoid risk selection are discussed. Specific attention was paid to 
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risk equalization. The potential obstacles of implementing risk equalization schemes in 
China are also analyzed.
Chapter 8 summarizes and concludes the thesis. 
Each of chapter 2 to chapter 7 was written as an independent manuscript with the 
purpose to be published as a journal paper. Therefore, there may exist some overlap 
among these chapters, i.e. introduction of the Chinese healthcare system, the list of 
pre-conditions, etc. There may also exist little variance in the terminologies for model 
1, 2, and 4, as well as the name of the major health insurance schemes in China, partly 
because the authors followed the opinions of reviewers regarding the names. 
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ABSTRACT 
Objectives: China’s government has decided to increase government funding by 1-1.5% 
of the Gross Domestic Products in the health care sector. However, it is still a question 
how to turn the new funding into efficient health care. 
Methods: To help to answer this question we analyze three prototype models of orga-
nizing the health care system that may be relevant for China, namely the “Government 
provision model”, the “regulated market with non-competing third-party purchasers”, 
and the “regulated market with competing third-party purchasers”. The pre- and post-
reform English health care system and the present Dutch health care system are used as 
examples of the three models. During the last 20 years these countries had, just as China, 
major health care reforms from a national centrally planned system to a market-based 
system. Based on the experiences in these countries we analyze the advantages and 
disadvantages of these three prototype models and discuss their relevance for China. 
Results and conclusions: We conclude that the creation of prudent third-party purchas-
ers, who have the incentive and ability to act on behalf of individual consumers, is a 
critical success factor, whatever model China chooses to implement. 
KEY WORDS: China, market-based reform, purchasing care.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Chinese government has committed to increase government funding for health 
care by 1-1.5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) during the coming years [1,2]. The goal 
is to make basic health care services accessible to all. However, China is at a loss as to 
how to transform the new funding into efficient and effective health care. The Chinese 
health care system faces major challenges, and the question is how the new money 
can be best used to deal with them. For more than two decades, China has reformed 
its health system from a governmental, centrally planned and universal system to one 
that is heavily based on the market [3]. In the early 1980s China virtually dismantled the 
previous system, in which the physicians were employees of the state and the govern-
ment owned, funded and managed the health care facilities.  The effect was that most 
Chinese health care facilities were largely ‘privatized’, although they are formally still 
public [4]. In addition the Cooperative Medical Schemes were dismantled, making 900 
million rural citizens uninsured, and due to the small scale of the risk pools that are 
based on the employers the health insurance schemes in the urban areas became also 
unsustainable. These developments have been openly acknowledged by the govern-
ment to be a failure [5].
The preliminary result of the 4th National Health Service Survey of China in 2008 
showed that the three major social health insurance schemes in China, namely the New 
Cooperative Medicine for farmers covered 89.7% of the rural population, the Urban Em-
ployees’ Basic Health Insurance designed for urban employees covered 44.2% of urban 
employees, and the Urban Residents’ Schemes for urban unemployed covered 12.5% of 
urban unemployed residents. About 60% of all health expenses in China (in 2002) are 
being paid out of pocket by the patient [1]. This lack of risk pooling makes expensive 
health care unaffordable for low-income people and puts the individual patient at great 
financial risk, driving many households into poverty. In addition, due to the information 
asymmetry between the physician and the patient, and due to a lack of information on 
the quality of the providers of care, an individual patient can hardly countervail supply-
induced demand and generally is not a good purchaser of care. Over the last decades, 
perverse incentives have altered physicians’ behavior in China towards self-interest at 
the expense of patients, even where professional ethics dictated otherwise [2]. The dis-
tortion of administered prices away from costs, gives providers strong incentives to favor 
the profitable high-tech diagnostics and skimp on unprofitable basic services. Based on 
an extensive literature study Eggleston et al. [6] conclude that current health service 
delivery in China leaves room for improvement, in terms of quality, responsiveness to 
patients, efficiency, cost escalation, and equity. They also conclude that substantial 
improvements could be made by changing the way providers are paid - shifting away 
24 Chapter 1 
from fee-for-service and the distorted price schedule - and that ‘active purchasing’ by 
insurers could further improve outcomes. 
In this paper we deal with the question how to best spend the new money to tackle 
the above problems concerning efficiency and equity. In China the debate focuses on 
“subsidizing the supply side”, i.e. government facilities or “subsidizing the demand side” 
[7]. And in the latter case, should the government subsidize individual consumers at the 
point of service, or subsidize them in purchasing health insurance? And in the later case, 
should there be competing or non-competing insurers, and what additional measures 
should be taken?  For example, Wagstaff and Lindelow [8] have shown that simply 
extending insurance coverage - in terms of the share of the population covered by insur-
ance - may increase rather than decrease the financial risk associated with household 
health care spending due to a lack of any countervailing power against supply- and 
consumer-induced moral hazard.
The above questions are closely related to the fundamental question of how to orga-
nize the health care system in China. Presently, helath insurance schemes are reaching 
the target of 100% coverage by policy. In some areas in China, there are pilot experi-
ments of merging the New Cooperative Medicine and the Urban Residents’ Scheme. The 
Chinese government has been considering of universal health insurance scheme. At the 
same time, the government is also considering introducing competing mechanisms into 
social health insurance [9]. What model will suit the Chinese situations best? To help to 
answer this question we consider the following three prototype models of organizing 
the health care system that may be relevant for China (see also Refs. [10,1]): (1) the “Gov-
ernment provision model”; (2) the “regulated market with non-competing third-party 
purchasers”; and (3) the “regulated market with competing third-party purchasers”. The 
third model is also referred to as the “managed competition model” [11,12]. The latter 
two models assume competition among the providers and assume that there is a third-
party who acts as a prudent purchaser of care on behalf of the consumers. In this paper 
we consider the option of subsidizing the purchase of health insurance, rather than giv-
ing subsidies to the consumers when receiving services. The advantage of subsidizing 
health insurance is that (1) the risk pooling reduces the citizens’ financial risk, and (2) 
the consumers no longer herself is the purchaser of care, but this can be delegated to a 
professional third-party purchaser (i.e. the insurer). For reasons explained above, we do 
not consider models where the individual consumer herself purchases (subsidized) care. 
We will discuss the experiences with these three models in the following settings: (1) 
the ‘traditional National Health Services (NHS)’ in England; (2) the ‘reformed (i.e. after 
1991) NHS’ in England; and (3) the post-reform (i.e. after 2006) health care system in the 
Netherlands. The reason for choosing these countries is that in the last 20 years they 
went, just as China, through reforms from a centrally planned system towards a market-
based system [13-15]; and second, health care system in these countries are very close 
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to the three theoretical models that are relevant to the Chinese health care reform. The 
experiences of these countries may yield worthwhile lessons for China, which will be 
discussed in the last section.
2. THREE PROTOTYPE MODELS: EXPERIENCES OF ENGLAND AND THE 
NETHERLANDS 
2.1. Government provision model 
The NHS of England before the 1991-reform is characterized by health care services 
funded through general taxation, provided predominantly by government facilities, and 
free at the point of services. 
 The British government succeeded in taking care of all its residents with relatively 
low health care expenditure as a share of GDP and showed relatively strong capability in 
controlling the escalating health care expenditure compared with other OECD countries 
during the 1970s [16] . At the same time, the NHS is one of the “cheapest” way of organiz-
ing a health care system with relatively low transaction costs [18]. With a hierarchical 
network of health care facilities and centrally planned care provision, the NHS needs 
relatively simple legislation compared to the other two models.
However, the ideology of a welfare state does not guarantee an NHS without prob-
lems. As most of the countries with a government provision model, the English NHS 
has been facing financial pressures ever since its establishment [19]. Beginning from 
the early 1980s, along with technology development and aging population, the medical 
expenditure outraced the growth of economy. At the same time, the economic reces-
sion weakened the financial ability of the government and threatened the sustainability 
of the “big stomach” of NHS. Government agencies were criticized for bureaucracy in 
decision making and inefficiency in care provision [20].
Though through strict rationing measures the NHS was still sustainable, the conflict 
between unlimited demand for health care and limited resource has been so serious 
that the government encountered constant funding crises after 1970s. 
 “Queue” is a major measure that was used in rationing health care before the estab-
lishment of the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence. During the 1980s, 
the problems of long waiting lists and waiting times, especially for elective procedures, 
were notorious for the NHS. Alleged causes for these long waits are (1) under-funding; 
(2) a lack of incentives for efficiency and for responsiveness  to consumer preferences; 
and (3) perverse incentives for specialists working in public hospitals who are allowed 
to also work in private practice, to increase the demand for their private practice by 
increasing the wait for public services. Although a two tier system where patients can 
get access to care with shorter waiting time via private practices, may conflict with the 
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ideological goals of the NHS, supporters of the private sector argue that it is an effective 
pressure-valve for reducing the financial pressure in the public system. 
There are other reasons why the incentive mechanisms for the providers working 
in the NHS were problematic. Under capitation payment for General Practitioners 
(GPs) and global budget for hospitals, payments to providers were not related to their 
working-load. Health care providers faced perverse incentives with respect to efficient 
or high-quality care, because if they were efficient or provided high-quality care, they at-
tracted more patients but not more resources. Efficient providers were in fact punished 
for their efficiency. 
The government was also blamed for bureaucracy and unresponsiveness to consumer 
demand. With a centrally planned health care system, it was difficult for the “center” to 
gain information about quality as well as cost of care [21]. The “top-down” management 
also worked poorly in stimulating innovation [16]. After the early 1980s major reforms 
took place with a high frequency, which may be considered as an indication of dissatis-
faction with the ‘traditional NHS’.
2.2. Regulated market with non-competing third-party purchasers 
Based on the belief in superior efficiency in a market-based system, the British govern-
ment in 1991 implemented the internal market reform, aiming at a “regulated competi-
tion” among health care providers. The major measure was splitting the responsibility 
of purchasing care from providing care.  Universal and free access to care, as well as the 
tax-financed funding of the NHS remained unchanged.
Regional Health Care Authorities (RHAs) then became third-party purchasers of care 
on behalf of the population in their specific areas. At the same time, GPs were invited to 
become GP fund holders (GPFHs), on a voluntary basis. GPFHs had the responsibility of 
purchasing some secondary care and community care on behalf of the patients on their 
lists and received a budget for doing that. In order to motivate the GPFHs to shop around 
for their patients, GPFHs were allowed to keep the remaining fund for their own prac-
tice. An increasing number of GPs took the opportunity to improve their own practice 
through GP fundholding, with the result that, on a voluntary basis, half of the GPs were 
fundholders by 1997. Standard fundholding practices are responsible for approximately 
20% of RHAs’ budget, i.e. primarily elective procedures, laboratory tests, some drugs and 
community nursing [22]. The GPFHs proved to be more effective in purchasing services 
with better quality, lower price, and shorter waiting time than RHAs [23,24].  Because 
RHAs had the responsibility to purchase health care for patients whose GPs were not 
fundholders, this ‘two tier’ system was blamed to be inequitable. 
In the late 1990s the option of voluntarily becoming a GPFH was replaced by the 
requirement for every GP to become a member of the new established Primary Care 
Group (PCG) in her practicing area. Later Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) were formed 
Purchasing health care in China 27
through mergers of PCGs. An advantage of these large scale organizations was that GPs, 
who lacked the management skills and the capacity for figuring out the quality and 
efficiency of secondary care providers, were no longer individually responsible for doing 
this. Quality auditing and utilization review became the collective responsibility of GPs 
in the same PCG [25]. Further mergers ended in even larger organizations, the Primary 
Care Organizations (PCOs). RHAs were left mainly with the role of administration and 
with the responsibility of financing the new third-party purchasers. 
However, the dilemma is that if the purchasers are at too far a distance from the 
population, the risk of non-responsiveness and bureaucracy emerges. This is one of the 
reasons that after having abolished the GPFHs, the government decided to re-establish 
them in 2006, albeit with another name “Practice Based Commissioning” [26]. 
An essential new aspect of the internal market reform was the principle “money 
follows the patients”. This was intended to take away the previous perverse incentives 
with respect to efficiency, quality, and responsiveness to consumer preferences. Conse-
quently hospitals were no longer under fixed global budgets. They started to operate 
as independent entities. Prospective payment schemes were used by RHAs and PCGs 
(as well as PCTs and PCOs). However, because hospitals were still governmental depart-
ments and physicians were still civil servants, these prospective payment schemes were 
only “soft” financial constraints. Several researchers doubt about whether the changes 
in the providers’ behaviors are in the direction as the government had hoped [27-29]. 
Although health care services are easily contractible in terms of payment, they are 
hardly contractible in terms of quality of care. The providers can take the advantages of 
implicitly changing the quality of care in order to maximize their own utility. 
Although there are improvements in terms of shortening waiting lists and waiting 
time, problems still exist. Running a regulated market is more expensive than the tra-
ditional NHS. Due to the complex nature of health care services, transaction costs rose 
as a share of health expenditure [18]. Consumer information was far from enough for 
purchasers to make clear judgments on the quality and price of the providers [30].  
Le Grand [25] concludes that the internal-market reforms in the 1990s did not produce 
marked changes on the key criteria of performance. Their explanation was that the in-
ternal market was not really put to the test, because the incentives were too weak and 
the constraints too strong. Nevertheless the reform of separating the purchasers and 
providers changed the culture within the NHS from “command and control” to “contract”. 
Switching the contract is the most powerful weapon held in the hands of purchasers.
After the first 7 years of the internal market reform several new reforms and reorgani-
zations of the NHS took place, such as the creation of foundation trusts, a greater NHS-
use of the private sector, the publication of indicators of the providers’ performance, 
the provision of more choice (among providers) for patients, and the implementation of 
payments-by-result [31].
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Foundation trusts are hospitals that are free from central government control and 
local authority management. These trusts were supposed to compete with private 
hospitals. Contracts between hospitals and their staff were changed to give physicians 
more incentives to provide efficient and high quality care. Independent Sector Treat-
ment Centers were introduced to provide plurality of provision and enhance consumer 
choice of secondary care.
In the period 2001-2005 the performance of hospitals has been published in ‘star 
ratings’. Publishing information on performance has been shown to be powerful, if 
designated to affect the reputation of organizations through ranking systems [31]. 
Evaluation of the recent reforms provides a mixed picture so far [32]. On one hand, 
significant progress has been made in terms of shorter waiting times and increased 
quality of care. On the other hand, the Audit Commission [32] found little hard evidence 
of benefits from the recent reforms and innovations.
In sum, though the languages of health care reform in the NHS has changed from 
“competition” to “cooperation” [33], and back again to “competition” [31], a core element 
of the market mechanism has been maintained, which is the separation of purchasers 
and providers, with the aim of creating powerful third-party purchasers of care who act 
in the interest of the consumer.
2.3. Regulated market with competing third-party purchasers 
The history of the Dutch health care system can be characterized by three major waves 
of health care reforms [14]. The first wave of the health care reform lasts from 1940 to 
1970s. The primary focus of the Dutch government then was to promote public health, 
to guarantee a minimum level of quality, and to ensure universal access to basic health 
services. 
The second wave of the health care reform is marked by cost containment by the 
government from 1970s to 2000. Supply and price regulations were extensively used. 
Demand-side constraints then played a restricted role in containing costs as compared 
to supply-side constraints. 
Although the cost containment reforms proved to be effective in containing costs, 
they might have been “too successful”, as the rationing policies were increasingly 
subjected to growing criticism. The system was also highly criticized because of a lack 
of incentives for efficiency and innovation. From the early 1990s, the third wave of the 
reforms aimed at enhancing efficiency and consumer responsiveness in the health 
care system through regulated competition, not only among providers of care but also 
among health insurers. 
After decades of central price- and capacity-control by government, the Dutch health 
care system is now in transition from supply-side regulation towards a ‘regulated market 
with competing third-party purchasers’. In an international context the Netherlands’ 
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health system reform is unique: it is the first country in the world that is consistently 
implementing Enthoven’s model of national health insurance based on managed com-
petition in the private sector [34]. During the past 20 years, successive governments 
have consistently worked on the realization of the preconditions for regulated (or man-
aged) competition.
Since 1 January 2006 the Health Insurance Act has obliged each person who legally 
lives or works in the Netherlands to buy individual private health insurance with a legally 
described benefits package from a private insurance company. In order to assure equity 
in finance in the health care system, all Dutch residents have to pay an income-related 
contribution to the tax-collector, who transfers these contributions to a Risk Equaliza-
tion Fund (REF).  In addition all adults have to pay a premium directly to the chosen 
insurer. Each insurer sets its own community-rated premium. Consumers are fully price 
sensitive at the margin. 
Individual consumers are encouraged to shop around among health insurers. For 
each type of insurance contract an insurer is obliged to accept each applicant at any 
time (“guaranteed issue”) for the same premium (“community rating per product”) per 
province. The contract period is maximum one year. Consumers have at least one option 
per year (on 1 January) to switch to another insurer or basic insurance contract. 
Since 2006 price competition on the insurance market strongly increased [14]. The 
introduction of the new health insurance scheme prompted many people to reconsider 
their choice of insurer, resulting in an all-time high switching rate of 18% of the total 
population.
Given the requirement of community rating, which provides the insurers with incen-
tives for risk selection, the risk equalization system is the major tool to reduce these 
incentives for selection. For high-risk insured the insurers receive a high risk-adjusted 
equalization payment from the REF. For low-risk insured they have to pay an equaliza-
tion payment to the REF. According to the Health Insurance Act the sum of the income-
related contributions equals 50% of the total insurers’ revenues for the mandatory 
basic insurance. Until 2002 the risk equalization payments were primarily based on age, 
gender, and indicators of disability and socio-economic status. Since 2002 the following 
risk factors have been added: Pharmacy-based Cost Group (PCGs) in 2002 and Diag-
nostic Cost Groups (DCGs) and being self-employed (yes/no) in 2004 [35]. Even with 
this sophisticated risk equalization scheme, insurers have incentives and tools for risk 
selection [14]. 
Competing insurers are expected to become prudent third-party purchasers of care 
on behalf of their insured. Since 2006, insurers are allowed to selective contract with 
all care providers, including hospitals. Although the supply-side is still quite regulated 
by the government, insurers and health care providers get gradually more and more 
freedom to negotiate about prices, service and quality of care. Since 2005 prices for 
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physiotherapy are no longer regulated. Insurers and hospitals are allowed to freely 
negotiate prices and selectively contract for a range of products (Diagnostic-Treatment-
Combinations) accounting for about one third (in 2009) of hospital revenues. 
Insurers are allowed to integrate with health care providers and to provide care in 
their own facilities using their own staff (e.g. primary care centers, pharmacies). Recently 
insurers have started to set up primary health care centers and pharmacies. Insurers may 
provide their gate-keeping GPs with incentives to stimulate integrated and coordinated 
care, resulting in integrated care organizations that give a prime role to primary care. 
Currently most legal obstacles to that type of integrated care organization have been 
abolished, partly by the Health Insurance Act. Some large insurers are experimenting 
with some form of bonuses for, and risk sharing with, general practitioners.
Consumer information about price and quality of both insurers and care providers 
is one of the key conditions to enable the individual consumers to shop around. A few 
years ago the Dutch government took the initiative to set up a website where consumers 
can get information about insurers and providers of care (www.kiesbeter.nl). Consumers 
who visit this website can compare all insurers with respect to price, services, consumer 
satisfaction and supplementary insurance (premiums and benefits). In addition they 
can compare hospitals on different sets of performance indicators, which have been 
developed by the Health Care Inspectorate since 2004. The provision of adequate con-
sumer information is also one of the main priorities of the newly established Netherlands 
Health Care Authority.
In sum, the core of the health care reforms that is taking place in the Netherlands is to 
transfer the responsibility for purchasing care from the government to competing insur-
ers. Consequently the previous major tool for ‘purchasing care’, i.e. central legislation, is 
being replaced by private contracts between insurers and providers of care.
3. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
The Chinese government has decided to substantially increase the funding for health 
care. However, the new funding will not automatically result in efficient and equitable 
health care. For the last decades the health care sector in China has been dominated 
by the providers who are motivated under perverse incentives. Major health insurers in 
both urban and rural areas have little incentives and few tools to act as prudent purchas-
ers on behalf of the insured. At the same time, the large share of out-of-pocket payments 
indicates that the role of purchasers is predominantly taken by the individual patients. 
If this situation remains, it will be most likely that the new funding will be captured 
by the providers into inefficient care and higher income of physicians. A reform of the 
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current health care system is necessary to let the new money contribute to an efficient 
and equitable health system. 
3.1. Prospects of the three prototype models in China
In this paper we discussed the experiences with three prototype models of organiz-
ing health care systems that may be relevant for China. We primarily concentrated on 
improving the efficiency of the health care system, and not so much on the equity is-
sues. This is not because we consider equity unimportant, but because we think that 
the efficiency and equity issues can to a large extent be separated. Some people may 
have the view that the “Government provision model” offers the best perspective for 
equity. However, this is not true. As the experience in England indicates, the transition 
from the “Government provision models” to the “regulated market with non-competing 
third-party providers” can be made without any change in the tax-financed funding of 
the system. And the same holds for a further transition towards competing third-party 
purchasers. We can therefore conclude that the model that provides the highest level of 
efficiency is the preferred one and has the best potential to fulfill society’s preferences 
concerning equity. The relative advantages and disadvantages of these models are sum-
marized in Table 1. 
The first model is the “Government provision model”. As an example we discussed 
the traditional NHS in England (1948-1991), which in fact has many similarities with the 
Chinese health care system in the period 1949-1982. Strong aspects of this model are 
its ability to contain costs, the relatively simple regulation and the low administrative 
costs. Weak aspects, however, are the potential of under-funding, and the lack of incen-
tives for efficiency, for quality, for innovation and for consumer responsiveness, which 
may result in long waiting lists. It is hard to predict whether this “Government provision 
model” will be a likely candidate for future China. Given the general developments in the 
Chinese economy and society which have a market-based orientation, a more market-
based health care system with competing providers might seem more likely than the 
traditional “Government provision model”. 
Because of the information asymmetry between the patients and the providers of 
care, it is highly recommended that in a market-based health care system there will be 
powerful and motivated third-party purchasers, who act in the interest of the individual 
consumer. We consider a ‘regulated’ and not a ‘free’ market, because in a free, unregu-
lated market many goals of society with respect to efficiency and equity cannot be 
fulfilled (see e.g. Enthoven [12]. Given the establishment of new (urban and rural) health 
insurance schemes in the last decade [36], insurers seem a natural candidate to fulfill the 
role of third-party purchaser in a regulated market with competing providers in China. 
The crucial question then is whether or not there should be competition among these 
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third-party purchasers. Some of the arguments discussed here are derived from van de 
Ven et al. [37].
We restrict ourselves here to discuss only one variant of the on-competing purchaser 
model, i.e. the single, monopsonistic purchaser. That is, we do not consider here the 
model of multiple, non-competing purchasers. An argument in favor of a single third-
party purchaser can exert maximum buyer power to obtain the best medical care at the 
lowest price, especially when the provider market is highly competitive. However, the 
assumption of this argument is that the monoposonistic third-party purchaser is moti-




Strong ability to contain costs;
Low administrative costs;
Relatively simple legislation.
Fiscal pressure faced by the government, 
which may result in underfunding and two-
tier-system;
Lack of incentives for
 Efficient care provision;
 High quality care;
 Responsiveness to consumer preferences;
 Innovation;
 Accountability.
Long waiting lists and waiting time;
Bureaucracy;
If physicians are allowed to have a private 
practice: perverse incentives for them to 
reduce quality and increase waiting list in the 
public system;





Because ‘money follows the patient’: 
incentive for providers for
 Efficient care provision;
 High quality care;




Relatively high transaction costs of 
contracting;
No consumer choice among purchasers;
Relatively low incentive for purchasers for 
 Stimulating efficient care provision;
 Purchasing high quality care;
 Responsiveness to consumer preferences;
 Innovation;
 Accountability;
Relatively complex regulation / stewardship 








because of ‘voting by feet’ incentives 
for purchasers and providers for:
 Efficient care provision;
 High quality care;




Relatively high transaction costs of 
contracting;
Relatively complex regulation / stewardship 
(risk equalization, competition policy, quality, 
consumer information);
Potential for “risk rating” and/or “risk selection”, 
dependent on the regulation.
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vated to exert his purchasing power. Another argument in favor of a single purchaser is 
that the transaction costs are likely to be lower than in case of competing purchasers, 
since providers have to conclude a contract with a single purchaser only. Finally, a single 
purchaser may be preferred because it may facilitate the coherence and coordination of 
local health care delivery which is considered to be important from a public health per-
spective. The Achilles’ heel of the nonopsonistic model, however, is the lack of incentives 
for the third-party purchaser to act as an agent on behalf of the consumers [13]. Health 
insurers in China are motivated by political pressures, and not by financial incentives. 
Therefore, whether they are well motivated to use their purchasing power is unclear. 
For example, in 2005 the basic health insurance schemes in China collected 140.5 bil-
lion RMB. During the same period, 107.5 billion RMB was spent. At the end of 2005, the 
accumulated deposit of basic health insurance schemes was 127.8 billion RMB. Tian et 
al. [38] consider the high percentage of deposited fund as an indicator of inefficiency 
and one reason for high individual payment. A system of regulatory incentives and 
monitoring should be developed to guarantee that the single third-party purchaser will 
act in the citizens’ interest. At present, the prospects for the feasibility of such a system 
in China are uncertain. This problem is one of the reasons that the Chinese government 
is considering introducing competition in social health insurance. 
 A strong argument in favor of competing third-party purchasers is that competition 
can provide the purchasers with an incentive to act as an effective agent on behalf of 
their (potential) consumers. However, this model has to be complemented with com-
plicated regulation, e.g. to compensate high-risk citizens for risk-rated premiums and/
or (in case of premium regulation) to prevent risk selection. We recommend that a risk 
equalization system, i.e. a system of risk-adjusted premium subsidies, is part of such a 
regulatory framework. Although in the last decade severe progress has been made with 
the development of risk equalization systems, it might be a huge effort for China to 
develop such a system at short notice (let alone to collect the necessary data to do the 
calculations).
3.2. Transition and implementation
The current Chinese health care system is close to a “regulated market with non-compet-
ing third-party purchasers”. There are three non-competing third-party purchasers in the 
market, each with its own administration bureaus, targeting population, premium col-
lection channel, and benefit package. That leads to fragmentation in health care finance 
and raised problems of inequity and managerial problem. The transition to a “regulated 
market with non-competing third-party purchasers” can be made via merging the three 
major health insurance schemes. However, given the history that the Ministry of Health 
takes charge of the New Cooperative Medicine, and the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Security takes charge of the Urban Employees’ Basic Health Insurance and the Urban 
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Residents’ Scheme, merging of the schemes might be a politically difficult procedure. A 
transition from non-competing third-party purchasers towards competing third-party 
purchasers can be done in several ways. For example, the single insurer in a certain 
urban area may be split into several local branches. Over time, when the insurer has 
acquired all the specialized skills (and data!) that are necessary for becoming a reliable 
insurer and a prudent purchaser of care, the local branches might gradually become 
independent and the consumers could be given a choice among them. Other options 
are to allow insurers to work province/nation-wide, rather than only in one region (as the 
Dutch government did in the early 1990s with the previously non-competitive sickness 
fund insurance market) and/or to allow new insurers, including private insurers, to enter 
the previously monopolistic market (as the Irish government did in 1994 with the previ-
ously monopolistic market for voluntary health insurance). If the Chinese government 
chooses this way, one important issue is to create a fair environment of competition for 
new enterers. Another option is to give community health centers financial responsibil-
ity for (some of ) the follow-up care of their patients, and to give citizens a choice among 
these “fundholding community health centers”. This option would require that citizens 
should register with one community health center, and that this center fulfills the gate-
keeper function for their enrollees. In case of efficiency gains the enrollees could have 
broader benefits or lower copayments (just like the Medicare enrollees in the United 
States who choose an HMO). 
For a regulated market with competing providers of care it is essential that the 
third-party purchasers, whether or not they are competing, have sufficient tools to be 
a prudent purchaser of care on behalf of their members. For example, they should be 
allowed to selectively contract with only good and efficient providers, and they should 
have sufficient room for negotiating the relevant aspects of the contracts, such as the 
fee-structure, the price of care, volume, quality of care, and consumer responsiveness. 
That is, they should have the authority to change the physicians’ current perverse finan-
cial incentives. Currently this essential precondition is not fulfilled in China.
From the experiences in England and the Netherlands we conclude that the public 
availability of reliable consumer information about the quality of the health care pro-
viders and the third-party purchasers is another pre-condition to reap the fruits of a 
regulated market with competing providers. It does not make sense to give the citizens 
a choice among providers and third-party purchasers, if the consumers cannot compare 
their performance based on reliable, objective information. Currently, health insurers in 
several cities are sending “insurer staffs” including giving out information about services 
of the insurers, and at the same time, gaining reliable information about quality of the 
health care providers. Although spreading consumer information through this channel 
is not enough, consumer information is gradually now being created by the insurers.
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Another important lesson from the Netherlands is also that competition policy is very 
relevant. Competition is not for free. Government has to prevent cartels and the abuse 
of dominant positions by providers. Currently in China the level of competition on the 
health care market is low, even when competition is allowed or even encouraged by 
the government. Partly this due to a lack of consumer information [39]. At the same 
time, China’s Anti-monopoly Law, enforced on August 1st 2008, does not apply to sectors 
that provide public goods [40]. Although there are still debates on whether the anti-
monopoly law can be applied to public hospitals, it is clear from the evidence in the 
Netherlands that an anti-monopoly and anti-cartel law is an essential precondition for 
achieving competition among providers of health care.
Finally, whatever model China will choose, given the current deficiencies in the health 
care system a major challenge for China is to set up powerful agencies that have the 
incentive and ability to be cost-conscious third-party purchasers of care on behalf of 
the individual consumers. The chosen model may be different for different provinces/
regions, e.g. for urban and rural areas. In rural areas with a low population density, there 
might not be much room for competition in the health care market, just as there is no 
competition in other branches, such as garages, supermarkets and theaters. China is 
large enough to set up several experiments and to learn from the evaluation of these 
experiments.
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SUMMARY
As China explores new directions to reform its health care system, regulated competi-
tion among both insurers and providers of care might be one potential model. The Rus-
sian Federation in 1993 implemented legislation intended to stimulate such regulated 
competition in the health care sector. The subsequent progress and lessons learned 
over these 17 years can shed light on and inform the future evolution of the Chinese 
system. In this paper, we list out the necessary pre-conditions for reaping the benefits of 
regulated competition in the health sector. We indicate to which extent these conditions 
are being fulfilled in the post-reform Russian and current Chinese health care system, 
which shares a similar economic and political background with the pre-reform Russian 
health care system in terms of the starting point of the reform and analyse the prospects 
for regulated competition in China. 
KEY WORDS: regulated competition; health care reform; Russia; China
KEY MESSAGES
• Although it has been 17 years since Russia implemented legislation to stimu-
late regulated competition in the health care sector, competition is lacking 
among both insurers and providers, which is not surprising since most, if not 
all, of the necessary pre-conditions for regulated competition are not fulfilled 
in Russia.
• The experience of Russia in implementing regulated competition is a signal 
to Chinese policy makers that the necessary pre-conditions, such as con-
sumer choice, contracting freedom and appropriate government regulations 
(to name but three), must be fulfilled for such reform, and implementation 
strategies must be carefully considered.
INTRODUCTION
The past two decades have witnessed the transition of the health care system in China, 
from a centralized, government-funded system to a fragmented, underfunded and 
market dominated one (Ma et al., 2008). In the early 1980s China virtually dismantled 
the previous system, in which public provider institutions were fully funded by the 
government and employed salaried medical staff. Though public hospitals and clinics 
have remained owned and managed by the government, thus still state-owned legally, 
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the subsequent chronic underfunding has led to widespread “profit-seeking” behavious 
within these institutions to both cover the funding gap and enhance the service delivery 
capacity (Blumenthal and Hsiao, 2005). Meanwhile, over 900 million rural residents lost 
their insurance coverage with the collapse of the Cooperative Medical Schemes. More-
over, the urban employment-based social medical insurance faced increasing financial 
constraints, due to fragmented risk-pooling and inadequate managerial capacity. The 
reform has been openly acknowledged by the government to have failed to transform 
the health care system and to meet the public expectations (Ge, 2005). Presently, the 
“inconvenience” of health care services and the “rising costs” of the health care are two 
major sources of complaints in China. 
The Chinese government has committed to increase government funding for health 
care by 1-1.5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) during the coming years (Yip and 
Hsiao, 2008, Hsiao, 2007). The goal is to make basic health care services accessible to all. 
However, China is struggling with feasible policy parameters to make rational use of the 
funding injection, both in coverage expansion and in capacity building, to deliver health 
care effectively and efficiently.
Despite the multiple daunting challenges, the health policy debate has focused on 
how to channel the new “health stimulus” package into the existing health care system. 
In China the debate focuses on “subsidizing the supply side”, i.e. government facilities, 
or “subsidizing the demand side” (Cheng, 2008). And in the latter case, should there 
be only one government insurer or competing insurers, both public and private, and 
what should be the roadmap for implementation? Presently, the Chinese government is 
implementing different health insurance schemes for subgroups of the population with 
the aim of covering at least 90% of population by the end of 2011. A consolidated, even 
national, universal health insurance scheme is the long-term goal. Meanwhile, on top of 
all these debates, the central government is considering the introduction of competing 
mechanisms into the administration and operation of social health insurance (State 
Council of China, 2009). The design of this pro-competition social medical insurance is 
unprecedented in China, with a scope unmatched in other parts of the world.
Experiences and lessons can be learned from an international perspective. Accord-
ing to the theory of path dependence1, health care reforms in the Russian Federation 
are of particular interest because of the historical similarities between the pre-reform 
Russian and Chinese health care system. In fact, China copied almost all aspects of the 
society from the Soviet Union when constructing the People’s Republic of China in 1949. 
And both countries experienced the transition from a centrally planned economy to 
a market-oriented one during the 1980s and 1990s, though with different speed and 
strategies. During the period from 1950s and the 1980s, the health care system in the 
two countries had very similar structures and organization mechanisms, which, in 
both countries, had to some extent resulted in inappropriate allocation of health care 
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resources, bureaucracy and perverse incentives in the organization of health insurance 
and the health provision sector. 
Despite almost parallel health care systems in the past, Russia underwent and abrupt 
change in legislation from a centrally planned, government provision health care system 
to “regulated competition” and universal mandatory health insurance in 1993 (Sheiman, 
1994). 
We define regulated competition as “competition among the insurers as well as the 
health care providers, regulated by the government to achieve the government’s goal”. 
Regulated competition requires certain pre-conditions to be fulfilled to yield efficiency 
and equity in health care. In the absence of effective regulations, market failures such as 
risk selection, inefficient consumer choice and cartels would be inevitable. Competition 
might not be a natural outcome of the health care “market” only by having multiple 
providers and multiple insurers in the same setting. Equity may not be achieved by man-
datory health insurance if the government is not capable of enforcing the collection of 
premiums. If the Chinese government aims to further adopt market mechanisms in the 
health care system and universal health insurance in pursuing efficiency and equity, it 
needs to be cautious about the possible side effects, the consequences, and the difficul-
ties. The Russian health care reform provides us with rich lessons about implementing 
the regulated competition model. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a theoretical framework 
and a list of the necessary pre-conditions for a successful implementation of regulated 
competition. We then give a short description of the pre- and post- reform Russian 
health care system. What are the reasons and goals of regulated competition reform in 
the Russian health care system? To what extent is regulated competition functioning 
now and to what extent are the pre-conditions for regulated competition fulfilled after 
17 years? Briefly we describe the Chinese health care system and check the extent to 
which the theoretical pre-conditions for regulated competition are fulfilled in China. In 
the discussion section, we examine what lessons China can learn from the Russian expe-
rience of its health care reform in the last two decades. We also analyze the prospects of 
regulated competition in Chinese health care system if the Chinese government decides 
to adopt it in the health care sector. 
NECESSARY PRE-CONDITIONS FOR REGULATED COMPETITION 
Regulated competition in the health care sector is a model that allows competition 
among both the health insurers and the health care providers. Individual consumers pe-
riodically make a choice among the insurers. The insurers purchase health care services 
on behalf of their insured and interact with the health care providers. In an unregulated 
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competitive market, the insurers and the providers might use strategies to pursue profits 
or survival, which may not be in the interest of the consumers. These strategies include 
risk rated premiums, risk selection, market segmentation, product differentiation that 
raises information costs, discontinuity in coverage, refusal to insure certain individuals 
or coverage with exclusions for pre-existing conditions, biased information regarding 
coverage and quality, and erection of entry barriers. These strategies will be difficult 
for the individual consumers to counteract and may harm efficiency and equity in the 
health care sector. The essence of regulated competition, that makes it different from an 
unregulated competitive market, is the need for a powerful, willing, and active collective 
“sponsor” on behalf of the demand side. The sponsor should regulate the competition 
in the health care sector in order to counteract market failure and achieve efficiency as 
well as a desired level of equity (Enthoven, 1988). In Russia and China, the function of the 
sponsor is taken by the government.
Theoretically speaking, a successful implementation of regulated competition in the 
health care system requires the fulfilment of a list of necessary pre-conditions:
1) Consumer choice. Individual consumers need to have the right to periodically make a 
free choice among the insurers. 
2) Open entrance/exit of the health insurance/provision market. In principle there should 
be open entrance to the health insurance market and health provision market. 
“Open entrance” implies that inefficient insurers and providers must feel the poten-
tial threat of new and more efficient insurers and providers entering the market. In 
addition, there should be “open exit” for inefficient insurers and providers of care2. 
For example, it would be unfair competition if government would give financial sup-
port to an inefficient hospital that otherwise would go bankrupt. This pre-condition 
of “open exit” may be hard to fulfil in the case of state owned insurer or health care 
facilities, for which the government has a subsidiary responsibility.
3) Price-sensitive consumers. Consumers need motivations to act as prudent purchasers 
of health insurance and search for insurance products that suit them best with the 
lowest price. 
4) Contracting freedom. Regulated competition does not work if the prudent third-party 
purchasers, i.e. the insurers, do not have sufficient freedom in contracting with the 
health care providers. An insurer should be allowed to selectively contract with the 
providers, thus building its own provider network, and negotiate about content of 
the contract (e.g. price and quality). 
5) Enough health care providers. If health care providers are scarce, they enjoy a natural 
dominant position, which prevents effective competition. In that case, the insurers 
have little choice but purchasing health care services from all the providers in order 
to attract consumers and avoid unacceptable long waiting time.
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6) Competition regulations. Effective competition law and policy needs to be applied to 
the health insurers and providers. Cartels among the insurers and among the provid-
ers must be prohibited. Insurers and providers who hold a dominant position must 
be prohibited from abusing their dominant position. Competition-reducing mergers 
must be forbidden.
7) Standardised benefit package. Health insurance packages are complex products. 
It is hard for the consumers to understand the details of an insurance contract. If 
different insurers offer different insurance packages, it is hard for the consumers to 
compare them. To increase transparency and thereby increase competition on the 
health insurance market, it is necessary that the health insurance benefits are more 
or less standardised and can be easily compared and understood by the consumers.
8) Effective product classification on the health provision market. Health care services are 
rarely purchased on a single item basis. A simple health care intervention may be 
composed of a long list of health care procedures. To enable the insurers and the 
consumers to compare the price of the health care interventions, a clear and well-
developed system of product classification is needed.
9) Risk equalization schemes. In a free competitive health insurance market, the insurers 
risk-rate their customers. This will make health insurance unaffordable for high-risk 
groups and will harm the principle of equity. If risk rating is prohibited, the insurers 
may use risk-selection as a tool to avoid the predictable high risks. A risk equalization 
scheme is designed to adjust the predictable profit/loss that the insurers can make 
because of their enrolees of different risks. Such a scheme (or other subsidy schemes) 
is necessary to compensate the insurers for their high-risk enrolees. This reduces the 
insurers’ incentives for risk-rating and, in the case of premium regulations such as 
community rating, for risk-selection (Van de Ven and Ellis, 2000, van de Ven et al., 
2003). 
10) Effective quality measurement. Ideally as prudent third-party purchasers, the health 
insurers need to be able to purchase health care products of acceptable quality and 
competitive price on behalf of their customers. They also need to be able to regu-
larly overview the quality of the health care services they purchase in order to make 
future purchasing plans. Therefore effective quality indicators of the providers need 
to be publicly available to the insurers.
11) Consumer information. Sufficient and effective consumer information needs to be 
available for the consumers. Consumers need to be aware of their entitlements and 
the freedom to choose. Effective consumer information in terms of price, products, 
and customer service of different insurers need to be generated by independent 
entities and be disseminated among individual consumers. Information about the 
quality of different health care providers is also essential for individual patients and 
insurers to make prudent choice. 
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12) Appropriate government regulation. The government needs to carefully balance 
between government regulation and market-force. Government intervention such 
as detailed planning of health care resource together with regulating the payment of 
the providers limits the power of competition in achieving efficiency. On the contrary, 
a health care market without a suitable level of government intervention can have 
problems of market failure and inequity. It is the responsibility of the government 
to set the rules of the game. For example, the government needs to set a clearly 
defined basic health insurance package to guarantee a certain level of entitlement 
of health care. Organising mandatory cross-subsidization is also the responsibility of 
the government to ensure a certain level of equity.
THE REGULATED COMPETITION REFORM IN RUSSIA
The Russian health care system before 1993
From the1920s, the Russian health care system was funded mostly through general 
taxation in a centrally planned system. Governments of different levels owned, funded 
and directly managed medical facilities. Federal level Ministry of Health set the funding 
for health care and then gave explicit budgets to sub-national governments. Budgets 
allocated to polyclinics (major providers of outpatient care) and hospitals were based 
on their capacity, i.e. the number of doctors and hospital beds, and were not related to 
their performance. Physicians were government employees and received fixed salaries 
according to their years of working experience and specialty. Private practitioners prac-
tically did not exist. Medical care services were free at the point of service, or at least 
in theory they should be. Each citizen was appointed to a polyclinic according to their 
place of residence as the first point of contact with the health care system. If necessary, 
doctors at polyclinics referred the patient to a higher-level facility. Consumer choice of 
providers was rare (Schepin and Sheiman, 1992).
Though the previous Russian health care system made great achievements in improv-
ing the health status of the Russian people, the system had noticeable problems with 
poor quality and inefficiency. Government set quantitative targets to hospitals and 
allocated the budget accordingly. Therefore, hospitals had strong incentives to increase 
hospital beds and fill the beds as much as possible in order to reach (or even exceed) the 
government target and asked for more government budget in the following year. Rate 
of admission therefore was around 25 per 100 residents (Sheiman, 1995). In comparison, 
average discharge from the hospitals in EU countries was only 7.46 per 1000 population 
(European Community, 2002). The high admission rate, in combination with extended 
length of stay, resulted in over-utilization of inpatient care: in the 1980s the number of 
hospital days per person in Russia was 2-3 times higher than in the West (Twigg, 1998). 
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Primary care physicians who worked for polyclinics lacked the incentives to treat the 
patients by themselves; they frequently referred the patients to specialists and hospitals. 
Referral rate was around 30%; much higher than that in UK and France (Sheiman, 1995). 
Waiting time was also a serious problem. Patients often had to pay under-the-table to 
doctors in order to move rapidly to the front of a queue or acquire services of better 
quality (Telyukov, 1991). 
The government tried to solve the “scarcity” of hospital care simply by increasing 
hospital beds and employing more physicians. The number of hospital beds in Russia 
was on average 11.34 per 1000 population in 1997, much higher than the EU number of 
6.95 in the same period (Twigg, 1998, European Community, 2002). 
To cope with inherent structural ineqalities, in 1988 the Russian government initiated 
a pilot project: polyclinics were made fundholders. Medical funds were transferred to 
fundholders who had to pay for referrals out of their own funds. Implemented first in 3 
regions and then in around 10 regions of Russia, fundholding schemes decreased the 
utilization of inpatient care and contributed much to enhancing structural efficiency. 
However, this project was stopped in 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
substantial economic problems which have aggravated a traditional “residual approach” 
to health sector funding. The increasing problems with funding have intensified a search 
for a new health finance model. 
The Russian health care reform
In 1994, the Health Insurance Law introduced mandatory health insurance (MHI) in the 
Russian Federation, with the aim of changing the health care system from a govern-
ment provision model to a model of regulated competition among the insurers and the 
providers of care. MHI was set out to provide comprehensive coverage for all citizens 
and later updated to entitlements of specific population groups (Fotaki, 2006). 
Purchasing of care and provision was separated through setting up health insurers, 
which were expected to become prudent purchasers of health care with the motivation 
and actual leverage to influence providers’ performance, replace input-based alloca-
tion of resource by contracting and performance-based payment, and introduce more 
choice through competitive bidding. Competition among both the insurers and the 
providers deemed to be the major instrument of enhancing quality and efficiency. It 
was also expected that the benefit package would be more specific through setting an 
explicit border between free and non-free care.  
Collection of funds in the new finance system is based on contributions of employers 
and the government. Contributions of employees and individual citizens have been re-
jected – mostly for political reasons. All citizens are allowed to select an insurer without 
contribution. In this case price-sensitivity does not exist.
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The contribution rate for employers is low by standards of countries with the “classic” 
MHI model. At the start of the reform, it was 3.6 % of payroll, and changed many times 
in the following years, with a general downward trend. Currently it amounts to 3.1% of 
payroll, though it is planned to increase it to 5.1% in 2011. 
Regional governments make contributions for non-working population (pensioner, 
unemployed, etc), but the law does not specify the specific rate of contribution. Al-
though the federal government sets targets of contributions per capita, most of the 
regional governments do not follow them – some of them cannot (due to the low finan-
cial capacity), some do not want to (due to the low priority of the health sector). This has 
led to a great under-funding of MHI. The reform has been implemented in the situation 
of serious financial constraint: public health expenditure was limited to 2.8-3% of GDP. 
Only over the last three years this share has increased to 3.5% (mostly due to growing 
funding from the federal budget).
The system is operated by the Federal MHI Fund and 833 Regional MHI Funds. The 
former is responsible for equalization of regional funding; the latter for pooling con-
tributions and then allocating them to competing insurance companies using a risk-
adjusted capitation rate. In many regions, the Regional MHI Funds must work closely 
with the Regional Health Authorities (RHAs), though they are not directly accountable 
to the RHAs. A general and increasing tendency is for the centralization of employers’ 
contributions in the Federal Fund, rising from 6% in 1994 to 35% in 2008. This reflects a 
growing concern about a substantial regional disparity in funding. 
Each region builds its own system of MHI organization, with various roles of health 
insurers. Although most of the regulations on the MHI are federal ones, the regional 
implementation of the federal law was driven more by the RHAs than by the Funds them-
selves. Three regional models are presented in Table 1. The model originally planned, 
with competing insurance companies is not universal: in 1998 it was implemented only 
in 45% of Russian regions, though since that - mostly due to the pressure of the federal 
government - its coverage has increased to 77% regions. At the start of the reform many 
regional governments opposed to insurance companies and made Regional MHI Fund 
(and its local branches) the insurer - in 26% of regions in 1998, but then this share has de-
Table 1 Percentage of Russian regions with a specific MHI model*
Organizations acting as insurers in regional MHI systems 1998 (%) 2005 (%) 2006 (%)
Regional MHI Fund and its local branches 26 10 5
Branches of Regional MHI Fund  and medical insurance companies 23 36 18
Only medical insurance companies 45 53 77
*The data for specific years refers to 83-88 regions
Sources: Shishkin (2000) Database “Implementation of Health Care Reform in Constituent Territories of the 
Russian Federation”, at: http://www.healthreform.ru and http://zdrav.socpol.ru 
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creased substantially. As a sort of compromise some regions have chosen a mixed model 
with both the Fund and insurance companies in the role of insurers (18% of regions in 
2006). The major argument for the non-competitive market structure in some regions is 
the high administration cost by too many intermediaries in MHI. 
Even though the legislation allows and even encourages competition among the 
health insurers and providers, competition has not come naturally to the Russian health 
care system. One of the most important reasons of this failure is that the necessary pre-
conditions for regulated competition were not designed well at the start of the reform 
and have not been fulfilled during the reform process (see Table 2). 
Individual-level consumer choice among the health insurers is very limited. The 
employers choose the insurers on behalf of their employees. Starting in 2007, regional 
governments select insurers for MHI on behalf of non-working population on a competi-
tive basis but with no role of individual level consumer choice. Sometimes competition 
among the insurers takes the form of competing on kickbacks to the managers and 
officials who have the power of making choice (Tompson, 2007). 
Even in regions with high penetration of insurance companies, these companies do 
not bear substantial financial risks. According to the Health Insurance Act 1993, they are 
financially responsible for covering medical costs only “within the limit of the allocation 
from the Regional MHI Fund”. An insurer can apply for subsidies from the Regional Fund 
if it spends more. If all insurers spend more than expected, the capitation rate that the 
Table 2 Necessary pre-conditions for regulated competition and a checklist of Russia and China 2008
Necessary pre-conditions for 
regulated competition 
Russia China
Consumer choice Rarely Rarely 
open entrance/exit No No
Price-sensitive consumers No No
Contracting freedom Rarely No selective contracting;
Contents of the contract under 
negotiation between the HIBs and 
the providers.
Enough health care providers Not enough high quality providers No
Competition regulations No May not applicable 
Standardised benefit package No No
Effective product classification Not enough Not enough
Risk equalization schemes Not enough No
Effective quality measurement No No
Consumer information Not enough Not enough
Appropriate government 
regulation
mixed, not appropriate Not appropriate 
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insurers pay the providers of care is adjusted downwards (or tariffs for services become 
lower). 
A large share of the providers’ income relies on direct funding from regional and local 
government budgets, which cover fixed costs of health facilities (utilities, equipment 
costs). Insurers control less than 40% of public health expenditure. This fragmented 
structure of finance distorts incentives of the providers. They face contradictory signals 
sent by the government (input-based funding) and insurers (output-based). Providers 
tend to incline to the targets set by the government in order to obtain a more substan-
tial budget (Tompson, 2007). The lack of funds also harms the ability of the insurers to 
improve quality of care and efficiency, even if they are motivated to do so. 
The Russian government is presently making efforts in directing budgetary alloca-
tions to Regional funds to create a one channel financial system – mostly through MHI. 
This movement may resolve the problem of contradicting incentives, but it will greatly 
increase the authority of the Regional MHI Funds at the expense of RHAs, and will in-
crease the power of the federal government in regional health care at the expense of 
regional authorities. 
The barrier faced by private providers in entering the health care market is high 
because of the difficulties in getting license, and the premature capital market. Exit of 
the poor-performing public hospitals is also rare largely because of the protection by 
local governments (Sheaf, 2005). The MHI system is basically a cartel one. Tariffs are col-
lectively negotiated by regional insurers association, providers association, and health 
authorities. The providers do not have freedom to set the price of health care services. 
Neither is there any freedom of benefit package variation in the MHI system. Voluntary 
health insurance is an isolated market, limited in scope.
Insurers have limited freedom to negotiate the volumes and quality of care with 
providers. A standard contract is used which does not contain volumes of care and 
specific requirements on quality of care. Insurers are supposed to control quality of 
care and protect the rights of the insured. These are their major functions (in addition 
to paying the providers). The insurers (mostly big ones) have made some progress in 
this area which justifies their existence in the MHI system. However, their capacity to 
influence service utilization and quality remains limited due to the lack of negotiating 
mechanisms and the focus on assuring a basic level of quality of health care provision, 
but not on enhancing the level of quality of the contracted providers. Most negotiating 
work is done by the RHAs, who actually act as the major purchasers of care with the 
insurers playing a secondary role.
Selective contracting is limited because many providers, particularly hospitals, are 
highly regionalised and often have a natural monopoly position. The usual contracting 
pattern for the insurers is to contract with all the providers in a given region. 
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There are different payment schemes for providers in Russia. For outpatient care, pro-
viders are mostly paid on a fee-for-service basis. Some regions (around 15%) use capita-
tion payment and three regions implemented policlinic fundholding. For inpatient care, 
there is a general trend to a “finished case” payment: the tariffs are set for normalized 
length of stay for each detailed case and are based on clinical standards. Many regions 
group these cases into homogeneous clinically related groups or Diagnostic Related 
Groups (DRGs).  In the regulated competition model, a clear and universal definition of 
the providers’ “product” is needed. However, this is not met in Russia, where every region 
(and sometimes local areas within the region) uses its own version of “product” clas-
sification. Some regions use those methods together with global budget for hospitals. 
In recent years, there is a trend towards pay for performance. For example, in Kemerovo, 
Kaluga, Moscow oblasts process and outcome indicators are used for paying bonuses to 
outpatient care providers.
 Regional funds allocate the funding among the health insurance companies on a 
capitation basis. The capitation is based on a simple equation related with only age and 
gender (Tompson, 2007). A more sophisticated risk equalisation system is needed to 
avoid the problem of risk-selection. The work on a new formula is underway.
Effective quality measurement is lacking in the present Russian health care system. 
Utilization review, if any, is done by the health authorities rather than the insurers, 
though there are some good examples to the contrary. 
New incentives in the MHI have contributed to downsizing bed capacity and impa-
tient utilization. The number of bed-days per capita decreased from 3.6 in 1997 to 2.9 in 
2007. This is the result of decrease in both admission rate and Average Length of Stay. 
But there is still considerable inefficiency in the health system mostly due to problems 
in the low level of primary health care – its under-funding and lack of incentives. Health 
care services are still highly skewed towards expensive inpatient care, which consumes 
between 59-64% of public health spending in 2001-2007 (Marquez, 2008). There is also 
large regional disparity in terms of general health indicators and satisfaction with the 
health care system with the health care system. 
Consumers are generally unaware of patient rights and their entitlements under the 
Health Insurance Law (Fotaki 2006). Consumer information about services of health in-
surers and providers practically does not exist. In 2006 an experiment promoting choice 
among maternity houses was initiated. Performance data on specific maternity houses 
was collected and made public, which is a first step to informed choice.
Thus after 17 years since the signing of the Health Insurance Law, the Russian gov-
ernment successfully separates the provision and purchasing of care. A multi-insurer 
health insurance system is set up. Providers are paid mostly for the actual volumes of 
care. However, the implementation of regulated competition has not been completed. 
Neither the insurance companies are competing for the insured, nor are the health care 
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providers competing for the insurers. Incentives for better performance and health gains 
are limited, which is a result of under-funding as well as poor design and inconsistent 
implementation of the reform.
CHINA’S HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
Brief overview 
From the 1950s till the early 1980s, China’s health care system had much in common 
with the pre-reform Russian one. Government funding (especially from the central gov-
ernment) was the major financing source of the health care system. Health care facilities 
were owned, funded and managed by the government. Physicians were government 
employees and received fixed salaries based on their years of working experience and 
specialty. Most citizens had their appointed providers based on their place of residence 
registration or the nature of their employers. The price of health care services was set by 
the government and was much lower than the real costs at the point of service based on 
heavy subsidization from the government.
Rural residents were encouraged to join Cooperative Medical Scheme (CMS). During 
the 1970s, CMS covered more than 90% of the rural population. Urban residents were 
covered by different health insurance schemes, such as Labour Insurance Scheme (LIS) 
for employees and their dependents, and Government Insurance Scheme (GIS) for stu-
dents, government employees and their dependents. 
Since the mid 1980s, the central government has stopped subsidizing the health care 
sector and decentralized this responsibility to local governments. The rule of subsidiza-
tion was that the local governments should adjust the amount of subsidization accord-
ing to their financial abilities. Not surprisingly, subsidies to the health care sector shrunk 
a lot. For instance, government subsidization to the 2nd Hospital of Wuxi City, Jiangsu 
Province shrunk from 25.4% to 3.3% of their total revenue during 1978-2007 (Cao et 
al., 2004).  Furthermore, in order to enhance the providers’ awareness of efficiency, 
the subsidies were changed from open-ended subsidization to fixed budgets. A study 
showed that with an inflation rate of 20% of the cost of health care services, the increase 
of governmental subsidization was only 8% during the 1990s (Hesketh and Zhu, 1997). 
Subsidies from the government covered only the basic salaries of the physicians and 
hospital staffs, which is far below basic living costs. And the subsidies usually contrib-
uted less than 30% of the whole cost of the health care providers (Hesketh and Zhu, 
1997). At the same time, the central government still held the power of setting the price 
of health services far below the real costs, with the goal being that basic health care is 
affordable for everyone. Responsibilities to fill the deficits were thrown to the hospitals 
and clinics themselves. Realizing this problem, the central government intentionally left 
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room for the providers to make profit. It distorted the pricing scheme of the health care 
services by setting prices of the “basic” health care services low but setting prices of the 
“high-tech” health care services far above the real costs. And the hospitals and clinics 
were allowed to have a 15% -20% mark-up for drugs4.
Since the 1990s, the income of the physicians who work for public hospitals (majority 
of the Chinese hospitals are public ones) consists of at least three parts: basic salary 
paid by the government; bonus paid by the hospital; and under-the table payment from 
the patients. The basic salary for an ordinary physician is far below basic living costs. 
Under-the table payment, which is usually kickbacks from pharmaceutical companies or 
red-envelops with cash from individual patients, is illegal. Many physicians rely heavily 
on the bonus from the hospitals. It is decided that the bonuses relate to the revenue 
generated by the physicians or their department. This introduces an improper incentive 
for the physicians and the hospitals of inducing too much demand from the patient.
China’s Total Health Expenditure as a share of GDP is 4.67% in 2006. Of this, govern-
ment health expenditure took a share of 18.1%, social health expenditure 32.6%5, and 
out-of pocket payment 49.3%. Per capita health expenditure in 2006 is 748.8 yuan 
(about US$ 93.66). There is a large disparity in health expenditure between urban and 
rural population. With expenditure per capita of urban residents is 3.45 times of that of 
the rural residents in 2007 (Ministry of Health China, 2007). 
Due to the market-oriented reform during the 1980s, the economic structure of social 
life was changed. That led to the collapse of CMS, LIS and GIS. Presently, there are three 
major health insurance schemes in China. 
•	 New	Cooperative	Medical	Scheme	(NCMS)	 is	a	voluntary	health	 insurance	scheme	
covering rural population. The Ministry of Health (MOH) and its local branches have 
administrative responsibility for the scheme. At the end of 2008, the NCMS covered 
815 million rural residents (61% of the total population in China) (Statistics & Infor-
mation Centre, Ministry of Health 2009). However, the benefit level is low, only 1.58% 
of THE was spent from the pool of NCMS in 2006 (Gao and Han, 2007), though with 
some increase in more developed areas in recent years.
•	 Basic	Medical	Insurance	Scheme	(BMIS)	is	a	mandatory	health	insurance	scheme	for	
urban employees and retirees. Administrated by the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Security (MOLSS7) and its local offices (Health Insurance Bureaus (HIBs)), the BMIS 
covered 180 million people (13% of the total population) at the end of 2008 (Zhang 
2008). 
•	 Urban-Resident	Scheme	(URS)	is	a	voluntary	health	insurance	scheme	for	children,	
students, and urban residents who are unemployed. Implemented since 2007, the 
Urban-Resident Scheme is still in its infant stage. This scheme is also operated by the 
Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (MOHRSS) (the previous MOLSS) 
and HIBs. The population under this scheme is gradually expanding. 
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Pre-conditions of regulated competition and China’s health care system
In this section, we examine whether the pre-conditions as mentioned in Table 2 are 
fulfilled in China.
Consumer choice 
Urban dwellers are covered by health insurance schemes that are managed by munici-
pal level HIBs, with the types of insurance schemes decided by the residents’ status of 
employment. The MOH and its regional branches (local Department of Health) are in 
charge of NCMS for farmers who live in rural areas. There are only a few private insur-
ance companies selling expensive unsubsidized health insurance products. Therefore, 
insurers such as the HIBs and Department of Health do not compete with each other 
and there is no consumer choice among either insurers or insurance packages in China. 
Competition among the insurers can be achieved through multiple methods, such as: 
allowing the local branches of the HIBs to expand their practice to other areas and 
finally to become independent institutes; or allowing private health insurers to enter 
the subsidized health insurance market, and create an environment of fair competition 
for both public insurers and private ones. Moreover, a HIB could act as a pure purchaser, 
and set the minimum benefit mandate on which multiple insurers compete to attract 
consumers. 
As public hospitals are legally owned by the government, consumer choice among 
the providers is not effectively transferred into opening/closure of hospitals. The General 
Physician and referral system exists in a very limited scope. Licensed physicians mostly 
work for the hospitals. 
Open entry and exit to the market
Due to the high requirement involved in opening a hospital, there is a substantial obsta-
cle for entering the health provision market. Private for-profit health care facilities have 
been emerged in recent years, especially in large cities such as Beijing and Shanghai 
(Hou and Coyne, 2008). This might increase the supply of health care services and foster 
competition among the providers. Exit of the health provision market is rare because the 
state legally owns and funds public hospitals.
Social insurers in China are government agencies. They are under political pressure 
of reaching a certain percentage of insurance coverage among the population. The 
government sets limited budget for the insurers. Although HIBs do not go bankrupt 
in case of exceeding this budget, this will have negative influence on the career of the 
government officers who are in charge of the HIBs. Therefore, HIBs are motivated to keep 
large deposits in order to make sure that the risk pool is not financially unsustainable 
(Tian et al., 2008). When their expenditure is higher than expected, they try to shift the 
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risk to the insured. This can be done through higher coinsurance rate, and by manipulat-
ing the number and type of medication in the drug formula. 
Incentives faced by the HIBs are complicated. While they are motivated to shift the 
risk to their enrollees, the NCMS and URS are voluntary insurance schemes, so people 
can choose to be unsubscribed. The insurers can hardly achieve their target of insur-
ance coverage if health insurance is unaffordable or health care service is unaffordable 
even with insurance. Therefore, the insurers cannot shift too much risk to the insured. 
Changing the incentive mechanisms for insurers will be a challenge facing the Chinese 
government.
Price-sensitive consumers
China and Russia have similar ways of calculating health insurance premiums, which 
is based on a certain percentage of the salary of the insured and is not related to their 
choice of insurer (if there was any choice). Therefore, consumers are not price-sensitive 
with respect to their insurance package. 
Contracting freedom
Chinese public hospitals have been constructed, as in Russia, on a highly regionalized 
basis. Providers hold natural monopoly positions in a certain region, especially in rural 
areas with low population density. Most of the HIBs in China are prohibited to selec-
tively contract with health care providers, and are obliged to contract with all the willing 
providers once the providers meet some basic conditions. In the rural areas, selective 
contracting can be difficult to be realized due to the natural monopoly position held by 
the health care providers, even if it was permitted. 
Out-of-pocket payment comprise 60% of the revenues of the health care providers 
in China (Eggleston et al., 2008a), which is higher than their Russian counterparts. In 
2003, 70.3% of the population was still uninsured (Ministry of Health, 2008). Since 2007, 
the Chinese government has been working on the URS that covers urban residents 
who were not covered by health insurance previously. In rural areas, the NCMS is also 
covering more population based on increased government subsidies. The principle of 
the health insurance schemes in China, as stated by the government, is to have “low 
benefit level and wide coverage”. It then becomes natural that copayment rate is still 
high, especially for the NCMS (Eggleston et al., 2008b, Hu et al., 2008). 
A large proportion of uninsured people, as well as a high level of under-insurance, 
harms the negotiation power of HIBs in China. The insurers and the health care providers 
can negotiate about the contents of the contracts, but the government sets the pric-
ing scheme for non-for-profit hospitals and allows little room for differentiated pricing. 
Although private for-profit hospitals have pricing freedom, in 2007 their share was only 
3% in the health care provision “market” in terms of the number of hospitalized patients 
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(Ministry of Health of China, 2008). Therefore, pricing freedom of the health care provid-
ers is limited in China. In order to create an environment of pricing freedom, the Chinese 
government first has to set a more realistic pricing scheme, reflecting the resources and 
risk involved. Secondly, the service volume (wholesale vs. retail medical service) and 
the formation of a “preferred provider network” for selected specialty care should be 
recognized as part of the negotiation power of health insurers in order to obtain price 
discounts. 
Number of health care providers
There exists a large disparity in the amount of health care providers across different re-
gions in China. In Jiangsu province, one of the most wealthy coastal provinces in China, 
the number of licensed physicians per 1000 population is 1.56 in 2007 (Deparment of 
Health Jiangsu Province, 2007), while the figure is only 0.95 in Gansu province, one of 
the least developed western provinces (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2007). 
Even in the more wealthy provinces, the number of licensed physicians per 1000 popula-
tion is smaller compared with that in the Russian Federation (4.31 in 2006), and other 
developed countries, such as the Netherlands (3.71 in 2005) (WHO, 2007).
Competition regulations
China’s National People’s Congress passed a new Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) in August 
2008. However, this law does not apply to social sectors that are crucial to people’s 
welfare. Although health care sector is not explicitly exempted by the AML, public hos-
pitals are considered to be highly related to social welfare and thus may be exempted. 
Therefore, there might be no valid competition regulation that can be applied in the 
health care sector in China. 
Standardized benefit package
A universal standardized benefit package does not exist in China. The principle of health 
insurance in China is that each HIBs sets the benefit package according to the level of 
economic development in the local setting in order to maintain the balance of the pool. 
Therefore, the entitlement of the insured varies by area and over time.
Effective product classification
In most cases, the HIBs know little about the quality of health care services, except for 
several general indicators such as in-hospital mortality or 2-week readmission rates. 
Hospitals organize quality assurance programmes internally, but do not make quality 
indicators available to insurers or consumers. Therefore, quality assurance (or enhanc-
ing) programs of this kind cannot contribute to more prudent purchasing behavior of 
either the insurers or the potential patients. A utilization review should be undertaken 
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by the HIBs but is rarely done because they are not empowered to enforce providers to 
cooperate.
Risk equalization schemes
The concept of risk equalization schemes is brand new in China. If competition among 
the insurers is introduced in the health insurance sector, individual data about health 
services utilization/expenditure needs to be collected. Techniques and experiences 
about risk equalization schemes need to be gained in China.
Consumer information
Consumer information is scarce in China. Individual consumers know little about the 
service of the insurers and the quality of the health care providers. Consumer choice 
among health care providers is based on their perceived reputation and the “level” of the 
providers. However, the “level” of providers might be an inaccurate indicator of quality. 
This is decided by the health authorities and is not based on their quality of care but 
on their capacity to provide care. One improvement is that health insurers in several 
cities are now sending “insurer staffs” to their contracted hospitals, in order to spread 
consumer information about insurers among the patients, and to collect information 
about quality of care. 
Appropriate government regulation
Local governments in China are still subsidizing public hospitals, though the extent of 
subsidization is relatively small compared with that in Russian. During the 1980s and 
1990s, the Chinese government put much effort into pushing public hospitals towards 
a market approach. Unfortunately, the Chinese government was not successful in 
setting the rules of the game. For example, pricing schemes for public hospitals have 
long been considered as inappropriate and one of the major reasons of inducing the 
physicians to over-utilize expensive high-tech examinations. The pharmaceutical policy 
results in over-prescription of antibiotics and expensive drugs (Ge and Wang, 2005). 
Cross-subsidization across regions is poorly organized due to weak financial ability of 
the central government compared with the local ones. Even in the same region, cross-
subsidization among those of different social economic status is not well organized 
because people of low social economic status, such as dependents of the employees, 
migrant and informal sector workers, are not covered by any insurance schemes (Center 
of Statistics Information Ministry of Health China, 2005). The good news is that with 
the recent implementation and development of URS, these populations are gradually 
covered by health insurance with subsidies from local governments.
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DISCUSSIONS 
Lessons from the Russian health care reform 
It has been 17 years since the Health Insurance Act 1993 was passed in Russia. However, 
currently competition cannot be observed among either the insurers or the providers. 
This lack of competition is not surprising since most, if not all, of the necessary pre-
conditions for regulated competition are not fulfilled in Russia. If the Chinese govern-
ment decides to employ regulated competition in the health care sector, the following 
lessons can be drawn from the Russian experience. 
Firstly, direct payment from insurers to providers should forma significant share of 
Total Health Expenditure in order to reap the benefits of an insurance-based health care 
system. In Russia, payments based on a contractual relationship between insurers and 
providers form a relatively small share of public health expenditure, compared with the 
share of government funding to the providers. Insurance companies are therefore de-
prived of the power of effectively negotiating with health care providers for better care 
and lower price, even if they are allowed to do so (Tompson, 2007). In China, the share of 
out-of-pocket payment in Total Health Expenditure was between 50% to 60% from 2001 
to 2004 (Zhao et al., 2007). The Chinese government needs to ensure that a larger share 
of payments to providers come directly from the insurers, if the role of the competing 
insurers as prudent third-party purchasers is to be realized in the health care sector.
Secondly, the government should be willing and prepared to let the market force work 
in the health care sector. Furthermore, the central government must have enough tools 
to enforce and supervise the implementation of the law. In Russia, local governments in 
large parts of the country have not fully implemented the Health Insurance Act 1993. 
This shows the unwillingness or incapability of the lower level governments to encour-
age competition among the health insurers and health care providers. It also shows that 
it is important to get support from the majority of the actors before a policy is made. In 
Russia the central government seems to be somewhat weak when local governments do 
not behave according to the Health Insurance Act 1993, and it has no effective tools to 
supervise the implementation of the law by local governments.
This is a problem also facing the Chinese government. If it is determined to introduce 
any health care reform, effective tools need to be created to help implement relevant 
laws. The present proposal (State Council of China, 2009) about health care reform in 
China is characterized by conflicts and negotiations among several key actors in the 
health care sector, such as MOH, MOHRSS, Ministry of Finance, and the National Devel-
opment and Reform Commission. The Chinese government should ensure that major 
stakeholders, such as the insurers, the health care providers, the population, and the 
local governments, do not obstruct the proposed reforms.
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Thirdly, when implementing regulated competition in the health care sector, the 
government needs to change its role from an active player in the health care system to a 
collective sponsor who sets the rules of the game and organizes cross-subsidization. The 
Russian government is still heavily involved in collecting premiums; local governments 
are still budgeting health care providers in their present health care system. This direct 
involvement of the government becomes an obstacle for effective competition among 
health insurers and among health care providers. At the same time, the Russian govern-
ment is not effectively organizing cross-subsidization. The Chinese government has also 
been directly involved in the health care delivery system for six decades. If competition 
is going to be introduced in this sector, the Chinese government needs to step back 
and act as a regulator rather than a front-line player. And the Chinese government also 
needs to pay more effort in organizing cross-subsidization across regions and across 
population of different socio-economic status. 
 Fourthly, generating enough public resources is a must in implementing any health 
care systems that aims to enhance the efficiency and ensure a reasonable level of equity. 
The Russian health care system has been reformed in a situation of under-funding (2.8% 
- 3% of GDP in 1991-2002, and 3.4% of GDP at present). Under-funding from the gov-
ernment will inevitably lead to a large share of private spending. Powerful third party 
purchasers are difficult to be introduced in this context. Besides this, in case of Russia 
and China, where the sponsor is a public entity, enough pubic resources are needed to 
organize cross-subsidization both among regions and sub-populations. 
Fifthly, introducing proper incentives is as important as structural reforms. Through 
introducing MHI funds and multiple insurance companies in the health care system, 
the structure of the Russian health care system has been changed since 1993 (at least 
in the model areas). However, the complicated relationship between the Regional MHI 
Funds and the RHAs generates mixed incentives for health insurance companies as well 
as health care providers. Without proper incentives, competition cannot come naturally 
in the health care sector. If the Chinese government is going to change its health care 
system into an insurance-based one and is going to introduce effective competition 
among the health care providers, proper incentives for both the insurers and providers 
are needed.
Finally, it is important to disseminate consumer information via multiple channels. 
Although consumers are entitled to the right of making choice among the insurers in 
Russia, Fotaki (2006) found that consumers are generally not aware of this entitlement, 
or of consumer information about services of the insurers and providers. In China, gen-
erating and disseminating information about services and price of the insurers and the 
providers by independent entities is a must if any competition mechanisms are going to 
be introduced in the health care sector.
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Prospects for regulated competition for the Chinese health care system
The prospects for regulated competition in the Chinese health care system depend 
on whether the Chinese government is willing and able to fulfill the necessary pre-
conditions for regulated competition. The culture of “the employer decides on behalf 
of the employees” in the Soviet-era has been changed in China for more than three 
decades. Consumers are used to be independent in making a choice. We can anticipate 
that actual individual level consumer choice among the health insurers can take place 
if the government allows this. However, consumer choice does not necessarily lead to 
efficiency if multiple insurers are not competing. The HIBs are presently government 
branches and are under mixed motivations. Therefore, introducing effective competi-
tion among the insurers is a great challenge for China. 
As China has gradually expanded its health insurance schemes, demand-side cost 
sharing has been implemented aggressively. With out-of-pocket payments forming 
30–50% of medical expenditure, Chinese consumers are sensitive to medical prices, 
especially those of new medical technology that will penetrate most of the as yet under-
developed regions in China. Moreover, as benefit schemes are not comprehensive, there 
will be opportunities for insurers to target newly-added health benefits to minimize 
moral hazard through high co-payments or high deductible schemes. Making consum-
ers price-sensitive might not be difficult technically, but if the government subsidizes 
consumers to make health insurance affordable, the subsidies should be such that the 
consumers are price-sensitive at the margin.
Making the consumers price-sensitive might technically not be difficult, but if the 
government subsidizes consumers to make health insurance affordable, the subsidies 
should be such that the consumers are price-sensitive at the margin.   
The number of private health care providers has a trend to increase in large cities, 
partly because policies regarding the entrance of providers have been loosened in 
recent years (Hou and Coyne, 2008). However, whether this trend can be maintained is 
still doubtful. Private for-profit (PFP) hospitals are facing much higher taxation than their 
non-for-profit (NFP) competitors. At the same time, PFP hospitals do not receive subsi-
dies from the government as public hospitals do. These policies place the PFP hospitals 
at a disadvantage if they have to compete with the NFP ones. Therefore, most of the PFP 
hospitals choose to change to being NFP after the three years of tax-exempt period (Hou 
and Coyne, 2008). The fiscal policies regarding PFP hospitals might become obstacles for 
new enterers. In the urban areas, even if no more private enterer the health provision 
market, the number of providers is already large enough for a competitive market. At 
the same time, investors whose major aim is to make profit might not invest in poor rural 
areas with low population density and weak purchasing power. In China, whether real 
and fair competition among health care providers can be introduced largely depends on 
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the incentive mechanisms faced by the providers and the existence of a valid competi-
tion law.
Presently, patients in China have freedom (or relative freedom) to choose among 
providers. However, consumer choice without effective information is one of the major 
reasons that patients crowd into tertiary hospitals only to treat a cold (Xinhua Net, 2009). 
Although consumer choice among insurers is not an issue now, consumer information 
will become important if the Chinese government chooses to introduce competition 
among insurers. An independent entity is needed to help produce, update, and channel 
down effective information about price and quality of health insurers as well as health 
care providers.
In a spectrum from the government provision model to the regulated competition 
model, there are lots of alternatives in organizing the health care system. However, a 
perfect model does not seem to exist. In implementing each model, certain pre-condi-
tions are to be fulfilled and trade-offs are to be made. Although regulated competition 
is a theoretically sound model, it is a technically complicated one. The experience of 
the Russian health care reform is a signal to Chinese policy makers that certain pre-
conditions need to be fulfilled.
Implementation strategies need to be carefully considered in a reform towards the 
model of regulated competition. In the Netherlands regulated competition has been 
implemented for over two decades. The government recently published a report and 
announced that the health care reform is on balance a positive one, though there are 
still problems, such as bottlenecks for purchasing care by the insurers, insufficient risk 
equalization, and insufficient consumer information (van de Ven et al., 2009). Pro-com-
petition policy makers who are interested in regulated competition in the health care 
sector need to be aware of the technical and political complexity of this model. At the 
same time, learning lessons from other countries will facilitate the Chinese government 
to avoid mistakes and implement health care reforms successfully.
ENDNOTES
1 Path dependence explains how the set of decisions one faces for any given circumstance 
is limited by the decisions one has made in the past, even though past circumstances 
may no longer be relevant (Bebchuk and Roe 1999).
2 There must be sufficient consumer protection in case of bankruptcy of insurers and 
providers of care.
3 The number of regions was more than 83 at the beginning of the reform (in 1993 there 
were 89 regions listed). With the merging of regions, there have been 83 regions in Rus-
sia since 2008 (Wikipedia contributors, Federal subjects of Russia, 2010).
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4 In China, all hospitals and clinics own and operate pharmacies. 
5 Social expenditure is public expenditure through earmarked employer/employee 
contributions.
6 The 2006 exchange rate for yuan to US$ was around 8:1.
7 In March 2008, the MOLSS was re-organized and renamed as the Ministry of Human 
Resources and Social Security (MOHRSS).
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ABSTRACT
The Dutch government has been implementing the reform of regulated competition in 
the healthcare system for decades. Such a reform aimed at a balance between equity 
and efficiency. In this paper, experiences from the Dutch healthcare reform of regulated 
competition are described and analyzed according to the Chinese context. The Chinese 
government needs to fulfill a list of pre-conditions to make competition in the health-
care sector successful. And the reform of regulated competition may be a politically and 
technically complicated process. There are some important lessons that China can learn 
from the Dutch reform: first, strategy of the reform must be consistent in a long term; 
second, fundamental reform is not necessarily taken in the form of dramatic change in 
the system; and last, to introduce market mechanism into China’s health reform, some 
pre-conditions are required.
KEY WORDS: regulated competition, healthcare system, government, market, Nether-
lands
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1. INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1980s, China has virtually dismantled the previous system, in which 
physicians were employees of hospitals and the government planned, owned, funded 
and managed healthcare facilities. One direct result is that most Chinese healthcare 
facilities are “profit”-oriented, though their legal characteristic is still state-owned 
(Blumenthal, Hsiao 2005). In addition, health insurance schemes, both in the rural and 
urban areas, became unsustainable. These developments were openly acknowledged 
by the government to be a failure (Ge 2005). Presently, problems with “accessibility” and 
“affordability” are two major sources of complaints in China. 
In April 2009, the central government of China committed to significantly increase 
governmental funding in the healthcare sector and considered creating competition 
in the healthcare sector (State Council of China 2009). Two years have passed; there has 
been yet no clear answer of how to create value with the new investment. This wave of 
healthcare reform faces substantial challenges. One of the focuses of debate about the 
reform is whether the government should subsidize the supply side (healthcare provid-
ers) or the demand side (health insurers or patients). If the government would subsidize 
the demand side, should there be competing or non-competing health insurers? In fact, 
the 2009 blueprint mentioned the option of allowing competition among social health 
insurers, and even allowing private insurance companies to enter the health insurance 
market, which is currently dominated by public insurance agencies. 
Allowing competition in the healthcare sector is a complex process, experiences 
and lessons can be learned from an international perspective. In the Netherlands, the 
government has been paying efforts on reforming its healthcare system from a highly 
regulated and planned one into a regulated-competitive one for two decades. Valuable 
lessons can be learned from the Dutch experiences. 
In section 2, the pre-reform Dutch healthcare system is briefly introduced in order 
to identify the reasons and the motivations for a change towards regulated competi-
tion. In section 3, we describe the reforming Dutch healthcare system. We also analyze 
the political process of this prolonged reform. To what extent regulated competition is 
functioning now and to what extent the pre-conditions for regulated competition are 
fulfilled after 20 years is also nalysed in this section. In section 4 we give a picture of 
the current situations of the Chinese healthcare system, by checking the prospects of 
fulfilling the pre-conditions of regulated competition in China. In section 5 we deal with 
the lessons that China can learn from the Dutch experience in its healthcare reform in 
the past two decades. 
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2. THE PRE-REFORM DUTCH HEALTHCARE SYSTEM (BEFORE 1990)
2.1 The health insurance sector
The Dutch healthcare system has been historically organized on private initiative in 
both funding and provision of care. Before 1940, there was practically no governmental 
intervention with respect to health insurance and providers. From 1940 to 1970, the 
Dutch government focused on promoting public health, guaranteeing a minimum level 
of quality, and ensuring universal access to basic health services. In 1941, a mandatory 
health insurance scheme for low- and middle-income groups was introduced. Cover-
age included physician services, prescription drugs, and hospitalization less than one 
year, maternity care, dental care for children, some paramedical care, and some medical 
devices. In 1968, Exceptional Medical Expenses Act (AWBZ) that covers long-term care, 
care for the mentally and physically disabled, and hospitalization for longer than one 
year, was passed and constituted a mandatory national health insurance scheme (van 
de Ven, Schut 2008). 
After many waves of reform, The Dutch health insurance system in 2000 could be il-
lustrated by Figure 1. 
 
What can China learn from the regulated competition reform from the Netherlands? 67
The first compartment was a mandatory national health insurance AWBZ. Premium of 
AWBZ was income-related up to a certain income-level. Regional care offices took the 
responsibility of administering the AWBZ and borne no financial risk for that. 
The second compartment consisted of mandatory sickness fund insurance for low- 
and middle-income groups (62% of the population) and the voluntary private health 
insurance for people exempted from mandatory sickness fund insurance. 
Almost all sickness funds had a regional monopoly position due to a legally estab-
lished territorial division of the market before 1992. The government set a uniform 
benefit package. Premiums of the sickness fund were to a large extent income-related 
and were paid to a central fund administrated by the Sickness Fund Council. Sickness 
funds were retrospectively fully reimbursed for the medical expenses of their enrollees. 
Therefore, sickness funds were purely administrative bodies bearing no financial risks.
The insured with private health insurers had consumer choice among competing pri-
vate  health insurers operating in the Netherlands (about 50 in 2000). Private insurers were 
allowed to risk-rate their enrollees, and there was no requirement of open-enrollment. His-
torically, the benefit package of sickness funds and private insurers was basically the same. 
The insured with either kind of insurers used mostly the same facilities and doctors, and 
waited in the same waiting line. Therefore, services received by the insured were of little 
difference. There was little government regulation on the private insurance market until 
the mid-1980s. Price competition among private health insurers led to cream-skimming 
by insurers and adverse selection by consumers. The elderly and high-risk groups faced 
the risks of being uninsured due to high premiums. Since 1986, the Health Insurance Ac-
cess Act (WTZ) has been adopted to guarantee a comprehensive benefits package and 
a legally determined maximum premium for specified risk groups. Losses of the private 
insurers caused by the law were levied on all private insured (Schut 1992). 
The third compartment consisted of voluntary supplementary health insurance cover-
age with risk-rated premium. Supplementary health insurance covered health services 
not included in the first and second compartment, such as luxury services within a 
hospital, prolonged physical therapy, and some alternative medicine. 
The private insurance market was a competitive one, which only applied to about one 
third of the insured population. With no variation among health insurance products for 
AWBZ and sickness funds, no variation in price of health insurance package for sickness 
funds insured, and no consumer choice among sickness funds before 1992, the Dutch 
health insurance system was dominated by government-regulated cartels of insurers.
2.2 The healthcare delivery sector
There is a sharp distinction between general practitioners (GPs) and medical special-
ists in the Netherlands. The GPs are mostly the patients’ first contacting point with the 
healthcare system and act as gatekeepers of the healthcare system. Individuals can 
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choose among GPs and are supposed to register with a GP. Most GPs work in solo prac-
tices. Sickness funds usually reimbursed GPs on a capitation basis, while private insurers 
usually paid GPs Fee-For-Service (FFS). The insured can be reimbursed by the insurers for 
services from medical specialists only when they are referred by their GPs.
Most general hospitals are private non-profit institutions. About 75% of the medical 
specialists are private practitioners who co-operate in hospital-based partnerships. Most 
medical specialists were paid FFS regardless of the type of health insurance schemes 
before 1980. 
Despite the private basis of the Dutch healthcare delivery system, inflation of health-
care expenditure forced the Dutch government to heavily regulate on price and supply 
of care since mid-1970s. Based on the Healthcare Tariffs Act (WTG) 1980, the Central 
Office on Healthcare Tariffs (COTG) set out guidelines for the composition and calcula-
tion of tariffs. Actual charges were negotiated between representative organizations of 
providers and insurers based on the guidelines and then had to be approved by the 
COTG. The open-ended hospital reimbursement system was replaced by a budgeting 
system. The Healthcare Prices Act (1982) enabled the government to control physicians’ 
fees and also their total revenues. By the mid-1990s, the traditional FFS system was 
largely replaced by a “lump-sum payment” per hospital for all specialists working in that 
hospital. The hospital sector was heavily regulated by the government. Construction of 
new hospitals and all other major hospital investments were subject to approval by the 
government (van de Ven, Schut 2000). Furthermore, the Dutch government indirectly 
controlled the output of healthcare services via controlling the supply of physicians. 
In short, the Dutch health delivery system was highly regulated by the government in 
terms of price (tariffs) of care and capacities of production. And there was very limited 
room for the providers to compete with each other. As a result, the pre-reform Dutch 
health delivery system was also characterized by government-regulated cartels of 
providers.
3. REFORM TOWARDS REGULATED COMPETITION IN THE NETHERLANDS 
(1990 – PRESENT)
3.1 Motivations of the reform
Under heavy governmental regulation, the Dutch healthcare system was characterized 
by a lack of incentives for efficiency. None of the involved parties: such as, consumers, 
insurers, and providers of care, had any financial incentives for efficiency. In many cases, 
the financial system was actually rewarding inefficient behavior and punishing efficient 
behavior. 
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Due to the complexity of the planning process, the many parties involved, their con-
flicting interests, and lack of clarify of the regulation, the Dutch government was also 
not able to effectively regulate the healthcare. 
The Dutch health insurance system had problems, such as the different premium 
structures for different insurance schemes, cream skimming and adverse selection in 
the private health insurance market. These problems jeopardized the goal of universal 
health insurance set by the Dutch government. 
These problems motivated the Dutch government to consider a fundamental reform 
in the Dutch healthcare sector (van de Ven, Schut 2000).
3.2 Regulated competition and the Dutch progress from 1990 to 2008
Inspired by Enthoven’s Consumer Choice Health Plan (Enthoven 1978) and first proposed 
by Dekker Committee, the Dutch government has been implementing regulated com-
petition, which aims to obtain a balance between equity and efficiency, in its healthcare 
system since 1988. 
The key point of the regulated competition model is to allow competition among 
both the health insurance market and the health provision market. Consumers have 
free choice among competing health insurers, who act on behalf of their enrollees and 
purchase healthcare services among competing healthcare providers. In an unregulated 
competitive market, competing insurers and healthcare providers have incentives to 
adopt some strategies for profit, including risk rating, adverse risk selection and some 
hidden forms of it, and preventing potential competitors from entering the market. To 
prevent these strategies, which may lead to market failure, there needs to be a sponsor, 
who has the willing and ability to regulate the market and to guarantee equity, on be-
half of the consumers. The role of such a sponsor is normally taken by the government, 
employer, or other entities. 
Due to historical reasons, healthcare sector in the Netherlands was far from a fertile 
ground for competition. Therefore, the first decade of the reform was not actually to 
make competition work in the Dutch healthcare system, but rather to create a workable 
environment for competition (Schut 1992). In other words, the Dutch government has 
been engaged in fulfilling the theoretical pre-conditions for regulated competition. 
In the following part, we check the procedure of fulfilling the pre-conditions of regu-
lated competition model in the current Dutch healthcare system. 
1) Giving right of choice to price sensitive consumers. 
Individual consumers need to have the right to make a free choice among insurers. 
From 1992 sickness funds are permitted to extend their operating areas and enrollees 
have the chance to choose another sickness fund once in a year (van de Ven, Schut 
2000). Also in 1992, several private health insurance companies and a large employer 
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got permission to establish new sickness fund organizations. This was a signal of open-
ing the market of sickness fund and introducing multiple insurers in a given market. It 
indicated potential competition among sickness funds based on flat premium, quality, 
their contracted providers, services, responsiveness, and reputation.
Since 1 January 2006, the Health Insurance Act has obliged everyone who legally lives 
or works in the Netherlands to buy individual private health insurance, with a legally 
prescribed benefit package, from a private insurance company (van de Ven, Schut 2008)1. 
The difference between sickness funds and private insurance companies has been abol-
ished. All health insurers are required to accept any willing consumers for mandatory 
health insurance benefit with the same community-rated premium. Consumers can now 
freely choose among health insurance companies (including sickness funds) on a yearly 
basis. 
It is also expected that consumers are sensitive to the difference among premiums of 
insurance companies. Since 2006, consumers’ payment for their health insurance can be 
divided into two parts: the first part, which is correlated to the individual income, is paid 
to the central risk equalization fund; the second part is paid directly to the insurance 
companies of their choice. Consumers may also choose to purchase supplementary 
health insurance, of which price is unregulated and therefore may be risk-rated.
2) Risk-bearing insurers. 
Even with multiple insurers and consumer choice, insurers need to have incentives to 
compete. Financial incentive is the most straightforward one. 
During the period 1941-1991, all sickness funds were fully reimbursed for their medical 
expenditures. From 1993, the retrospective cost reimbursement was gradually replaced 
by risk-adjusted premium subsidies from the central risk equalization fund plus flat rate 
premium contribution from their insured. This implies that sickness funds changed their 
role from pure administrative bodies to risk-bearing entities. However, the government 
decided to compensate a large portion of the incurred losses of the sickness funds until 
the risk-adjustment method was improved. The actual financial risk for sickness funds 
was only 3% in 1993 (van de Ven, Schut 2000). 
In May 1995, the Dutch government announced an increase of the financial responsi-
bility for insurers and sickness funds. It was also on the agenda of the government that 
the financial risk of 3% of the difference between the actual expenses and the predicted 
expenses (based on age, gender, region, and disability) of the sickness funds will be 
increased to about 65% in 1998. However, the sickness funds’ financial risk in 1998 was 
about 29%, which is far below the government’s plan. In 2000, the sickness funds’ finan-
cial risk was increased to about 36%. 
1.  The financing and coverage of AWBZ was not changed in 2006.
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Private health insurers always bore financial risks for their operation, except for the 
WTZ-insured enrollees since 1986. According to European regulation, the government is 
not allowed to enforce private insurance companies to accept insured who will predict-
ably generate a loss, such as in the case of an open enrolment requirement for  a stan-
dardized benefits package with community-rated premiums and without and adequate 
risk-adjusted system for subsidies. However, the private insurance companies opposed 
any form of risk-adjusted premium subsidies (van de Ven and Schut, 2000). 
Together with improvement of the risk-adjustment schemes, the health insurers’2 
financial risk was increased to 59% in 2008, and 75% in 2010. 
3) Contracting freedom. 
Regulated competition does not work if prudent third-party purchasers, say the insurers, 
do not have sufficient freedom in contracting with healthcare providers. Insurers should 
be allowed to selectively contract with the providers and negotiate about content of the 
contract (e.g. price and quality). 
From 1941 to 1993, sickness funds were required by law to contract with all the 
providers who wanted a contract. Since 1994, selective contracting with physicians 
and pharmacists was allowed. However, sickness funds seldom used the opportunity of 
selective contracting except for contracting with physical therapists. 
Negotiation over lower fees of healthcare services between the sickness funds/private 
insurers and the providers was allowed from 1992. Sickness funds successfully made use 
of this tool and broke the price cartel of providers of some medical devices. As a result, 
prices went down by a quarter to a third. 
Since 2005, prices for physiotherapy are no longer regulated. Although the providers 
are still heavily regulated by the government, insurers and providers gradually get more 
contracting freedom over prices, service, and quality of care. Insurers and hospitals are 
allowed to freely negotiate about prices and selectively contract for a range of products 
accounting for about 34% of hospital revenues in 2009. 
Insurers are also allowed to operate forms of managed care such as Health Mainte-
nance Organizations (HMOs). 
4) Sufficient risk-bearing healthcare providers. 
The number of physicians per capita in the Netherlands was 3.8 per 1000 population in 
2006, slightly above the OECD average of 3.1. There were 8.6 nurses per 1000 population 
in the Netherlands in 2006, lower than the average of 9.7 in OECD countries. The number 
of acute care hospital beds was 3.0 per 1000 population in 2006 in the Netherlands, less 
2.  The differences between sickness funds and private insurance companies have been abolished 
since 1 January 2006.
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than the OECD average of 3.9 beds (OECD, 2009). The Dutch government has been de-
regulating the entrance of the market for healthcare providers. From 1992, GPs are free 
to open a practice wherever they want. In May 1995 the Dutch government announced 
to deregulate the Hospital Planning Act, though large-scale investments related to 
hospital building still need permission from the government.
The Dutch government is still heavily regulating the price and capacity of production 
on the supply side. As a consequence, the providers were not confronted with large 
financial risks. Since 2008, the government gradually loosens the regulation on the 
providers in terms of price of care and allows the insurers and the providers to negotiate 
over the price and quality for some services (van de Ven, Schut 2008). In 2009, hospitals 
are allowed to set prices for about 34% of hospitals services under a government-deter-
mined price cap. This also means that the hospitals will be more financial risk-bearing 
than in the past.
5) Effective product classification.
Health insurance package is often a bundle of entitlements given to the consumers 
with a price. Therefore, consumers need to be able to compare the price of the health 
insurance package effectively with the help of effective product classification. Similar to 
the insurance package, healthcare services are rarely purchased on a single item basis. 
A simple healthcare intervention may be composed of multiple healthcare procedures. 
The insurers also need to be able to compare the price of the healthcare services with a 
well-developed product classification of healthcare services.
The mandatory health insurance has a standard benefit package for all individuals 
and insurers. Supplementary health insurance can vary according to benefit package 
and premiums.
Inpatient services provided by hospitals and physicians are paid for mostly on the 
basis of Diagnostic Treatment Combinations (DTCs) (Enthoven, van de Ven, W. P. 2007). 
6) Effective risk equalization schemes. 
In a free competitive health insurance market, insurers want to break even on each con-
tract. They either risk-rate or risk select their customers. This will make high-risk groups 
under-insured and harm the principle of equity. Therefore, a risk equalization scheme 
(or other subsidy schemes) is necessary to compensate the insurers for their high-risk 
enrollees. An effective risk equalization scheme removes the insurers’ incentives for risk-
rating and (in case of premium regulations such as community rating) risk-selection. 
From 1993, sickness funds receive risk-adjusted premium subsidies from the Central 
Fund, in addition with a flat rate premium paid by their enrollees. The risk adjustment 
system has been gradually enriched since its emergence in 1993. From 1993 to 2002, the 
risk equalization payments were primarily based on age, gender, indicators of disability, 
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and social-economic status. Because of the insufficient risk-adjustment scheme, the 
government compensated sickness funds for the losses from extreme high expendi-
tures of high-risk insured and a significant portion of actual expenses above a certain 
threshold amount per insured per year. In 2002, Pharmacy-based Cost Group (PCGs) was 
added in the risk adjustment scheme; in 2004, Diagnostic Cost Groups (DCGs) and be-
ing self-employed (yes/no) have been added (Enthoven, van de Ven, W. P. 2007). Along 
with these improvements, financial risks borne by health insurers have been gradually 
increased.
7) Effective quality measurement. 
Ideally as prudent third-party purchasers, health insurers need to be able to purchase 
healthcare products of acceptable quality and competitive price on behalf of their 
customers. They also need to be able to regularly overview the quality of the healthcare 
services they purchase in order to make future purchasing plans. Therefore effective 
quality indicators of the providers need to be available to the insurers.
Dutch healthcare providers traditionally self-regulated the quality development. The 
Quality Institutions Act 1995 offered a simple framework for quality assurance and im-
provement. Although without decisions regarding specific tools and procedures, the Act 
mandated that every profession or organization in healthcare set standards for optimal 
care; develop strategies for monitoring and improving care; and create systems to en-
able public reporting to the healthcare inspectorate, through an annual quality report, 
and to patient organizations (Grol 2006). 
In the last 15 years, there has been an effort to develop, test, and validate indicators, 
assessment tools, and instruments used in measuring clinical performance of general 
practitioners under the pressure from stakeholders such as the government, inspector-
ate, payers, and patient organizations. 
There are certain evaluations which are focused on medical specialists and other 
hospital professionals. Specialist societies run regular and compulsory appraisals of 
specialist teams with well-developed and validated procedures and criteria. Since 2006, 
the inspectorate for healthcare has obliged the hospitals to collect data on some per-
formance indicators, including mortality after myocardial infarction or stroke, wound 
infection, pressure ulcer incidence, and medication errors. These results are publicly 
reported on a freely accessible website (www.kiesbeter.nl). 
8) Sufficient consumer information. 
Sufficient and effective consumer information needs to be available to the consumers. 
Consumers need to be aware of their entitlements and the freedom to choose. Effec-
tive consumer information in terms of price, products, and services of different insurers 
need to be generated by independent entities and be disseminated among individual 
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consumers. Information regarding healthcare services of different healthcare providers 
is also essential for individual patients and insurers to make prudent choice. 
The Dutch government set up a website where consumers can get information about 
health insurers and providers (www.kiesbeter.nl) a few years ago. Information about 
health insurers includes price, services, consumer satisfaction, and supplementary 
insurance (premiums and benefits). Information about providers includes different sets 
of performance indicators developed by the Healthcare Inspectorate (IGZ). Besides this 
website, the newly established Netherlands Healthcare Authority (NZa) is also respon-
sible to provide adequate consumer information.
9) Effective competition regulations. 
Effective competition law and policy need to be applied to the health insurers and 
providers. Entrance and exit of the health insurance market and healthcare market 
should be allowed and be made possible in practice. Cartels among insurers and among 
providers must be prohibited. Insurers and healthcare providers who hold a dominant 
position must be prohibited from abusing their dominant position.
On January 1st, 1998, a new Competitive Act (Mededingswet) became effective. With 
this more powerful anti-monopoly law, anti-competitive behaviors by health insurers 
and healthcare providers were better regulated than in the past.
4. THE FULFILLMENT OF THE PRE-CONDITIONS IN THE CHINESE 
HEALTHCARE SYSTEM
4.1 No room for competition and financial risk for social health insurers
Urban employees are obliged to be enrolled with a mandatory scheme that is managed 
by the local Health Insurance Bureau (HIB). Unemployed people and rural residents have 
an option to be insured by a voluntary scheme that is managed by the local HIB and 
health authority respectively. There are few private insurance companies selling health 
insurance products. Insurers such as the HIBs and Department of Health do not compete 
with each other and there is no consumer choice among either insurers or insurance 
packages in China.
Insurers in China are governmental bureaucracies. Local insurance agencies keep 
large amounts of deposits in order to avoid any financial risk. They have no incentives to 
lower the premium or expand benefit package with the large deposit (Lu, Wang 2010). 
And once the health expenditure is higher than their expectation, they shift their risk to 
the insured by increasing the level of copayment.
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4.2 No financial risk and rigid capacity planning for public healthcare providers
Chinese public hospitals have been constructed on a highly regionalized basis. The 
government set guidelines of healthcare facility planning that aimed at controlling the 
number of healthcare facilities, as well as hospital beds and health workforce within each 
local area (Ministry of Health, 2009). The volume of healthcare provision is calculated 
from a formula including population within a certain area and the average utilization 
rate of hospital beds, and is updated every five years. With highly-regulated capacity of 
provision, providers hold natural monopoly positions in a certain region, especially in 
the rural areas with less population density. Public healthcare facilities virtually face no 
financial risk. 
Due to the governmental planning over the number of healthcare providers, HIBs 
are obliged to contract with almost all the willing providers because of the providers’ 
monopoly power in the market, though by regulations they are allowed to selectively 
contract with healthcare providers,. 
Private for-profit hospitals hold pricing freedom. However, their market share was only 
3% in terms of number of hospitalized patients in 2007 (Ministry of Health China 2008). 
Therefore, pricing freedom of the healthcare providers is limited in China.  
4.3 Other pre-conditions for regulated competition are not fulfilled
There is currently no effective product classification of healthcare services in China. 
Nevertheless the insurers are making progress. Traditionally, HIBs pay the healthcare 
providers mostly on a fee for service basis. However, early attempts of Diagnosis-
Related-Groups are experimented in some areas. 
The concept of risk equalization schemes is new in China. If competition among insur-
ers is introduced, techniques and experiences need to be gained.
In most cases, HIBs know little about the quality of healthcare services except several 
general indicators such as in-hospital mortality or two-week readmission rate. Hospitals 
organize quality assurance programs internally, but do not make quality indicators 
publicly available. Utilization review is rarely exercised by the HIBs because they are not 
empowered to enforce the providers to cooperate. 
Consumer information is limited in China. Individual consumers know little about 
the service of the insurers and quality of the healthcare providers. Consumer choice of 
healthcare provider is based on their perceived reputation and the “stars” of the providers. 
The “stars” of providers might be an inaccurate indicator of quality. Evaluated by health 
authorities, the “stars” is based on the capacity of, rather than quality of providing care.
There exists large disparity in the density of healthcare providers across different 
regions in China. For example, in Jiangsu province, one of the wealthiest coastal prov-
inces in China, the number of licensed physicians per 1000 population is 1.56 in 2007 
(Department of Health Jiangsu Province 2007). In the meanwhile, this figure is only 0.95 
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in Gansu province, one of the least developed western provinces (National Bureau of 
Statistics of China 2009). Even in the more affluent provinces, the number of licensed 
physicians per 1000 population is smaller compared with that in the Netherlands. 
China’s National People’s Congress adopted a new Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) in Au-
gust 2008. However, the AML does not apply to social sectors that are crucial for people’s 
welfare. Although healthcare sector is not explicitly exempted from the AML, public hos-
pitals are considered to be highly related to social welfare and might be exempted from 
the AML. Therefore, there might be no valid competition regulation in the healthcare 
sector in China. 
In short, pre-conditions for the regulated competition are currently to a large extent 
unfulfilled in China.  
5. LESSONS FROM THE DUTCH EXPERIENCE AND DISCUSSIONS 
It has been 20 years since regulated competition was considered as the main line of the 
Dutch healthcare reform in 1988. During this period, the reform of regulated competition 
is slow but steady. In early 1990s, the public even considered the proposal of regulated 
competition a failure. This was not true. In fact, consecutive governments implemented 
policies that aimed at loosing governmental power and fulfilling the pre-conditions of 
competition in the healthcare sector. 
The Chinese government determines to reform its healthcare system with a large 
amount of investment. Same as the Dutch healthcare reform, it is hard to identify an ap-
propriate model and systematically work towards it. The Chinese government is aware 
of the importance of market mechanism in the healthcare sector in the government 
announcement that described the blueprint of the healthcare reform (Ministry of Health 
of China, 2009). However, some policies that may block the functioning of market force 
were implemented (with some implemented and then abolished during a very short 
period of time) after the publishing of the governmental announcement. These conflict-
ing actions of the government further indicate the comprehensiveness and the difficulty 
of the healthcare reform in China.
The reform of regulated competition is not yet finished in the Netherlands. However, 
at this stage, preliminary lessons can already be learned from the Dutch experiences:
1) Governmental strategy should be consistent in a long term.
Although regulated competition in the healthcare system was proposed by the Dekker 
Committee in 1988, it was only a political proposal at that time. When it came to political 
decision-making and implementation, the market-oriented program proved to be tech-
nically too complex. From 1988 to 1994, the government implemented several policies 
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to fulfill the pre-conditions for competition in the health insurance market, though real 
competition was not observed during that period.  During 1994 to 2000, the Dutch 
government even strengthened the control over the providers (Helderman et al. 2005). 
However, the government still insisted in creating the technical and institutional pre-
conditions for regulated competition. Insures were facing more and more financial 
risks. Since 1997, price competition had been observed among sickness funds (van de 
Ven, Schut 2000). The government also agreed on the convergence of sickness funds 
and private health insurance companies. In 2001, the Dutch government once again 
explicitly announced the reform plan of regulated competition (Helderman et al. 2005). 
Market oriented reforms has then been implemented not only in the health insurance 
sector but also in the health provision sector. The Dutch reform progress is slow but 
steady. Explicitly or implicitly, consecutive governments were (are) working on fulfilling 
the pre-conditions for regulated competition. 
If the Chinese government decides to introduce competition in the healthcare sector, 
it must take the time to prepare and implement the reform.
2) Fundamental changes may not take the form of revolutionary reforms.
Consecutive Dutch government chose the strategy of muddling-through, rather than 
breaking-through in the implementation of policies to avoid opponents from major in-
terest groups. In China, major interest groups in the healthcare sector include Ministry of 
Health (MOH) that represents healthcare providers and the insurer for rural populations, 
Ministry of Human Resource and Social Security (MOHRSS) that represents the insurer 
for urban populations, and patients. The recent initiations of healthcare reforming plans 
are results of internal and external conflicts among these interest groups. The Chinese 
government could learn from the Dutch government about the strategies of obtaining 
support from major interest groups and muddling-through the reform.
3) The government should take the lead of fulfilling the pre-conditions of a regulated 
competition model.
First, the government should have “willingness to change”, especially in terms of giving 
way to market force, though that may mean loss of “power”. We observe “willingness to 
change” in consecutive Dutch governments. The Chinese government showed strong 
willingness to change in recent years. However, willingness to change does not equal 
with “willingness to lose power”. The Chinese government has a long history of planning 
and controlling over the healthcare sector, especially over the providers. If the Chinese 
government decides to adopt more market mechanisms, it has to change from a plan-
ner and controller to a regulator.
Second, the government needs to be neutral in setting rules of the game. Providers 
in China have intimate relationships with MOH. Therefore the government may not be 
78 Chapter 4 
neutral and make policy decisions and treat public and private healthcare providers 
equally. For previously “public” entities, the government needs to strategically change 
them into risk-bearers. 
Last but not least, the government should fully aware of the difficulties and potential 
side-effects of allowing competition in the healthcare market. Preparations of data, 
talents, and management skills might take significant time.
REFERENCES
Ministry of Health of China, 2009, Guidelines and principles for planning health facilities in China, avail-
able: http://www.moh.gov.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/mohyzs/s3578/200908/42632.htm. 
accessed on 20 May, 2010.
OECD, 2009, OECD Health Data, Available: http://stats.oecd.org/BrandedView.aspx?oecd_bv_id=health-
data-en&doi=data-00348-en. Accessed on 10 Nov, 2010.
Blumenthal D, Hsiao W. 2005, “Privatization and its discontents–the evolving Chinese health care system”, 
The New England journal of medicine, vol. 353, no. 11, pp. 1165-1170. 
Department of Health Jiangsu Province, 2007, Jiangsu Health Development Statistics Newsbrief 2006, 
Department of Health Jiangsu Province, Nanjing. 
Enthoven A. 1978, Consumer choice health plan, New England Journal of Medicine, vol. 298, pp. 650-658 
709-720. 
Enthoven AC, van de Ven WPMM. 2007, Going Dutch–managed-competition health insurance in the 
Netherlands, The New England journal of medicine, vol. 357, no. 24, pp. 2421-2423. 
Ge YF. 2005, The evaluations and advice of the reforms of the health care system in China, Development 
Research Center of the State Council, Beijing. 
Grol R. 2006, Quality development in health care in the Netherlands, Radboud University Nijmegen Medi-
cal Centre, Nijmegen. 
Helderman J, Schut FT, van de Grinten TED, van de Ven WPMM. 2005, Market-oriented health care reform 
and policy learning in the Netherlands, Journal of Health Politics, Policy, and Law, vol. 30, no. 1-2, 
pp. 181-208. 
Lu CW, Wang QC. 2010, Research of the controlling over fund deposit of Urban Employees’ Basic Health 
Insurance Scheme, Economic Review, vol. 1, pp. 47-50. 
Ministry of Health China. 2008, Chinese Health Statistical Digest Available: http://www.moh.gov.cn/
newshtml/19165.htm, accessed on March 23 2009.  
National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2009 , China Statistics Yearbook 2008. 
Schut FT. 1992, Workable competition in health care: Prospects for the Dutch design, Social science & 
medicine, vol. 35, no. 12, pp. 1445-1455. 
State Council of China. 2009, Opinions of the State Council of China on Deepening Health Care Reform, 
People’s Publish, Beijing. 
Van de Ven WPMM, Schut FT. 2008, Universal mandatory health insurance in the Netherlands: A model for 
the United States? Health affairs, vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 771-781. 
Van de Ven WPMM, Schut FT. 2000, The first decade of market oriented health care reforms in the Neth-
erlands, Paper presented at the meeting of the European Health Care System Discussion Group, 
London School of Economics. London. September 14-15.
Chapter 5 
Competition in the Chinese hospital 
market – effective regulations required
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ABSTRACT
The Chinese government announced to encourage competition in the hospital sector. 
This paper examines the current room for competition in the Chinese hospital market 
and analyzes proper regulations to have a competitive hospital market. It is observed 
that the government rigidly regulates price and plans capacity of public hospitals, which 
are the major players in the hospital market. There is no level playground for public and 
private hospitals. Public hospitals face exit barriers. Consumer choice among hospitals is 
limited by reimbursement policies of major insurers. There is insufficient price and qual-
ity information about hospitals. We conclude that currently the extent of competition in 
the Chinese hospital market is limited. Market monopoly of public hospitals is regulated 
and supported by the government. International experience suggests that effective 
competition law is essential for a competitive market, including the hospital market. 
The Chinese hospital sector is in practice exempted from the Chinese Anti-Monopoly 
Law (AML). If the Chinese government decides to encourage competition in the hospital 
market, it is imperative to eliminate regulated monopoly and remove the hospitals’ ex-
emption from the AML, and to change its role from a player to a regulator in the market. 
KEY WORDS: Chinese hospital market, competition regulation, regulated monopoly
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1.  INTRODUCTION
Seeking a balance between equity and efficiency, combining governmental planning and 
market mechanisms … encouraging investment in the hospital market besides governmen-
tal subsidization, encouraging the development of private and for-profit hospitals and their 
cooperation with public and not-for-profit ones. 
(Ministry of Health of China 2010)
China has initiated a healthcare reform since 2009. As a part of the reform, the hospital 
reform has been a difficult one. Various pilot reforms have been experimented in 17 
cities since 2010. These pilot reforms include improving internal management capacity, 
formulating public hospital groups, separating healthcare service provision from selling 
pharmaceutical products, and conversion pubic hospitals into stake-holding hospitals, etc. 
According to the “Opinions of the State Council of China on Deepening Health Care 
Reform”, Chinese policymakers have been contemplating how to allow and encourage 
competition in the hospital market (State Council of China 2009). Because of multiple 
imperfections in a hospital market such as uncertainty and information asymmetry, com-
petition may lead to unintended results, such as a Medical Arms Race and risk selection 
in case of some payment schemes (Varkevisser 2009; Varkevisser, Capps & Schut 2008). 
Public hospitals are the key players in the Chinese hospital sector. Solo clinical practice 
is rare in China; almost all physicians are employed by public hospitals. Except for long-
term care, in- and out-patient services are mostly provided by public hospitals. Because 
of their dominant position in the hospital sector, and because they are embedded in 
a unique hierarchy, public hospital sector is difficult to be fundamentally reformed. 
Such a reform is considered as the most important and challenging part of the Chinese 
healthcare reform (News 2011). The Chinese government is attempting various reforms 
in the hospital sector, among which, several have been piloted to encourage hospital 
competition. One example is converting public hospitals into shareholding entities, 
aiming at giving public hospitals more autonomy and more incentives for efficiency. An-
other example is to loosen the restrictions regarding consumer choice among hospitals. 
The Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (MOHRSS), which is the Chinese 
social health insurance authority, has also officially encouraged local Health Insurance 
Bureaus (HIBs) to reimburse subscribers across administrative areas (News 2009), giv-
ing consumers a broader choice of hospitals and encouraging competition in a wider 
geographical area.
 Effective competition, however, is far more complex than giving hospitals autonomy 
and incentives for efficiency. There are a bundle of pre-conditions required, including 
open entry/exit of the hospital market, sufficient number of healthcare providers, free 
consumer choice, sufficient consumer information about price and quality, proper 
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product classification, effective quality measurement, and effective anti-monopoly law, 
etc. The enforcement of effective competition regulation1 is one of the most important 
prerequisites. However, even if effective competition is achieved in the Chinese hospital 
sector, it does not guarantee accessibility and affordability of healthcare, which are 
two important goals of the current healthcare reform. Specific pre-conditions must be 
fulfilled to achieve these goals, such as the existence of prudent purchaser(s) of care, ef-
fective risk equalization schemes, etc. In this paper, competition policies, among which 
one of the most important one is competition law will be investigated in the context of 
the Chinese healthcare reform, especially hospital reform.
The goal of our research is to examine the current regulations relevant to competition 
in the Chinese hospital market and to explore required regulations to enhance effective 
competition, focusing on the enforcement of the anti-monopoly law (AML). Required 
regulations are studied based on theory and international experience.  Our two research 
questions are: 
-	 What is the current room for competition in the Chinese hospital market? 
-	 What regulations are needed to encourage effective competition?
The structure of this paper is as following: section 2 is a brief introduction of the 
Chinese hospital sector. In section 3, the current room for competition in the Chinese 
hospital market is analyzed. In particular we analyze the existing competition-related 
regulations in the market, e.g. the Chinese AML. In section 4, proper regulations that are 
required for an effective competition in the hospital market are analyzed; international 
experience of implementing AML, especially in the hospital market, is discussed. In sec-
tion 5, one pilot reform in the Chinese public hospital sector is described and analyzed, 
focusing on its effect on competition. Conclusions and discussion are given in section 6.
2. BACKGROUND OF THE CHINESE HOSPITAL MARKET
When the hospital system was set up shortly after the establishment of the People’s 
Republic of China (in 1950), the Chinese central government created a typical commu-
nist healthcare system with a government-owned hospital network comprising tertiary, 
secondary, and primary hospitals. Physicians were salaried employees of hospitals and 
thus government employees. Solo practice did not exist except for ‘barefoot doctors’, 
who were salaried by rural communes in rural areas. Although the hospital sector has 
1.  We use the term ‘competition regulation’ rather than competition law because the Chinese 
government has a tradition of regulating the market with governmental regulations rather than 
laws.
Competition in the Chinese hospital market 83
experienced dramatic changes since 1980s, the 3-level hospital framework has remained 
largely unchanged. 
The responsibility of the Ministry of Health (MOH) of China includes nationwide su-
pervising and administrating, including capacity and human resource planning, of all 
healthcare facilities. It is also responsible for implementing the national basic medical 
system and administrating the health insurance scheme for rural populations (New Co-
operative Medical Scheme). Public hospitals are owned by the government and are thus 
all non-profit organizations. Although they are generally protected from bankruptcy, 
financial support from the government is limited. Governmental subsidy is on average 
only about 10% of a hospital’s total revenue – far from enough for daily operation (Egg-
leston et al. 2008). The base salary of medical staff in public hospitals is standardized 
by province, and is normally set as a basic living standard. Both hospital directors and 
employees are motivated to create extra revenue for internal allocation on employee 
benefits or hospital development. 
The National Committee of Development and Reform (NCDR), which is responsible 
for regulating the price of healthcare services, sets price of basic services lower than 
marginal costs (to make services affordable) and price of high-tech examinations higher 
than their marginal costs. At the same time, hospitals are allowed a 15% mark-up on 
drug price. Such a price schedule intentionally leaves room for hospitals to profit from 
drugs and high-tech examinations. This distorted pricing schedule leads to perverse 
incentives for hospitals to excessively use high-tech equipment and drugs (Hsiao, 2008). 
Such an incentive is passed on to physicians with various bonus schemes in hospitals. 
Generally speaking, the government gives public hospitals both incentives and leeways 
to pursue profits (Hsiao 2008). 
Solo practice has been allowed since mid-1990s, but it is rare. Private-owned hospitals 
are allowed within certain criteria. Before 2011, almost all private hospitals (defined ac-
cording to their private ownership) were automatically categorized as for-profit. Since 
2011 they can choose to be for- or not-for profit. 
According to MOH statistics, by the end of 2010 the number of public hospitals was 
almost twice of that of private hospitals (Ministry of Health China 2010). Public hospitals 
are generally much larger than private ones (by about eight times) in terms of hospital 
beds and number of physicians. Besides their superior capacity, public hospitals also 
have a higher utilization rate (90%) than private ones (59%). It is thus not surprising to 
find that public hospitals treat many more outpatients (by about 11 times) than private 
ones. This ratio is similar for inpatient admissions. In sum, public hospitals take a signifi-
cant share of the Chinese hospital market (Table 1). 
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3. CURRENT ROOM FOR COMPETITION IN CHINA’S HOSPITAL SECTOR
Competition in the Chinese hospital sector is hindered because of at least 7 reasons as 
following.
3.1 No enforcement of AML in the hospital sector
China’s AML was adopted in August 2007 by the National People’s Congress and came 
into force in August 2008. Three agencies, NCDR, the State Administration of Industry 
and Commerce (SAIC), and the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), have parallel en-
forcement authority (Wang 2008). MOFCOM conducts merger reviews and monitors 
international cooperation according to competition policies. SAIC is in charge of cartels, 
abuses of dominant market position, and abuses of governmental power that restricts 
competition. Monopolistic pricing behaviors fall within the exclusive authority of NDRC.
Key definitions in AML. The relevant market is defined as ‘a product or service (or a group 
of products or services) and a geographic area within which business operators compete 
during a certain period of time (AML art. 12). ‘Business operators’ has a broad meaning, 
including both natural and legal persons and any other entities that produce products 
or supply services (AML art. 12).
Scope of regulation in AML. The Chinese AML’s essential goals are prohibiting cartels 
(AML chp. 2), prohibiting abuse of dominant position (AML chp. 3), and controlling 
Mergers &Acquisitions (M&A) (AML chp. 4). Because many pricing and output restraints 
in China were organized or/and encouraged by industry associations, which operate 
under government authority, chapter 5 of the AML is devoted to regulated monopolies, 
i.e., monopolies caused and supported by the government because of their ubiquity. 
Regulated monopolies arise from many kinds of governmental actions such as restrict-
ing price competition in a particular industry or restricting market entry.
According to the AML, industry associations and government authorities cannot force 
individuals or undertakings to purchase the products or services that are provided by 
Table 1 Comparison of public hospitals and private hospitals in China (2010)
Public hospitals Private hospitals Ratio 
Number of hospitals 13,850 7,068 1.96
Hospital beds 3,013,768 373,669 8.07
Medical staff (thousands) 3,090 348 8.88
Outpatient visits (billions) 1.87 0.17 11
Admissions (millions) 87.24 8 10.91
Source: China health development statistical report 2010 (www.moh.gov.cn/)
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their members. It does not, however, explicitly deter government agencies from restrict-
ing competition. 
Enforcement of AML in China. Up to August 16, 2010,  MOFCOM had received about 140 
anti-monopoly lawsuits, most of which were M&A cases (Ministry of Commerce of China 
2010). However, no lawsuits against regulated monopoly have been brought to the AML 
to date. The lack of lawsuits against regulated monopoly and the difficulties in the draft-
ing process of AML regarding this topic suggest that regulated monopolies are a real 
stumbling block for the AML (Owen 2008).
Exemptions to the AML. Several sorts of undertakings are exempted from the AML. Under 
Articles 15 and 28, undertakings may obtain an exemption from the law if they can 
prove that their monopoly agreements or transactions satisfy the “public interest” cri-
teria. National security (Art. 7) and the agricultural industry (Art. 56) are also exempted 
from the AML.
The AML has not yet been enforced in the hospital market, primarily because public 
hospitals (i) provide products tightly related to the public interest and are therefore 
exempted from the AML and (ii) form a powerful anti-competition interest group mak-
ing the AML difficult to enforce (Zeng, Yu 2008). Although the applicability of AML in 
the hospital market is still under debate, numerous regulations have had anti- or pro-
competitive effects, which we now analyze.
3.2 Lack of autonomy of hospitals regarding capacity and pricing
Theory and evidence of price competition in the healthcare sector
In a hospital market, hospitals can compete on either price or quality, or both. If both 
quality and price competition are allowed (in case quality is measurable and both qual-
ity and price information is known by patients), Gaynor et al (2004) predicts based on 
theory that hospital competition may either increase or decrease quality. In this case, 
how providers respond to competition depends on the preference of patients.  If price 
competition among hospitals is introduced in a setting where quality is difficult to mea-
sure and purchasers face significant pressure to constrain costs, clinical quality can be 
harmed because providers tend to choose to differentiate themselves on the elements 
of care that purchasers of care can easily observe (i.e. price) at the expense of those that 
they cannot (i.e. clinical quality) (Gaynor, 2004).  This theory is supported by empirical 
researches from the US (Volpp et al, 2003) and the UK (Propper et al, 2004; Propper et al. 
2008), where the price competition significantly decreased clinical quality.
If price of healthcare services is regulated or set by the government and hospitals 
are given the incentives to compete, they can only compete on quality. Gaynor et al 
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(2004) also analyzed this scenario in their research. They concluded that faced with 
competition, as long as reimbursement rate are greater than hospitals’ marginal costs, 
hospitals will increase their quality in an effort to increase market share until their profits 
approach zero. Empirical studies in the US and UK support this theory (Cooper et al, 
2011; Gaynor et al, 2010; Kessler et al, 2000). 
In both scenarios, effective quality measures and publicizing quality information are 
important pre-conditions to hospitals competition result in outcomes desired by the 
government and the public.
Hospital capacity and pricing in China
In the Chinese hospital market where quality is not well measured, it is dangerous to 
allow free price competition. At this stage, proper government regulated price is maybe 
desirable. The Chinese government has different price regulations for non-profit (NFP) 
hospitals (all public hospitals and some private) and for-profit (FP) ones (some private 
hospitals) (Ministry of Health China 2000). The central government issues price-setting 
guidelines, defining items and healthcare services. Provincial governments are respon-
sible for setting service-based governmental guiding prices (e.g., price for diagnostic, 
nursing, routine blood test, or abdominal ultrasound) for NFP hospitals, around which 
NFPs are allowed a price float range of ±15%. In practice, price variation among public 
hospitals is rarely observed. FPs follow market price, and have no price constraints. 
The biggest pitfall with pricing is the distorted pricing scheme described in section 2, 
which intentionally leaves large profit room for high-tech examinations and drug and 
set lower-than-costs price to basic healthcare services. This distorted pricing schedule 
leads to perverse incentives for hospitals to excessively use high-tech equipment and 
drugs (Hsiao, 2008). Such an incentive is passed on to physicians with various bonus 
schemes in hospitals. Such a pricing scheme gives wrong price signals to healthcare 
providers and seriously inhibits effective competition that might leads to better quality 
of care. The Chinese health authority plans local healthcare in terms of the number of 
hospitals (and their level), hospital beds, and medical staff (Ministry of Health of China 
2009). A top-down and static plan is made every five years by predicted number of beds 
needed in a specific area based on previous number of inpatients, hospital bed turnover, 
and utilization rates, as well as an assumed increasing rate. Local health authorities are 
responsible for ensuring that all health facilities, public and private, follow the plan. 
Purchasing decisions on high-tech medical devices in hospitals are also subjects to the 
approval of national or regional health authorities (Ministry of Health of China 1995). 
The planning logic is similar to that of hospital beds. Besides these regulations, the 
government controls the number of physicians nationwide by controlling the number 
of medical students that each university may enroll. 
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In conclusion, public hospitals in China, which take a large share of the hospital mar-
ket, do not have autonomy in terms of capacity building and pricing. The government 
tightly controls over the capacity and price of the public hospitals.
3.3 No effective entry/exit to the market
In 2004 the MOH explicitly encouraged private and foreign investments in the hospital 
market. The government further loosened entrance regulations for private and foreign 
investments in the hospital market at the end of 2010. For example, private hospitals 
were given priority if the government considers more hospitals or healthcare facilities in 
a certain area (Council of developing and reform et al. 2010). 
Private hospitals can apply for bankruptcy according to the Enterprise Bankruptcy 
Law of China (issued on August 27, 2006). However, there is currently no clear market 
exit mechanism for public hospitals. If a public hospital runs a deficit, local government 
usually supports it with (more) subsidization, or provides it with better policy than previ-
ous. 
Thus, the current Chinese hospital market is far from a contestable market.    
3.4  No level playground for private and public hospitals
Real obstacles for private hospitals, however, lie not in entering the market but surviving 
it. Because of four major reasons, it is difficult for private hospitals to compete with the 
public ones. 
First, public hospitals have advantages in terms of taxation. Public hospitals are tax-
exempt. Private hospitals face 16 sorts of taxes, including a VAT, operation tax, and en-
terprise income tax after an initial three-year tax exemption period. On average, private 
hospitals are taxed about 10.6% of annual revenue (Chen 2008). 
Second, public hospitals have privileges in terms of contracting with major payers. 
Public hospitals contract with HIBs much more easily than private ones because both 
public hospitals and HIBs are government branches. In urban areas local HIBs are the 
major social health insurer covering the employed and retired populations (Urban 
Employees’ Basic Health Insurance) and are currently expanding to the unemployed 
(Urban Residents’ Basic Health Insurance). The two insurance schemes cover more than 
80% of the urban population (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2011). In rural areas 
local health authorities are responsible for New Cooperative Medical Scheme, which 
covers 96.3% of the population (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2011). The in-
sured can choose freely among hospitals, but are reimbursed only if they are treated in 
contracted hospitals. Although reimbursement rate varies widely across different insur-
ance schemes and areas, it is essential for hospitals that they obtain a contract with the 
local insurance agencies. Nearly all public hospitals have such contracts; a large share 
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of private hospitals does not have them. For example, only 20% of private hospitals in 
Shanghai have contracts with the local government insurance agencies (Chen 2008). 
Third, insurers implement different payment scheme to public and private hospitals. 
Once a hospital obtains a contract with local insurers, they generally reimburse on a 
fee-for-service (FFS) basis. The price follows the government schedule and is generally 
set higher for higher level hospitals than lower level ones. The accreditation system that 
determines hospital level, however, only applies to public ones. Private hospitals are left 
unaccredited. According to reimbursement policies, unaccredited hospitals can only be 
reimbursed according to the schedule of primary (the lowest level) hospitals and thus 
receive the lowest price regardless of quality and capacity. 
Fourth, public hospitals have advantages over private ones in attracting top-level 
talents. Public hospital physicians are government employees (i.e., more permanent 
employment); those in private hospitals have less job security and fewer career advance-
ment opportunities. Besides that, public hospitals generally have a better reputation 
than private hospitals, and thus are more attractive for top-level physicians. With dif-
ficulties in attracting top talents, private hospitals have problems with quality. 
In December 2010, the central government decided again to encourage private invest-
ment in the hospital market (Council of developing and reform et al. 2010). According to 
a governmental document issued in December 2010, the regulations that have effects 
of unequal-treatment for public and private hospitals, such as taxation difference, con-
tracting difference, different payment scheme, have supposedly been removed (Council 
of developing and reform et al. 2010). While it is too early to evaluate the impact of this 
governmental action, it gives a signal that the government is at least attempting to level 
the playing field for private and public hospitals.
3.5 Lack of purchasing techniques of major health insurers
Major social health insurers in China are governmental branches. Their role is getting 
more and more important because of the increasing share of the population covered 
by social health insurance schemes. However, most of them perform still as third party 
payers, rather than third party purchasers because of their poor capacity of purchasing. 
They reimburse contracted hospitals mainly on a Fee-for Service (FFS) basis defined in 
most areas by the provincial government. At the same time, competition among hos-
pitals is hindered because major payers are unable to negotiate prices effectively as a 
result of poor product classification.
Some experiments with payment schemes such as global budgets, capitation, and 
Diagnosis-Related Groups (DRGs) have recently arisen in developed areas such as Bei-
jing, Shanghai, and Jiangsu province, but their enforcement varies. For example, the HIB 
of Wuxi, Jiangsu province sets global budgets for each contracted hospital but even 
when a public hospital exceeded it by 30%, the HIB made up the deficit after negotiating 
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with the local health authority, which is the pillar of public city hospitals2. The global 
budget system does not in practice financially restrain public hospitals.
The Beijing HIB has experimented with reimbursement based on certain DRGs since 
1993. In 2011 a payment scheme based on 104 DRGs3 was encouraged in more areas by 
the MOH (Ministry of Health of China 2010). Local HIBs can choose from the 104 DRGs for 
their own pilot experiments. It is too early to evaluate their level of use.  
3.6 Restricted consumer choice
In principle, consumers can choose their hospitals but subscribers are reimbursed only 
if choosing the hospital that contracts with the local social health insurers. In practice, 
local insurers normally contract only with public hospitals in the same administrative 
region. Consumer choice in practice is therefore to a large extent restricted among 
public hospitals and within an administrative region. In theory, this restriction has been 
loosened because the MOHRSS has tried to remove limitations of consumer choice by 
encouraging reimbursement across administrative regions (News 2009). However, the 
actual implementation of this policy is however currently unobserved.
3.7 Insufficient consumer information
Hospitals are obliged by health authorities to show the price of their products explicitly 
to the consumers. Most hospitals follow the regulation and display prices on a digital or 
white board in their lobbies. What they show, however, are item-based prices according 
to the NCDR and its local branches. Without effective product classification, it is almost 
impossible for consumers to compare prices, because care usually comprises a bundle 
of items or services. 
Quality is not effectively measured for hospitals in China. There is no official quality 
report for hospitals. Consumers are also poorly informed about quality. The only indi-
cation of quality of healthcare service is a hospital’s level or star, which is assigned by 
health authorities based on capacity rather than quality of hospitals.  
3.8 Conclusion
Current regulations with pro- or anti-competitive effects are summarized in Table 2. The 
emerging of these barriers is mostly due to the traditional relationship between public 
hospitals and the governmental agencies that act as the umbrella organizations. These 
regulations are still in place today mostly because the interest groups (mainly large public 
hospitals and relevant governmental branches), which benefit from a non-competitive 
market, have strong incentives to blockage any pro-competitive regulations. As they 
2.  Information is from an interview with the director of Wuxi HIB (March 26, 2011).
3.  The number of DRGs is small compared to other countries. 
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are in the position of being able to heavily influence policies, these anti-competition 
regulations are still in place today. Although the Chinese government announced to 
encourage competition in the hospital sector, anti-competitive regulations widely exist 
while those with pro-competitive effect are rare. Governments of different levels have 
strong power of implementing various “policies” regardless of their effect on the room 
of competition in the hospital sector. Because of the fact that AML is not enforceable 
in the public hospital sector, it is extremely hard to break the government-supported 
regulated monopoly. 
4. PROPER REGULATIONS REQUIRED
If the Chinese government really wants to allow and encourage competition in the 
hospital market, all the regulative obstacles should be removed. However, a free market 
is not necessarily perfectly competitive. The degree of imperfect competition depends 
more on provider behavior (strategic provider interaction, behaviors intended to control 
price) than on market structure. These anti-competitive behaviors should be banned if 
competition is desired in a hospital market. Although the hospital market has several 
specific characteristics (e.g. information asymmetry, uncertainty, differentiated prod-
ucts, etc.), these characteristics do not exempt the hospital market from competition 
laws because most other markets that are not exempted from competition laws are also 
not text-book markets (Gaynor, Vogt 2000). Another important issue is that the market 
power of hospitals is not necessarily beneficial to consumers. The major goal of competi-
tion regulation is to ban the abusive behavior of a market-dominating entity (Samuel-
Table 2 Summary of regulations regarding the Chinese hospital market competition
Pro-competition regulations
Disseminating valid and reliable consumer information about price and quality No
Effective product classification No
Enforceable Anti-monopoly Law No
Level playground for public/private hospitals No
Free consumer choice among hospitals Noa
Anti-competition regulations
Inappropriate price control Yes
Capacity control (hospital beds, medical staff, high-tech equipment) Yesb
Entry/exit obstacles Yesc
a In theory no restriction within an administrative area. Choice across administrative area is to a certain extent 
restricted. This restriction has been loosened since 2009. In practice, this regulation has not been implemented.
b Hospitals may use other strategies to overcome capacity control from the government.
c It is gradually removed since 2011.
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son, Nordhaus 1998). Therefore, an effective competition law should be applicable in the 
Chinese hospital sector. An effective and applicable competition law needs to have the 
following basic elements according to international experience. 
4.1 Classification of competition laws
Competition laws can be classified according to the objectives of jurisprudence:  
i. Cartels. An important assumption in a competitive market is that individual 
undertakings independently determine product price and quantity. Cartels are agree-
ments about price, quantity, market division, or market share among providers. They can 
have anti-competitive effects and are forbidden by most anti-competitive laws.
In the US, physicians and hospitals have a tradition of self-regulation by professional 
associations or networks that may also provide their members platforms for creating 
cartels over price or price-related terms or agreements to obstruct innovative forms of 
healthcare delivery. In the US, they are forbidden by the Federal Trade Committee (FTC) 
anti-trust actions. In 2003 the FTC reached an agreement with a network of doctors and 
hospitals in northeast Maine, under which the organization stopped negotiating with 
third-party payers on behalf of its members (Federal Trade Commission 2003). 
In China, professional associations or networks are less powerful compared to their 
US counterparts. However, the distorted price schedules and capacity regulations by 
the government in practice create Cartels among public hospitals. These governmental 
regulations can be defined as administrative monopoly according to the Chinese AML 
They should be forbidden by AML if competition is to be encouraged in the Chinese 
hospital sector. However, most governmental regulations are considered to be in favor 
of public interest (which is exempted from the AML according to chapter 1, article 7 of 
the Chinese AML). Up till now, there has been no case in China against administrative 
monopoly.
ii. Abuse of dominant position. If a company legally gains a dominant position, 
it is forbidden to abuse it by, for example, predatory pricing, binding contracts, price 
discrimination, or refusing to provide essential facility to a competitor. An example is the 
1990 ‘Dr. Friedman case’ in the US (Meier, Albert & Brau 2011). Medicare set a fixed price 
for the out-patient dialysis of its beneficiaries, but no price limit for in-patient dialysis. Dr. 
Friedman, who owned a dialysis clinic with a dominant position that was judged by the 
FTC, required the physicians who sent their out-patients to his clinic for dialysis to also 
send their hospitalized patients to his clinic for dialysis (binding contract). At the same 
time, Dr. Friedman charged higher than average price on inpatients dialysis. In 1990, 
such a binding contract behavior of Dr. Friedman was forbidden by the FTC. 
In Article 17 of the Chinese AML, six types of abusive conduct are prohibited, includ-
ing selling or buying goods at unfairly high or low prices, selling goods at a price below 
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cost without valid reasons, refusing to trade with another party without valid reasons, 
restricting another party to a transaction to dealing exclusively with it, or only with des-
ignated undertakings without valid reasons, tying products without a valid reason, or 
imposing other unreasonable conditions of trade, applying different price or transaction 
terms to equivalent trading parties without valid reasons, and other abusive conduct as 
might be recognized by the relevant antimonopoly enforcement authorities.
Since the enforcement of AML, there have been some cases regarding abuse of domi-
nant position. Various types of companies have been involved, including pharmaceuti-
cal companies (for example Shandong Weifang Shuntong Pharmaceutical company), 
internet search engines (for example Baidu), and some state-owned enterprise (for 
example China Telecom, China Unicom, and Hebei Salt company) (Wang, 2012).
iii. Merger &Acquisition Firms opt for M&As to consolidate a fragmented market, 
increase their operational efficiency, and give them a competitive edge. Some mergers, 
however, substantially reduce competition or even lead to a monopoly power. M&A 
rules monitor M&A behavior and limit the degree of concentration in a relevant market. 
Hospital mergers have proved to be a difficult part of the antitrust enforcement world-
wide. In the US, the first hospital merger case was brought to the FTC in 1981. From 1981 
to 1997, the FTC and the Department of Justice (DOJ) received 956 merger applications 
involving general acute care hospitals. The agencies challenged only 2 percent of them 
(Leibenuft 2007). The Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa) from 2004 to 2007 has 
permitted all 6 hospital mergers seeking approval (Varkevisser, Capps & Schut 2008). 
Different forms of M&As among public hospitals are organized by the government in 
the Chinese hospital sector, without proper supervision by the AML authorities. Their 
effects on competition are also rarely analyzed.  However, M&A cases in other market 
sectors are reviewed by MOC. One example is that Coca-Cola’s bid to acquire China Hui-
yuan (one of the largest juice company in China) is rejected by the MOC (News, 2009). 
4.2 A relevant market
If AML would be applicable in the Chinese hospital market, it is also necessary to define 
a relevant market. The Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued by the U.S. DOJ and the FTC 
in 1997 defined a market as 
“… A product or a group of products and a geographic area in which it is produced 
or sold such that a hypothetical profit-maximizing firm, not subject to price regulation, 
that was the only present and future producer or seller of those products in that area 
likely would impose at least a small but significant and nontransitory increase in price, 
assuming the terms of sale of all other products are held constant.”
A relevant market is “a group of products and a geographic area that is no bigger than 
necessary to satisfy this test” (US. Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission 
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April 2, 1992). The two principle dimensions in defining a relevant market are product 
and geography.
A relevant product market. The degree of demand and supply substitutability is impor-
tant to the scope of a relevant product market. 
There is little debate about the relevant product market for hospitals. In US hospital 
merger cases, it has been defined as “a broad group of medical and surgical diagnostic 
and treatment services for acute medical conditions that the patient must retain in a 
health care facility for at least 24 hours for recovery or observation” (DOJ, FTC 2004). 
Despite the general acceptance of the concept, few researchers have attempted to 
disaggregate the product market to differentiate inpatient care (Zwanziger, Melnick & 
Eyre 1994, Sacher, Silvia 1998). Although theoretically sound, the approach has not been 
widely employed in antitrust analyses. 
A relevant geographic market. A relevant geographic market pertains to where products 
are produced or sold. The determinants of a relevant geographic market in the hospital 
context are subjects of much research. Elzinga and Hogarty (E/H) approach (Elzinga, 
Hogarty 1978; Elzinga, Hogarty 1973) and the three-step Critical Loss analysis introduced 
by Harris and Simons (Harris, Simons 1989) are both widely used in deciding a relevant 
geographic market. Several other approaches – time-elasticity, competitor share, op-
tion demand – have been proposed that include consideration of consumers’ relative 
insensitivity to price of healthcare services and the overly broad nature of ‘general acute 
care’ as a product (Varkevisser et al. 2008).
In practice, it is crucial to choose a suitable way of defining a relevant geographic 
market according to the context of a specific healthcare system. For example, in Ger-
many, the courts tend to use a stringent way of defining a relevant geographic market 
for hospital merging cases; while in the Netherlands and especially in the US, the courts 
tend to under-estimate the anti-competitive effects of hospitals mergers and use a more 
permissive way of defining a relevant geographic market for hospitals (Varkevisser et al, 
2012). According to the Chinese AML, the definition of a relevant market is in-line with 
the definition adopted by the US anti-competition law. However, there has been very 
little, if not no, effort made to adjust this definition especially in the hospital market.
4.3 Conclusion 
The goals and the key definitions of the Chinese AML are consistent with that in the 
US. The implementation of the AML depends not only on the law itself, but also on the 
broad social background, in which the law is rooted. In China, the main challenge lies in 
the implementation of the AML. 
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Although abuse of administrative power is prohibited by the Chinese AML, it is the 
most difficult part in enforcement. If the Chinese government determines to encourage 
competition in the hospital sector and to enforce AML in this sector, it is an important 
first step to disentangle the currently tight relationship between public hospitals and 
the (local) government. Only when public hospitals are independent from the govern-
ment, is it possible that AML can be enforced in this sector.
5. ONE EXAMPLE OF PILOT REFORMS IN THE CHINESE HOSPITAL MARKET
Since 2010, several ongoing pilot reforms that may have impact on competition in the 
Chinese hospital market have been implemented in some pilot cities. One example is 
the reform of changing public hospitals into share-holding entities in Luoyang in 2010 
(Department of Health Luoyang 2010).
The city government of Luoyang (2008 population: 6.54 million) made public hospi-
tals share-holding entities in December 2010 (Department of Health Luoyang 2010). The 
plan is to gradually transit government-owned public hospitals into shareholder-owned 
(by employees or other investors) public hospitals. With such reform the government is 
attempting to transit from a player in the hospital market to a referee. 
The goal of the government is to give more incentives for efficiency to the public 
hospitals, to give more autonomy to the public hospitals over their strategies, and even-
tually to encourage competition in the hospital sector. Therefore this reform is by itself a 
pro-competitive one. However, whether the reform creates room for competition is de-
termined not only by changing the ownership of the hospitals in the market, but also by 
the fulfillment of other pre-conditions, including giving the public hospitals autonomy 
over their products and price, clearance of entry/exit obstacles, free consumer choice, 
sufficient consumer information, effective product classification, enforceable AML, and 
level playground for both public and private hospitals. Given the government’s limited 
financial control over public hospitals even when owning them, changing ownership 
may only have a limited effect on hospitals’ financial motivation. While All other influen-
tial factors remain unchanged, the change of ownership alone may have limited impact 
on the efficiency of hospitals. For example, because of insufficient consumer informa-
tion available, hospitals might compete only on price and not quality of care. This will be 
harmful for the consumers and the society because a “market of lemon” will be created 
(Hoffer, Pratt 1987). 
In sum, the Luoyang government showed its willingness to change in this pilot. One 
pre-condition for a competitive hospital market: giving autonomy to public hospitals, 
is to be fulfilled to a certain degree. This suggests a step forward towards a competitive 
hospital market.
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6. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
6.1 Conclusion
The Chinese government is attempting to allow and encourage competition in the 
hospital market. Effective competition, however, does not naturally arise from consumer 
choice and motivated providers. Other important pre-conditions are required, such as 
the enforcement of AML in the hospital sector, forbidding the government from abusing 
its administrative power in the hospital market,  creating a level playground for public 
and private hospitals, giving consumers sufficient choice and disseminating reliable 
consumer information, as well as conducting valid and reliable quality measurement of 
hospitals. 
Based on the observation of the current regulations in the Chinese hospital sector, 
we conclude that the current room for competition is limited because of the prevailing 
regulated monopoly supported by the government. The government heavily regulates 
capacity and price, has no effective product classification system, creates exit obstacles 
for public hospitals, and disseminates rarely any (if not no) reliable and publicly available 
quality information about hospitals. Private and public hospitals are treated differently 
in terms of taxation and contracting with insurers. Private hospitals also face difficulties 
in attracting top-level talents, and thus can hardly compete with public hospitals, even 
if they are allowed to enter the market. 
Although competition laws have been enforced in the healthcare sector in several 
countries, the Chinese hospital market is in practice exempted from AML. Governmental 
regulations, cartels, and M&As among public hospitals are therefore also exempted 
from the examination of anti-monopoly authorities before their implementation. Such a 
context suppresses effective competition. 
If the Chinese government decides to further encourage competition in the hospital 
market, we propose several necessary pre-conditions, which should be fulfilled:
• Eliminating regulated monopolies in the hospital market. 
• Transiting the government’s role from an owner and administrator of public hospi-
tals to a regulator who sets the rules of the game. 
• Removing the hospital market’s exemptions from AML enforcement.
6.2 Discussion
A competitive hospital market requires both the existence and the enforcement of 
the proper regulations. The enforcement of regulations is problematic in China. The 
interaction between public hospitals and social health insurers is now often an internal 
discussion process between the MOH and MOHRSS and their local branches, though 
insurers always have formal contracts with public hospitals regarding quality and price 
of healthcare service. Public hospitals can easily challenge contracts with local HIBs, 
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which leads to ineffective negotiation. Building the capacity to enforce regulations in 
the Chinese hospital market is essential.
Key stakeholders in the Chinese hospital market have different interest and goals, 
which lead to sometimes conflicting regulations. MOH represents public hospitals and 
emphasizes generating high quality healthcare and removing financial constraints. Two 
other ministries are the payers (besides individual patients) of the healthcare providers. 
MOF is responsible for allocating governmental subsidies to health authorities, which 
then organizes allocation among public hospitals. MOHRSS acts as the major health in-
surer. Both MOF and MOHRSS emphasize cost constraints and therefore expect hospitals 
to provide care efficiently, while MOH still tends to work as a protective pillar of public 
hospitals. All the key stakeholders should cooperate with each other in the implementa-
tion of other pro-competitive regulations and clearance of anti-competitive ones, in 
order to create a competitive hospital market.
An essential, but not sufficient, condition of a competitive market is the existence of 
multiple independent hospitals. This basic assumption has yet to be fulfilled in China. 
Public hospitals are still to a large extent controlled and protected by the government. 
The government might continually encounter conflicts among its branches when initi-
ating pro-competition regulations. And even if they are initiated, their enforcement is 
hardly guaranteed. The government indicates willingness to change. However, there is 
still a long way to go.
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ABSTRACT: 
The Chinese government is considering a (regulated) competitive healthcare system. 
Sufficient consumer information is a crucial pre-condition to benefit from such a 
change. We conducted a survey on the level of consumer information regarding health 
insurance among the insured population in Nanjing, China in 2009. The results from 
descriptive analysis and binary logistic regression demonstrate that the current level of 
consumer information about health insurance is low. The level of consumer information 
is positively correlated with the subscribers’ motivation to obtain the information and its 
availability. The level of searching for health insurance information is also low; moreover, 
even upon searching, the chance of finding relevant information is less than 25%. We 
conclude that the level of consumer information is currently insufficient in China. If the 
Chinese government is determined to adopt market mechanisms in the healthcare sec-
tor, it should take the lead in making valid and reliable information publicly available 
and easily accessible. 
KEY WORDS: consumer information; health insurer; regulated competition; China, 
healthcare reform
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INTRODUCTION
In 2007, the Chinese government initiated a wave of healthcare reforms and promised to 
increase government funding in the healthcare sector by 1-1.5% of GDP in the coming 
years (Hsiao 2007, Yip & Hsiao 2008). It is still too early to evaluate the major reforms 
aimed at building a universal health insurance system and strengthening healthcare 
provision, which have been instituted thus far. In its ongoing effort towards structured 
healthcare, the government is considering allowing private health insurance companies 
to operate in the social health insurance sector. This is actually a step towards the regu-
lated competition in the health insurance market.
A model of regulated competition means that the government regulates the market 
to achieve pubic goals (e.g. accessibility, affordability, and good quality of care), while 
consumers periodically choose among competing health insurers and health insurers 
selectively contract with competing healthcare providers. It is highly recommended that 
several pre-conditions must be fulfilled for the system to achieve intended outcomes 
such as efficiency and equity ((Xu & van de Ven 2009, Xu et al. 2010). If the pre-conditions 
are currently not met, the government should pay efforts in fulfilling them during the 
process of the market-oriented reform. Sufficient consumer information is an important 
per-condition. 
Consumer information about health insurance has not to our knowledge been studied 
in China. Although the Chinese health insurance sector is overall a non-competitive one, 
it is arbitrary to have any conclusions about the current level of consumer information. 
We thus conducted an empirical study of the insured in Nanjing, China to examine the 
current levels of (i) consumer information about health insurance and (ii) searching for 
health insurance information.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in the second section, the importance 
of consumer information in a competitive healthcare market is discussed in theory and 
practice. The third section describes the health insurance information survey in Nanjing, 
including a background description, methods, and results. The fourth section ends with 
conclusions and discussions. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSUMER INFORMATION IN A COMPETITIVE 
HEALTHCARE MARKET
Theoretical background
Informed consumers know the price distribution of a product in the market via searching 
or advertisement (Janssen, Non 2008). Varian (1980) formulated a mathematical model 
that suggests price approaches marginal cost in proportion to the growth of informed 
102 Chapter 6 
consumers. The market is thus more competitive with a large share of informed consum-
ers. If the share is small, price dispersion is likely to vary widely (Parakhonyak 2010). 
If the share of active consumers increases and the number of informed consumers is 
sufficient, the price will approach that of a perfect competition (Salop & Stiglitz 1977; 
Waterson 2003). This suggests that the level of consumer information and how consum-
ers use information can significantly influence the competitiveness of a market. 
If consumers are provided with information that is not directly related to decision 
making, they need the knowledge and the time to filter out unnecessary information. 
Unnecessary information is an obstacle to utilizing information. Similarly, information 
must be understandable or consumers will ignore it or consider it unimportant (Hibbard 
1997). 
Theoretically, consumer information is effective only if the following criteria are satis-
fied: 
• The source of information is reliable.
• Information is valid.
• Indicators are consistent with the aspects they measure; quality measurement re-
flects consumers’ and professionals’ perceived quality. 
• Information about price and quality is accurate and up-to-date.
• Information is publicly available and easily accessible.
• Information is understandable for consumers of average intelligence in the society. 
• Information is relevant.
In the health insurance market, products are highly heterogeneous. Consumer infor-
mation about their quality and content (e.g. benefit package) is as important as price. 
Therefore, effective consumer information about quality, content, and price is essential 
to both consumers in decision making and insurers in maintaining or increasing the 
number of their customers. 
Sufficient consumer information is an essential pre-condition of an efficient competi-
tive healthcare market but it is not necessary that all the consumers should actively use 
the information in a competitive health insurance/care market. Insurers are motivated 
to improve their performance if a sufficient share of consumers actively uses consumer 
information because they want to maintain or expand their market share (market force 
mechanism) (Hibbard 2008). Moreover, when insurers cannot discriminate between 
informed and uninformed consumers, price can work as a signal of quality and actu-
ally convey part of the information from the informed to the uninformed (Grossman & 
Stiglitz 1976; Linnemer 2002). 
Some people expect a sufficient level of consumer information to generate a high 
switching rate in the market, but that the switching rate can be used as an indicator of 
the level of competition is a misunderstanding. In a market with perfect competition – 
an extreme scenario – all consumers stay with their choices because they are the most 
Level of consumer information in China 103
suitable choices in the market. In this case, the switching rate is zero. In a competitive 
healthcare market, even if only 5% of the consumers switch from poor performers to 
good ones, the former may continue to lose market share each year unless they improve. 
There is no single suitable market churn rate: looking at other highly competitive mar-
kets, we see churn rates that vary widely according to the type of product (Chiu 2005; 
Saba 2007). We can at least make the statement that the churn rate is not necessarily 
correlated with the level of consumer information and competition. 
We conclude that, in theory, a sufficient level of consumer information is essential for 
a competitive healthcare market. Health insurers are motivated to improve efficiency by 
lowering price or enhancing quality if they (i) know that consumers have sufficient con-
sumer information and (ii) cannot discriminate between the informed and uninformed. 
Determining the extent to which the level of consumer information is ‘sufficient’ is an 
empirical question.
Evidence of the effect of consumer information in a healthcare market 
Effects of consumer information on consumer choice. When consumer information is 
understandable, consumers generally value and use it (Bundorf 2009). Consumers tend 
to choose better performing health plans and providers and respond to initiatives that 
provide quality information, though the response varies significantly among consumers 
and across population subgroups (Beaulieu 2002; Jin & Sorensen, 2006; Kolstad 2009; 
Wedig & Tai-Seale 2002). Quality information also has an impact on consumers’ choice of 
managed care organizations (Scanlon et al. 2002). Chernew et al. (2008) have found that 
consumers have a moderately high willingness to pay to avoid plans with bad ratings. 
Consumers are sensitive to information that is new to them (Levesque 2006; Dranove & 
Sfekas 2008). 
A few studies report that consumer information has no effect on consumers’ choice of 
health plan (Farley 2002a, 2002b). However, Farley (2002b) found with subgroup analy-
sis that consumers who actually read the quality report chose plans with high scores 
compared with a control group. In another study, Abraham and Feldman et al. (2006) 
found no evidence to support either a link between quality information and switching 
behavior, or between perceived health plan satisfaction and switching. But as discussed 
above, switching as an indicator of the level of consumer information utilization can be 
misleading.
Even in those studies finding no effect of consumer information on consumer choice, 
no author ruled out the necessity of a sufficient level of consumer information. Possible 
explanations of consumers’ non-responsiveness are (i) consumers may define “good 
quality” differently from experts and industry leaders (Fung 2008); (ii) some information 
may be too complex for consumers to use; and (iii) consumers may already have the 
information and are no longer influenced by it.
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We conclude from the empirical research that consumer information can influence 
consumers’ choice of insurers. The empirical findings further emphasize the importance 
of satisfying the criteria of effective consumer information. How information is pre-
sented affects its interpretation and weight in decision-making (Hibbard 2002; Hendriks 
& Spreeuwenberg 2009). A good provider of quality information will report it in such a 
way that it allows consumers to easily identify the good performers. 
Quality improvement efforts of insurers. In theory, publicly available information leads to 
quality improvement through the market mechanism.  Hendriks and Spreeuwenberg 
(2009) found that quality of health plans scoring below average increased more than 
those scoring average or above. Consumer information had a positive effect on insurers’ 
quality improvement initiatives, especially among those ranked low in public reports.
Consumers’ attitude towards insurers and providers. Consumers update their views 
regarding the quality of healthcare providers and can accurately recall the hospitals 
ranked as high or low performers two months after the release of a report about hospital 
performance (Hibbard 2005). Changing consumers’ attitude towards specific providers 
is an important step before actually steering the consumers to better performers.  
Conclusion of the literature. We conclude from the previous empirical studies that a suf-
ficient level of consumer information has multiple effects in a competitive healthcare 
market. Most empirical studies support the theoretical argument for the importance 
of sufficient consumer information. Quality scores and rankings influence consumers’ 
choice. Consumers’ attitudes towards a specific insurer or provider are influenced by 
public reports. Insurers rated below average in quality reports tend to make quality 
improvement initiatives. 
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CONSUMER INFORMATION ABOUT HEALTH 
INSURANCE IN NANJING
Background 
Nanjing, an eastern Chinese city, has 6.17 million residents within 6582 square kilome-
ters (anonymous 2010). It was chosen by the Chinese government as a pilot area for 
the healthcare reforms because of its relatively high level of economic development. 
Its health insurance schemes are detailed below; the first three cover about 90% of the 
population (anonymous 2009). 
•	 Urban Employees’ Basic Health Insurance (UEB): Urban employees and retirees are 
mandatorily covered by the UEB, which has a city-wide risk pool and is managed by 
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the Health Insurance Bureau (HIB) of Nanjing. The UEB is funded by a combination 
of employee and employer contributions as a percentage of enrollees’ salary. The 
employees’ contribution is deducted from their salaries and sent to the HIB by their 
employers. The percentage is based on subscriber’s employment status (employed, 
retired, or self-employed) and ranges between 2% and 8%. 
• New Cooperative Medicine (NCM): NCM is a health insurance scheme with open 
enrolment and community rating. Rural residents2 can join the NCM voluntarily and 
are encouraged to do so. Subscribers pay a premium to the local health authority, 
which is in charge of the plan. The central and local governments also contribute a 
certain amount of money to the risk pool. The NCM has district-level risk pools and 
is managed by district-level health authorities, which are branches of the city health 
department. The premium of NCM varies across districts because contributions from 
local governments vary. Generally speaking, the premium for NCM is low in order to 
attract subscribers; on the other hand, copayments are high. The benefit package is 
far less comprehensive than the UEB.
• Urban Residents’ Basic Health Insurance Scheme (URB): With open enrolment and 
community rating, URB is a voluntary health insurance scheme implemented in 2008 
for students or unemployed urban residents. As with the NCM, the government sub-
sidizes subscribers and it is characterized by low premiums, a non-comprehensive 
benefit package, and high copayments.
• Government Free Medicine (GFM): Covering government officers and employees of 
not-for-profit organizations such as universities and public hospitals, GFM is financed 
through local taxation and managed by GFM offices at different levels of govern-
ment. Subscribers do not have to pay a premium. The benefit package of the GFM is 
comprehensive with limited copayment, which varies slightly across organizations 
and local governments.
• Health Insurance for Severe Diseases: All UEB enrollees can select to be enrolled in 
this plan for an additional contribution of ¥10 per month.3 It also covers low income 
and handicapped people, in which case it is subsidized by local government. It has 
a city-level risk pool and reimburses a portion of medical expenditure for a selected 
list of diseases.
• Commercial health insurance schemes and others: Some people join commercial 
health insurance schemes. Premium, enrolment, and benefit package are not regu-
lated in any means. Some employers organize group health insurance for their em-
2.  The definition of “rural population” in China is ambiguous and changes over time. Generally 
speaking, it is based on a “rural”, “agricultural”, or “countryside” definition. Therefore, groups of rural 
populations can reside inside Nanjing city.
3.  The exchange rate between RMB and euro is about 9:1.
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ployees to cover services or pharmaceuticals not covered by UEB. These other types 
of healthcare plans cover only a very limited percentage of population in Nanjing.
With respect to health insurance plans, we test the following hypotheses: 
1. Motivated consumers are more likely to have correct knowledge about their health 
insurance and are more likely to search for information than those who are not. 
2. Consumers with access to reliable sources of information have better chance of 
acquiring correct information about their health insurance schemes than others. 
Data and Methods
Data. Our study is based on a household survey on the level of consumer information 
about health insurance, conducted in Nanjing on the weekends of October and No-
vember 2009. Respondents were covered by some type of health insurance and were 
between 18 and 75 years old. A stratified random sample of 2000 residents was drawn 
from districts of different levels of economic development. The sample comprised 1175 
completed questionnaires (response rate 58.75%). 
Measures of the level of consumer information. Respondents were asked to indicate the 
price of their health insurance schemes (the out-of-pocket premium) from a few stan-
dardized answers, which were designed according to local health insurance policies. We 
cross-checked respondents’ answers with the premium that related to their age, type of 
employment, and employment status according to their local health insurance policies.4 
The variable “correctness of price”, indicating whether the respondent gave a correct 
answer about the price of his or her premium, was created. 
The respondents were asked whether they had free or limited choice among health-
care providers. We checked the accuracy of their answers against their types of health 
insurance schemes and created a second variable, “correctness of choice”. 
We used these two variables as indicators of respondents’ knowledge about their 
health insurance.
Measures of information searching level. We investigated the current level of searching for 
three types of information about health insurance schemes among the respondents: (i) 
out-of pocket (OOP) pharmaceutical costs, (ii) other healthcare copayment, and (iii) their 
health insurance in general (such as reimbursement method and service of the insurers). 
The reason for separating consumer information into these three types is that motiva-
tion to search varies according to respondents’ health needs, such as pharmaceutical 
use or health status.
4.  The price of health insurance depends on age and employment type and status.
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Independent variables. In the questionnaire, factors that may influence the level of 
consumer information are measured from three perspective: (i) type of insurance, (ii) 
difficulties of understanding consumer information, (iii) the importance of consumer 
information, (iv) other co-founding factors, such as education level, age, self-assessed 
health status, etc. 
Analytical approach. Descriptive statistics were used to describe the current level of 
(searching for) information about health insurance by consumers in Nanjing. We em-
ployed correlation analysis and binary logistic regression to test our hypotheses.  
Results 
Some descriptive statistics are listed in Table 1. There were more female (60%) than 
male respondents in the sample. UEB enrollees (59.7%) and NCM enrollees (20%) were 
the two largest insured groups (Figure 1). The elderly were over-represented (average 
age=50.17, SD=12.75), because all retirees are covered by UEB; furthermore, young 
people in the informal economic sector may choose to be insured or not, which may 
lead to adverse selection. As a result of the relatively high age of respondents’ age, 36% 
had chronic diseases and 81% were regular users of pharmaceuticals. Average cost of 
the latest inpatient admission was ¥8778 (SD = ¥13219.4) with an average out-of pocket 
payment of ¥4718 (SD = ¥8897). This is substantial when we take into account that 75.2% 
of the respondents had a monthly income of less than ¥2000.
Current level of consumer information in Nanjing city. Most respondents did not give cor-
rect answers regarding the price of their health insurance or their right to choose their 
healthcare providers (Table 2). Concerning benefit packages, their wide variation made 
it difficult to judge whether the respondents had correct knowledge. UEB subscribers, 
however, automatically receive “health insurance for severe diseases”, which we can call 
a benefit package component. Only 1.5% of the respondents knew that they had such a 
coverage, indicating their poor knowledge of benefit packages. Generally speaking, the 
current level of consumer information about health insurance was limited among the 
insured in Nanjing city.
Determinants of correctness of health insurance price. Several reasons affected subscrib-
ers’ knowledge of their insurance. First, enrollees of different insurance schemes were 
variously motivated to obtain and remember price information. UEB and GFM are 
mandatory health insurance plans and enrollees pay little to nothing for their insurance. 
On the contrary, NCM and URB are voluntary schemes; enrollees pay a significant part 
of the whole price of the insurance as premium, though the schemes are also heavily 
subsidized by the government. If consumers regard the premium as too high, they can 
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Table 1 Description of selected variables (N=1175)
Variable Percent (%)






















10 or more 5.9
No answer 0.3
Total 100.0






5 or more 0.2
No answer 2.6
Total 100.0
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choose not to join. In other words, in case of NCM and URB, health insurance is a com-
modity that can be purchased; and in case of UEB and GFM, it is more of an entitlement. 
NCM and URB subscribers are thus more motivated to search for and remember informa-
tion about health insurance price than GFM and UEB subscribers. 
Second, information availability varied with the plan. NCM and URB are strongly pro-
moted by the government due to political considerations and their voluntary nature. An 
important strategy is to broadly disseminate information about the schemes among the 
public. On the other hand, the government has a totally different strategy of dissemi-
 
 
Note: Health insurance for severe disease is compulsory for enrollees of UEB. And some 
people whose income falls below a certain level are also covered by this insurance 
scheme. Here we only include those who are only enrollees of health insurance for severe 
disease but not UEB enrollees in the category of “health insurance for severe disease, 
commercial health insurance and others”. 
Figure 1 Percentage of respondents according to type of health insurance schemes 
 
Table 2 Respondents’ knowledge about the price of health insurance and the right of free choice among 
healthcare providers (N=1175)
Price of health insurance Right of free choice among providers
Correct (%) 25.1 36.8
Incorrect/unknown (%) 74.9 63.2
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nating health insurance information about UEB and GFM, while information is mainly 
spread among employers. As a result, individual UEB and GFM subscribers receive little 
information about their health insurance plans. 
Third, difficulty in understanding information varied according to type of insurance. 
UEB premiums are based on a complicated formula that includes the enrollee’s age, 
employment status, and the nature of employment. NCM premiums are set as fixed 
amounts per year. GFM enrollees pay no premium. 
Fourth, difficulty in recalling the premium amount varied depending on the insurance 
plan. NCM and URB premiums are paid directly out of pocket and therefore more easily 
recalled. GFM enrollees pay nothing, which is also easy to recall. UEB enrollees’ contribu-
tions are deducted from their salary, making it extremely difficult to recall the price.
To separate other influential factors from “motivation”, we included variables such 
as “difficulty of understanding the information”, “reliable source of information (yes/
no)”5 in the analysis. We also tried to rule out the factor of “whether the information is 
considered important by the consumers”, because this is a potential determinant of the 
independent variable.  We identified the “importance of price information” by asking: “If 
you could choose an insurance plan, how important would you consider the premium?” 
The level of knowledge about price of insurance (premium paid by consumers) varied 
enormously among subscribers of the five major insurance schemes. NCM enrollees 
scored highest (89%) in correctness. The correctness rate was significantly higher than 
that of the UEB enrollees (10%) and GFM (0%) (Cramer’s V= 0.74, P<0.01).  The other de-
terminants did not have significant correlation with the respondents’ correctness about 
price of their health insurance schemes.  Other possible influential factors, such as the 
importance of price and difficulty in understanding price information, were ruled out. 
Therefore the superior knowledge about insurance price among NCM enrollees could 
be explained by their high motivation to obtain such information. However, for URB 
enrollees, who also had high motivation, only 9% gave the correct answer. One explana-
tion is that URB had been in effect for less than one year at the time of the survey, thus 
the enrollees might still have limited information about it.  
We used binary logistic regression to check the influence of each of the independent 
variables on the dependent variable keeping all else constant. The dependent variable 
was “correctness of the price of health plan”. Independent variables were plan type, the 
5.  We are interested in the influence of ‘formal’ information sources on consumers’ knowledge 
about their health insurance plans. Therefore, according to the current status of the Chinese health 
insurance system, we assume that information sources operated by the government (TV programs, 
newspapers, health insurers, toll-free help lines) are reliable. Other sources, such as doctors, em-
ployers, websites other than those of the insurers (there are currently no government-initiated 
independent websites about health insurance in China), family/friends, and patient organizations 
are considered unreliable.
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importance of plan price, the understandability of the price, and reliability of informa-
tion. Using the results from binary logistic regression, we calculated the predicted prob-
abilities of giving a correct answer about price of health insurance schemes for each 
group of the respondents keeping other independent variables at their means (Table 3). 
NCM enrollees and enrollees with commercial health insurance or other health insur-
ance schemes had significantly higher predicted probability of giving a correct answer 
about price of their health insurance than the other groups. Note that only 3% of enroll-
ees had commercial health insurance or another type of plan, we need be cautious with 
the implication of the result. We also found a significant difference in the probability of 
knowing the correct price of an insurance plan between respondents with and without 
a reliable source of information (25% and 18%, respectively) keeping other variables at 
their means. 
Table 3 Predicted probability of “correctly answering the price of health insurance schemes” keeping 
other independent variables at their means




Type of health insurance scheme
UEB† 59.0 9.8 0.11
URB 10.5 9.0 0.09
NCM 20.3 89.4 .91**
GFM 8.0 0 0.11
Severe disease HI, Commercial HI and others 2.2 20.8 0.23*
Importance of price
Least important† 2.7 24.1 0.21
Not important 9.0 36.8 0.03
Neutral 24.5 18.1 0.23
Somewhat important 33.7 24.2 0.24
Very important 31.1 28.2 0.02
Difficulty in understanding price
Very easy † 7.4 32.0 0.21
Somewhat easy 25.6 29.8 0.24
Neutral 39.2 24.2 0.23
Somewhat difficult 23.0 23.4 0.22
Very difficult 4.8 29.2 0.22
Reliability of information source
Unreliable information source† 31.6 22.9 0.18
Reliable information source 68.4 26.2 0.25*
† reference group.
*significantly different from the reference group, P < 0.10
**significantly different from the reference group, P< 0.05
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As discussed above, the variable “type of insurance scheme” contained many de-
terminants. The respondents’ perceived importance of information and difficulty in 
understanding information was ruled out. Therefore, only motivation and availability of 
information were significant determinants of the dependent variable. 
Our hypotheses, “well-motivated consumers are more likely to accurately know their 
health insurance schemes” and “consumers with access to reliable sources of informa-
tion have better chances of acquiring accurate information about their health insurance 
plan than others” were therefore not rejected.6 
Determinants of correctness regarding the right of choosing a provider. More GFM en-
rollees (56%) knew about their right to choose a provider than UEB enrollees (37%) or 
NCM enrollees (27%) (Cramer’s V=0.15, P<0.01). We used “self-assessed health status” 
as another indicator of motivation besides “type of insurance scheme”, because we 
expected respondents who considered themselves unhealthy (and perhaps use more 
services) to be more motivated to obtain such information. Two confounding factors 
might influence the respondents’ level of knowledge: how important the information is 
considered by the respondent, and how understandable the information is according to 
the respondent. The level of correctness about the right of choice among the providers 
did not differ significantly when we grouped respondents by “importance of right to 
choose among providers”, “difficulty in understanding the right of choice among provid-
ers”, “outpatient visits in the last 12 months”, “self-assessed health status”, and “reliable 
source of information (yes/no)”. 
We employed binary logistic regression to explore the influence of the independent 
variables on the dependent variable. Based on the results, we calculated the predicted 
probability of giving a correct answer about right to choose for each category keep-
ing other variables at their means (Table 4). A GFM subscriber’s probability of knowing 
about the right to choose was almost two times of that of an NCM subscriber. A person 
who had 10 outpatient visits in the past 12 months had a 20% higher probability of 
knowing about the right to choose than one who had none.  One limitation was that we 
could not identify the sequence between the respondents’ acquiring such information 
and their contact with healthcare providers. If respondents acquire such information 
because they forecast a need, the better knowledge among respondents with experi-
ence in the healthcare sector may be due to higher motivation. If the sequence is the 
other way around, their better knowledge may be due to their past experience within 
the healthcare sector. Not being able to identify the sequence, the influence of the num-
ber of out-patient visits can be explained by motivation or experience. However, self-
assessed health status was found to be a strong indicator of motivation. Respondents 
6.  One limitation is that the level of difficulty in recalling the price of a health insurance scheme 
cannot be ruled out in this survey; further research is needed to address this problem.
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Table 4 Predicted probability of “correctness in answering the right of choice among the providers” 
keeping other independent variables at their means
Sample share % of correct answer Predicted probability
Type of health insurance scheme
UEB† 59.7 37.2 0.36
URB 10.4 40.2 45
NCM 20.0 26.8 0.28**
GFM 7.9 55.9 0.53**
Severe disease HI, commercial HI and others 2.0 29.2 0.23
Importance of right of choice among providers
Least important † 1.4 37.5 0.37
Not important 6.4 44.0 0.45
Neutral 21.8 34.5 0.33
Somewhat important 40.1 36.5 0.36
Very important 30.3 37.6 0.36
Understanding choice among providers
Very easy † 9.9 37.1 0.34
Somewhat easy 28.5 38.1 0.37
Neutral 37.9 37.9 0.38
Somewhat difficult 17.7 32.8 0.30
Very difficult 5.9 40.3 0.44
Number of outpatient visits‡
0 † 65.8 35.7 0.34
5 3.2 51.4 0.43*
10 6.1 45.1 0.52*
Number of inpatient admissions‡
0 † 67.1 35.8 0.38
5 .4 50.0 0.22
Self-assessed health status
Very poor † 6.4 44.0 0.46
Fair 47.2 38.4 0.37
Somewhat good 27.3 37.1 0.37
Very good 15.4 30.2 0.31**
Excellent 3.7 27.9 0.24**
Reliability of information source
No † 33.0 39.2 0.39
Yes 67.0 35.6 0.35
† reference group.
* significantly different from the reference group P<0.10 ‡ Here we only calculated the predicted 
probability for a selected number of outpatient visit and inpatient admissions as an indication of the 
changes of the knowledge among people who have different degree of contact with the healthcare 
system.
** significantly different from the reference group P<0.05
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who claimed excellent health status had a 24% probability of giving the correct answer 
about right of choice, about half that of those reporting their health status as “very poor” 
gave correct answer about right of choice.
Other variables, such as the respondents’ perceived importance of the right to choose, 
the difficulty in understanding the right to choose, and the number of inpatient admis-
sions, did not have significant influence on the correctness of the respondents’ answers.
Generally speaking, the respondents’ current level of information about their health 
insurance scheme was influenced by two factors. The first was the respondents’ motiva-
tion to obtain the information. The second was the availability of the information. We 
found that respondents tended to know about information that had (potential) impact 
on them. And if such information was available, the probability of knowing increased 
significantly. 
The hypotheses that “well-motivated consumers are more likely to have correct 
knowledge of their health insurance scheme”, and “consumers who have access to reli-
able sources of information have better chance of acquiring correct information about 
their health insurance scheme than those without reliable sources of information” were 
thus not rejected.7 
Level of searching for information about health insurance schemes and its determinants. 
The overall level of searching for any kind of information was low among the respon-
dents (Table 5). Only 26% of the respondents had searched for one or more types of 
information.
One important finding was that among those who did search for health insurance 
information, their chance of “often” or “always” finding such information was only about 
25% (Table 6). And whether a respondent was capable of finding information was not 
correlated with ability (e.g. age, health status, educational level), the availability of a 
reliable source of information (e.g. type of insurance), and experience in the healthcare 
sector (e.g. use of pharmaceuticals, inpatient admissions, outpatient visits). Possible 
explanations of the difficulties in finding information could be: 
1. People could not obtain relevant information from their information sources.
2. People could not access information even if they assumed they had reliable source. 
For example, someone might consider the HIB an information source but reaching it 
by telephone was nearly impossible. Or she might go to the HIB information counter, 
but the attendant could not answer her question.
7.  One limitation is that we cannot separate experience from motivation in case of the impact 
of out-patient visits on the respondents’ knowledge about the right to choose a provider. Further 
research is needed to clarify this issue.  
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3. Information was not understandable for average respondents. Determinants of 
searching for information about OOP pharmaceutical costs. People were motivated 
to search for information about OOP pharmaceutical costs maybe because it was 
a significant expenditure or they simply considered the information important. 
Respondents who reported poor health status or had chronic diseases might have 
more OOP pharmaceutical expenditures than others. Unlike UEB and GFM enrollees, 
NCM and URB enrollees should be more motivated to search for health insurance 
information because they chose to join.
We checked the correlation of “search for OOP pharmaceutical costs (yes/no)” with 
“types of health insurance scheme”, “importance of benefit package”, “chronic disease 
(yes/no)”, “regular drug user (yes/no)”, and “self-assessed health status”. Respondents 
with chronic diseases were slightly more motivated to search for OOP pharmaceutical 
costs (19%) than those without (14%) (P<0.10). Similarly, respondents who regularly 
used pharmaceuticals were more motivated (19%) than non-drug users (14%) (P <0 .10).
The results of a binary logistic regression suggested that none of the above mentioned 
variables had a significant influence on the searching behavior of the respondents. This 
indicated that people, whatever their situation, generally did not search for the informa-
tion. The hypothesis that “Well-motivated people tend to search for information” is thus 
rejected. One explanation was that OOP pharmaceutical cost was based on complex 
drug formulas, which were decided by type of health insurance scheme and the respon-
dents’ district. 
Table 5 Percentage of the respondents who (yes/no) search for three types of health insurance 
information (N=1175)
Information about OOP 
pharmaceutical costs (%)
Information about other 
healthcare copayment (%)
Information about health 
insurance scheme (%)
Yes 15.6 15.2 14.4
No 84.4 84.4 85.6
Table 6 Frequency of finding needed health insurance information among the respondents who searched 
for information.
Information about OOP 
pharmaceutical costs (%)
Information about other 
healthcare copayment (%)
Information about health 
insurance scheme (%)
Never 16.5 17.9 9.5
Sometimes 61.5 58.1 62.1
Often 13.7 12.3 13.6
always 8.2 11.7 14.8
Total (N) 182 179 169
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Determinants of searching for information about other copayments. We assumed that 
respondents would be motivated to search for copayment information in the following 
scenarios: (i) health insurance plan had a high copayment (e.g. URB and NCM); (ii) the 
respondent had a poor health status or high use of healthcare services; (iii) the respondent 
had copayment experience in the past; and (iv) information was considered important. We 
therefore used the following variables as determinants: type of insurance plan, existence 
of chronic disease, number of outpatient visits and inpatient admissions in the previous 12 
months, self-assessed health status, and importance of copayment information. Correla-
tion analysis showed that searching for other copayment information was significantly but 
weakly correlated with having a chronic disease (Cramer’s V=0.05, P<.10), outpatient visits 
(Cramer’s V=0.08, P<0.05), and inpatient admissions (Cramer’s V=0.05, P<0.10). 
Using the results of a binary logistic regression we calculated the predicted probability 
of searching for copayment information of each sub-groups according to the independent 
variables, keeping other things at their means. The results suggested that the number of 
inpatient admissions had a significantly positive influence on searching for copayment 
information and GFM enrollees searched significantly more often than UEB enrollees. The 
predicted probability of searching for healthcare copayment information for respondents 
who had no inpatient admissions in the previous 12 months was 14%, as opposed to 33% 
for those who had 5 inpatient admissions, keeping other things at their means. 
The hypothesis that “Well-motivated consumers tend to search for information about 
health insurance” was thus not rejected but evidence supporting it was limited.
Attitude of respondents concerning consumer information 
Important aspects of consumer information. We assumed that price of the health insurance 
plan, copayment, content of the benefit package, the right to choose a healthcare provider, 
and insurers’ consumer service quality were potentially important aspects that people would 
take into account when choosing an insurer.8 Around 70% of the respondents considered all 
aspects somewhat or very important (Table 7). The top two most important aspects were 
benefit package (33.1%) and copayment (32.5%). Other aspects, such as price of health 
insurance scheme (14.1%), right to choose a healthcare provider (10.6%), and consumer 
service (6.7%), were considered most important by only a small share of the respondents.
In Nanjing, choosing an insurer is an imaginary scenario. For UEB and GFM, enroll-
ment is mandatory. For URB and NCM, consumers can only opt for being insured or not. 
Benefit packages are limited. Copayment is significant for most insured people receiving 
healthcare services. Therefore, information about benefit package and payment, rather 
than premium and right of choice among insurers, which was virtually non-existent, was 
regarded as important. 
8.  This is hypothetical; almost no consumer choice exists for health insurers in our case.
Level of consumer information in China 117
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Conclusion
Several reforms have been piloted in the Chinese healthcare system since 2009. With a 
substantial amount of additional investment in the healthcare sector, how to turn the 
investment into an efficient healthcare system remains unresolved. Regulated competi-
tion is a potential model but requires a sufficient level of consumer information to be 
successful. 
The rationale of a sufficient level of consumer information is justified both theoretically 
and empirically. One important note is that several criteria need to be satisfied while 
creating and disseminating consumer information. Evidence from the healthcare sector 
showed that effective consumer information can reshape the behavior of key actors in 
the market, such as channeling consumers to good performers, helping insurers contract 
with high-quality providers, and motivating insurers’ and providers’ quality improvement 
initiatives. There is also evidence indicating that consumer information can change the 
consumers’ attitude towards specific providers (Hibbard 2005). Besides them, some un-
intended consequences of publicly disseminating consumer information were observed 
in practice, such as negative attitudes, provider anger, and more seriously, selection be-
havior of the providers. These observations called for risk-adjusted rating and case-mix 
techniques in the process of generating consumer information (Hibbard 2005). 
The results of the survey showed that the insured in Nanjing currently had limited 
knowledge about their health insurance schemes. Respondents who voluntarily chose 
to be insured were more likely to have accurate knowledge of their plan than those 
were automatically covered. Recent (potential) care-seekers had better knowledge of 
their insurance plans than those who were healthy or did not seek care in the same 
period. This suggested that the level of consumer information was positively influenced 
by respondents’ motivation to obtain relevant information. The availability of reliable 
consumer information also positively influenced the respondents’ level of information. 















Price of health insurance scheme 2.5 9.0 24.5 33.7 29.9 0.4
Copayment of health care service 1.4 7.0 19.6 35.6 36.4 -
Content of the benefit package 0.8 4.4 18.7 34.1 42.0 1.0
Right of free choice among health 
care providers
1.4 6.4 21.8 40.1 30.3 -
Consumer service of the health 
insurer
1.3 4.9 20.7 35.3 37.8 -
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In 2006, the first year of the implementation of regulated competition in the Dutch 
healthcare system, a survey about consumer information was conducted in the Nether-
lands. Results revealed a much higher searching level (55-62%) than that of the Nanjing 
survey (~15%). Besides the low searching rate of our sample, the share of finding needed 
information among those who did search was also very low in Nanjing (~25%) in con-
trast to respondents of the 2006 Dutch survey (80%). This may partly explain why most 
respondents in the Nanjing survey never searched for any kind of information. We found 
that people who had had inpatient services in the previous 12 months were more likely 
to search for information about healthcare copayment than others.  
In conclusion, the necessary pre-condition of an efficient competitive healthcare mar-
ket, a sufficient level of consumer information, is currently absent in China. The results of 
the Nanjing survey indicated that consumers tend to search for relevant information if 
motivated. However, searching was not common among the respondents because their 
chance of finding the information was slim. Thus, if the Chinese government is going to 
give consumers the right to choose from competing insurers, it is important that it takes 
the lead in making valid and reliable information publicly available and easily accessible.
Discussion
Sufficient consumer information is not an automatically achieved in a competitive 
healthcare market. Although consumer choice gives consumers incentives to acquire 
information, it is essential that the information exists and is easily accessible. In the 
context of the Chinese healthcare system, it should be the government’s responsibility 
to ensure that consumers can access valid and reliable information. This can be done 
either by government generating or disseminating reliable and valid information, or 
government assurance that the information generated by other entities is reliable, valid, 
and publicly available. The government should help consumers familiarize themselves 
with reliable sources of information. 
Moreover, the function of the insurers should not be overlooked. In the Dutch 
healthcare system, insurers who compete for market share act as an important source 
of information. In the Nanjing survey, only 21% of the respondents chose “insurers” as 
their source of information. The Chinese insurers are currently not motivated enough to 
publicize price and quality information. Being governmental branches, their interests 
are aligned with those of the government. If this situation remains unchanged, the 
government can hardly be regarded as a regulator in the market that acts on behalf of 
the consumers. There is no assurance that the government would actively generate and 
publish information, even if the model of regulated competition were implemented in 
the Chinese healthcare system. Making the insurers independent of the government 
may be a necessary step toward creating sufficient consumer information.
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Several limitations of our study should be noted. First, the sample included only 
insured people. It was as yet unclear whether our results could be generalized to the un-
insured. Second, those who voluntarily chose to be insured (e.g. NCM and URB) might be 
more risk averse than others and might therefore lead to an upper bias of the result that 
people in voluntary schemes were more informed than those in mandatory schemes. 
The significance was not likely, however, given that the uninsured population in Nanjing 
was less than 10% at the time of the survey. Third, elderly people were over-represented 
in our sample because of the enrollment policy of the UEB and the results should be 
interpreted with caution.  Fourth, the un-respondent population was not investigated in 
this study. However, because this survey was an household interview, the main reason 
for un-respondence was that nobody answered the door, bias due to selection problem 
should not be a large issue. Last, our results, based on the Nanjing population, cannot 
be directly applied to all areas in China. 
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APPENDIX
Table A1 Binary logistic regression of the respondents’ correctness in answering the price of health 
insurance scheme (incorrect/unknown=0, correct=1) (N=99)
Odds ratio 90.0% CI for odds ratio
Lower Upper
Type of Health Insurance Scheme
URB 0.86 0.47 1.56
NCM 81.91** 51.52 130.20
GFM 0.00 0.00 .
Severe disease HI, commercial HI and others 2.58* 1.07 6.21
Important of price
Not important 1.62 0.44 6.00
Neutral 1.14 0.33 3.90
Somewhat important 1.21 0.36 4.05
Very important 0.84 0.25 2.83
Difficulty in understanding price
Somewhat easy 1.26 0.57 2.75
Neutral 1.19 0.56 2.55
Somewhat difficult Somewhat difficult 0.95 0.43 2.11
Very difficult 1.12 0.39 3.24
Reliable source of information 1.57* 1.05 2.36
Constant 0.07
Cox and Snell R square = 0.41, Nagelkerke R square = 0.60
*p<0.10. **p<0.05.
The reference categories in the regression are “UEB”, “importance of price” as “least important”, “difficulty 
in understanding price” as “very easy”, and “reliability of information source” s “not reliable information 
source”.
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Table A2 Binary logistic regression of the respondents’ correctness in answering whether they have right 
of free choice among healthcare providers (incorrect/unknown=0, correct=1) (N=1006)
Odds ratio 90.0% CI for odds ratio
Lower Upper
Type of Health Insurance Scheme
URB 1.44 0.92 2.24
NCM 0.69 0.48 0.99
GFM 2.03 1.25 3.27
Severe disease HI, commercial HI and others 0.54 0.19 1.53
Important of right of choice
Not important 1.43 0.40 5.11
Neutral 0.83 0.25 2.78
Somewhat important 0.98 0.30 3.22
Very important 0.99 0.30 3.23
Difficulty in understanding right of choice
Somewhat easy 1.15 0.70 1.91
Neutral 1.19 0.73 1.96
Somewhat difficult 0.84 0.48 1.46
Very difficult 1.51 0.76 3.01
Number of outpatient visits 1.08 0.99 1.17
Number of inpatient admissions 0.85 0.67 1.09
Self-assessed health status
Fair 0.70 0.41 1.20
Somewhat good 0.68 0.39 1.22
Very good 0.53 0.28 1.00
Excellent 0.36 0.14 0.93
Reliable source of information 0.84 0.63 1.12
Constant 0.87
Cox and Snell R square = 0.04, Nagelkerke R square = 0.06
*p<0.10. **p<0.05.
The reference categories in the regression are “UEB”, “importance of right of choice among prividers” 
as “least important”, “difficulty in understanding right of choice among providers” as “very easy”, “self-
assessed health status” as “proof”, and “reliability of information source” s “not reliable information source”.
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Table A3 Binary logistic regression of whether a respondent searched for information about healthcare 
service copayment (not searched=0, searched=1) (N=1127)
Odds ratio 90.0% CI for odds ratio
Lower Upper
Type of Health Insurance Scheme
URB 1.25 0.73 2.16
NCM 1.21 0.79 1.85
GFM 1.91 1.09 3.35
Severe disease HI, commercial HI and others 1.39 0.46 4.20
Chronic disease 1.30 0.88 1.92
Important of healthcare service copayment
 Least important
Not important 0.62 0.14 2.62
Neutral 0.65 0.17 2.54
Somewhat important 0.73 0.19 2.76
Very important 0.87 0.23 3.29
Number of outpatient visits 1.00 0.91 1.11
Number of inpatient admissions 1.25 0.97 1.59
Self-assessed health status
Very poor
Fair 1.36 0.68 2.71
Somewhat good 1.11 0.52 2.40
Very good 1.45 0.63 3.31
Excellent 1.70 0.57 5.10
Constant 0.13
Cox and Snell R square = 0.02, Nagelkerke R square = 0.03
*p<0.10. **p<0.05.
The reference categories in the regression are UEB, no chronic disease, importance of healthcare service 
copayment as “least important”, and self-assessed health status as “very poor”.
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ABSTRACT
In its 2009 blue print of healthcare reform, the Chinese government aimed to create 
a competitive health insurance market in order to increase efficiency in the health 
insurance sector. A major advantage of a competitive health insurance market is that 
insurers are stimulated to act as well-motivated prudent purchasers of healthcare on 
behalf of their enrolees, and that consumers can choose among these purchasers. To 
emphasize the insurers’ role of purchasers of care we denote them, as well as other 
entities that can fulfil this role (e.g. fundholding community health centres), as ‘Mutual 
Healthcare Purchasers’ (MHPs). As feasible proposals for creating competition in China’s 
health insurance sector have yet to be made, we suggest two potential approaches to 
create competition among MHPs: (1) separating finance and operation of social health 
insurance and allowing consumer choice among operators of social health insurance 
schemes; (2) allowing consumer choice among fund-holding community health centres. 
Although the benefits of competition are widely accepted in China, the problematic 
consequences of a free competitive health insurance market - especially in relation to 
affordability and accessibility - are generally neglected. To solve the problems of lack of 
affordability and inaccessibility that would occur in the case of unregulated competition 
among MHPs, at least the following regulations are proposed to the Chinese policy mak-
ers: a ‘standard benefit package’ for basic health insurance, a ‘risk-equalization scheme’, 
and ‘open enrolment’. Potential obstacles for implementing a risk equalization scheme 
are examined based on theoretical arguments and international experiences. We con-
clude that allowing consumer choice among MHPs and implementing a risk equalization 
scheme in China is politically and technically complex. Therefore, the Chinese govern-
ment should prepare carefully for a market-oriented reform in its healthcare sector and 
adopt a strategic approach in the implementation procedure. Crown Copyright © 2012 
Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
KEY WORDS: China; consumer choice; Mutual Healthcare Purchasers (MHPs); Chinese 
health insurance sector; healthcare reform; risk equalization
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INTRODUCTION
In the blue print of the Chinese healthcare reform (“Opinions of the State Council of China 
on Deepening Health Care Reform”) in 2009, the Chinese government explicitly states 
that one of the goals of the reform is to make healthcare affordable and accessible for 
every citizen (State Council of China, 2009). One of the major actions of the government 
has been the expansion of the basic social health insurance, aiming at a universal health 
insurance. Since 2009, the Chinese government has significantly increased healthcare 
investments (by 850 billion RMB over three years; approximately 109 billion euro, August 
2012 exchange), a large share of which has been made in the health insurance sector 
(State Council of China, 2009; Yip & Hsiao, 2008). As a result of this enormous additional 
investment, 96% of the population was covered by various types of social health insur-
ance by July 2010 (Hu, 2010).
Currently there are two major insurers responsible for fund collection and operation 
of the three social health insurance schemes in China: the Ministry of Health (MOH) and 
the Ministry of Human Resource and Social Security (MOHRSS). The MOH and its local 
branches (local health authorities at the county-level) are responsible for the New Rural 
Cooperative Medical Scheme (NRCMS). The MOHRSS and its local branches (local health 
insurance bureaus (HIBs) at the city level) are responsible for the Urban Employees’ Basic 
Health Insurance (UEBHI) and the Urban Residents’ basic Health Insurance (URBHI). The 
NRCMS and the URBHI are voluntary health insurance schemes for rural population and 
urban unemployed respectively. The premiums of these two schemes are paid directly 
by the enrolees to the insurers. The government encourages the enrolment in the two 
voluntary insurance schemes by substantial government subsidies (to a larger extent for 
the NRCMS than for the URBHI). The UEBHI is a mandatory health insurance scheme for 
urban employed people. The premium is collectively paid by employers and employees, 
the share of which depends on local regulations and the age of employees. There is 
currently no consumer choice of either the type of social health insurance schemes or 
the insurer. In principle, consumers can only be enrolled in a specific insurance scheme 
(according to their residence status and employment status) with a specific local insurer 
(according to their place of residence). With the NRCMS and the URBHI consumers can 
only choose to be enrolled or not, and not to choose among different insurance schemes. 
Although the coverage rate of social health insurance has risen significantly in the 
past decade, it is questionable whether currently the major social insurers are efficient in 
providing health insurance. In fact, there have been some critics about the high level of 
financial reserves (deposit) of the social health insurers: it was reported that some insur-
ers’ financial reserves exceeded their one year total premium revenue in the previous 
year (Lu &Wang, 2010). At the same time, co-payments for the social health insurance 
schemes are still high: the out-of pocket payments (OOPs) that individuals pay directly 
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to healthcare providers at the point of service, still amount to approximately 50% of 
the total health expenditure (You & Kasuki, 2011). In other words, even though the 
health insurers collect more funds than necessary, they neither lower their premiums 
nor upgrade their products (i.e. by providing more comprehensive benefit packages 
than is currently the case or lowing co-payments). The social health insurers are also 
criticized as not acting as prudent purchasers of care because they basically contract 
with all public healthcare providers (in practice no selective contracting), and initiate 
very little quality monitoring or programs aiming at quality improvement/control of 
their contracted health providers (Yip & Hanson, 2009).
The Chinese government is planning to create competition within its health insur-
ance sector in order to increase efficiency (State Council of China, 2009). Theoretically 
speaking, allowing consumer choice among health insurers is one option to give the 
insurers incentives to be efficient and to act as prudent purchasers of care. In practice, 
there are several countries with competitive health insurance markets, for example the 
Netherlands, Germany, Israel and Switzerland. In the Netherlands, it was found that the 
profit of health insurers was lowered due to competition (van de Ven, Schut, & Hermans, 
2009). In the 2009 blue print of the Chinese healthcare reform, the Chinese govern-
ment mentioned that private insurers would be encouraged to enter the social health 
insurance market, and market mechanisms would be introduced among social health 
insurers (State Council of China, 2009).
A major advantage of a competitive health insurance market is that insurers are 
stimulated to act as well-motivated prudent purchasers of healthcare on behalf of 
their enrolees, and that consumers can choose among these purchasers. Currently the 
individual consumer in China is in a weak position as a purchaser of healthcare because 
of the information asymmetry between the consumer and the provider of care (which 
may result in supply-induced demand) and because of a lack of information about the 
quality of healthcare. In addition, at the time that care is needed the consumer often is 
not in the position to compare the price and quality of the relevant providers of care. 
To emphasize the insurers’role of purchasers of care we denote them, as well as other 
entities that can fulfil this role (e.g. fundholding community health centres), as ‘Mutual 
Healthcare Purchasers’ (MHPs) (Bevan & van de Ven, 2010). Without proper regulation 
competition may induce serious side-effects especially for high-risk individuals, such 
as unaffordability and inaccessibility of insurance, and to a certain extent inaccessibility 
to healthcare if MHPs have incentives to avoid contracting healthcare providers with 
good reputation of treating certain diseases. These problems are announced as the 
major problems to be solved by the Chinese healthcare reform (State Council of China, 
2009). Based on the experiences in many settings with competitive health insurance 
markets, the regulations to prevent these problems should not be underestimated by 
the Chinese government.
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This paper aims to: (1) raise the awareness of Chinese policymakers regarding the 
possible side-effects of allowing consumer choice among MHPs; and (2) discuss the 
principles and practice (including the international experience) of a risk equalization 
scheme, which is a method to ameliorate these side-effects.
The key research question is: How could China solve the problems of unaffordability and 
inaccessibility that are likely to arise if consumer choice among MHPs is introduced?
In addressing this research question, the following sub-questions are considered:
-	 What feasible ways of creating consumer choice among MHPs can be identified?
-	 What are the advantages and disadvantages of (these ways of ) allowing consumer 
choice among MHPs in China?
-	 Which measures have been taken to address the side-effects of competition in the 
health insurance sector in other settings (i.e. countries) with a competitive health 
insurance market, such as, Belgium, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands, and Switzer-
land?
-	 What lessons can China learn from the international experience in order to create 
consumer choice among MHPs without the problems of unaffordability and inacces-
sibility?
Section 2 discusses the two potential options for creating consumer choice among 
MHPs in China, analyses their possible advantages and disadvantages and considers so-
lutions to problems that are likely to arise. Section 3 reviews and analyses several other 
countries’ experience of addressing the problems of unaffordability and inaccessibility 
of health insurance. Section 4 considers relevant lessons for the Chinese healthcare sec-
tor. Finally, Section 5 presents our conclusions and discussion.
POTENTIAL OPTIONS FOR, AND CONSEQUENCES OF, CREATING CONSUMER 
CHOICE AMONG MUTUAL HEALTHCARE PURCHASERS IN CHINA
Two potential options for creating consumer choice among MHPs
As mentioned above, the role of MHPs could be played by various entities. Government 
agencies are chosen to act as MHPs in the UK (local health authorities) and in countries 
with National Health Insurance such as Taiwan and Korea (health insurance bureaus). 
For profit or non-for profit private health insurance companies act as MHPs in countries 
such as the Israel, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland. Healthcare providers 
act as MHPs or are involved in purchasing care with various schemes, for example the 
fundholding Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) in England, and different Health Maintenance 
Organizations (HMOs) in the US.
Although all the above mentioned entities can become MHPs in theory, it would be 
difficult to introduce consumer choice of MHPs in China in any abrupt way. Because 
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healthcare is a semi-collective good, constituted on democratically established social 
rights, reform advocates not only have to overcome the various technical problems as-
sociated with any reforms, but also have to deal with substantial powers of veto against 
their reforms (Immergut, 1992). If the stakes of a policy program are high, as in the case 
of healthcare, actors may prefer to stick to their established institutions and policy 
programs in order to avoid uncertain and risky outcomes (path dependency) (Genschel, 
1997; March & Olsen,1989). Because of the sunk costs of existing institutions and es-
tablished policy programs, incremental changes in the system are much more frequent 
than fundamental ones (Wilsford, 1994). In this section, we discuss the following two 
(potentially complementary) options for creating consumer choice among MHPs that 
1) allow the Chinese government to learn from international experiences; and 2) are 
incremental rather than fundamental reforms, and therefore seem to be promising op-
tions in terms of policy implementation (Xu & van de Ven, 2009).
Option 1: separating finance and operation of social health insurance and allowing private 
insurers to operate social health insurance
As mentioned in the “Opinions of the State Council of China on Deepening Health Care 
Reform”, one potential option of creating consumer choice is to separate finance and 
operation of social health insurance and allowing private health insurance companies to 
be operators of social health insurance schemes (State Council of China, 2009).
Although a number of private insurance companies currently operate in China’s health 
insurance market, they are only allowed to provide supplemental health insurance prod-
ucts. The social health insurance sector has not yet been opened to private insurers. If 
finance and operation of social health insurance is separated, consumer choice could be 
introduced in the social health insurance sector by allowing qualified private insurance 
companies to operatesocial health insurance, and to allow individuals to choose among 
the insurers that would be stimulated to act as MHPs, no matter their public or private 
nature.
If the Chinese government succeeds in creating a level playing ground to all the insur-
ers/MHPs, they will face potential pressure from their competitors. Even the public MHPs 
(HIBs and local health authorities) will face this pressure because their position in the 
health insurance sector will be at risk if they keep losing enrolees, though they might 
not be fully exposed to the risks of exiting the market. In the long run, only those MHPs 
that operate efficiently will survive the market. In this way, MHPs are likely to be strongly 
motivated to be efficient and acting as prudent purchasers of care.
This option has its pros and cons. This option does not introduce a path-breaking 
reform by completely changing the role of the current HIBs and local health authorities. 
Instead, the role of the current insurers remains largely unchanged in the reform, at 
least at the beginning. Therefore, such a reform might face relatively less obstacles in 
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implementation. This option also gives equal opportunity and incentives for both public 
and private insurers/MHPs if implemented properly. 
One issue concerning this option is that private health insurance companies in China 
are currently only third-party payers of care in supplementary insurance. They might 
need time to obtain experience and talents to be able to act as prudent purchasers of 
care.
Another issue lies in how the government will regulate the market. This option only 
works if private and public MHPs compete on a level playing ground. It would be a 
challenge for the Chinese government to avoid being influenced by public MHPs in 
regulating the market.
Option 2: consumer choice among fund-holding CHCs 
Since early 2007, Community Health Centres (CHCs) have been emerged in the urban 
areas. CHCs are government-owned (with a few private-owned exceptions) and funded 
healthcare facilities in the urban areas. The primary intention is to encourage patients to 
seek primary healthcare at lower costs at CHCs, rather than in higher-level hospitals. They 
function similarly to the general practitioners (GPs) in many countries. The revenues of 
CHCs rely mainly on payments from HIBs and partly on OOPs from individual patients. 
As a result of China’s recent massive investment in the healthcare sector, around 30 
000 CHCs have been established in urban areas by November 2010 (Ministry of Health, 
2010). Urban residents are encouraged, but not obliged, to register with CHCs that are 
close to their place of residence. They are generally allowed to choose freely among 
other CHCs in the city of their residence.
A capitation payment scheme, which constitutes an ex-ante payment from HIBs to 
CHCs based on the number of registered consumers, has been piloted in several cities, 
including Zhenjiang and Suzhou in Jiangsu Province, in order to stimulate the CHCs 
to be efficient in providing primary healthcare services (Anonymous, 2007). Under the 
capitation payment scheme, CHCs are reimbursed with a fixed amount of approximately 
40 yuan per year per registered patient for providing primary healthcare services to 
these patients. This capitation payment is adjusted for patients with 11 specified types of 
chronic disease. This payment scheme aims to provide incentives to the CHCs to attract 
more registered patients, especially those suffering from one of the specified types of 
chronic disease, and to be cost-conscious in providing care. However, this scheme also 
gives incentives to CHCs to unnecessarily refer their patients to higher-level hospitals.
The second option for creating consumer choice among MHPs is that the HIBs transfer 
capitation funds to CHCs not only for the primary care provided by the CHCs themselves, 
but also for some secondary care delivered by higher-level hospitals (compare the GP-
fundholders in England in the 1990s). This option is a step forward based on the current 
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capitation payment scheme. An important aspect of this option, which we refer to as 
‘fund-holding CHCs’, is that individuals should be allowed to freely choose among CHCs.
CHCs are good candidate as MHPs because they have clinical knowledge and are at 
arms-length from the consumers. However, there are also pitfalls of this option: 1) the 
scale of registered patients of one CHC might be too small to satisfy the “law of large 
numbers” for being an MHP; 2) CHCs might lack necessary management skills, especially 
the skills regarding managing funds. These problems have been observed in the UK GP 
fundholders (Kay, 2002), and led to a reform in England from GP-fundholders to Primary 
Care Trusts (PCT) fundholders according to the recent UK government white paper Eq-
uity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS (UK Department of Health, 2010). In addition 
this option is not (yet) feasible in the rural areas in China because CHCs do not (yet) exist 
in rural areas.
Management skills could be obtained by CHCs over time. The problem of relatively 
small scale of CHCs raises the question whether it is feasible to pass the full risks of being 
MHPs to CHCs or it is better to pass only partial risks to CHCs. Exposure to the full risks 
might also become an obstacle in the implementation of such a policy. This problem 
could be addressed by various risk-sharing schemes and ex-post cost-based compensa-
tion between regulators or health insurers and CHCs. In this sense, option 1 and 2 are 
potentially supplementary to each other. If the management skills are obtained, and 
scales of CHCs grow over time, CHCs might be able to become independent MHPs in 
the long run.
Advantages and disadvantages of consumer choice among Mutual Healthcare Purchasers
There are a large bundle of literature that discussed the advantages and disadvantages 
of consumer choice among MHPs, as summarized below.
Advantages of consumer choice among MHPs
The main advantages of consumer choice among MHPs are as follows.
First, consumer choice can stimulate increased efficiency in the healthcare sector. 
When consumers are given the right ‘to vote with their feet’ and if they are provided 
with reliable information on benefit packages and price, they tend to choose the MHPs 
that provide the most favourable benefit package against the lowest price in the market 
(Enthoven, 1978). Thus, the market share of inefficient MHPs gradually shrinks. In option 
2, even though fundholding CHCs are owned by the government, they are still under 
political pressure to operate efficiently. As a result of such market forces and political 
pressure, the healthcare system is likely to become increasingly efficient.
Second, MHPs are likely to respond to consumer needs. Competing MHPs are stimu-
lated to meet their customers’ needs and preferences in order to retain their existing 
customers and attract new ones (Enthoven,1978). In the case of China, if consumer 
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choice is created among MHPs, a likely direct outcome would be utilising the current 
huge unnecessary financial reserves held by HIBs to lower OOPs.
Third, consumer choice drives innovative activities among MHPs. MHPs are likely to 
be stimulated to initiate innovative activities in order to improve their efficiency or 
responsiveness to consumers’ needs (Xu & van de Ven, 2009).
Disadvantages of consumer choice among MHPs
While the advantages of consumer choice described above are obvious, it is also true 
that, without proper regulation, consumer choice among MHPs can have serious side-
effects.
First, there might be an unaffordability problem. In theory, competition could make 
the system more efficient, and the average premium will decrease, keeping quality con-
stant. However, a lower average premium does not necessarily lead to lower premiums 
for everyone. In fact, without regulation, there might exist a wide variance among indi-
vidual premiums, for example, extremely low premiums for young and healthy people, 
and extremely high premiums for old and sick people. In a competitive health insurance 
market, insurers attempt to breakeven on each contract as competition squeezes their 
profit per contract to the minimum. Without appropriate regulations, insurers adjust 
their premium per contract according to the expected costs of the consumers (risk rat-
ing), or adjust their products according to the risks that they accept (risk segmentation), 
or simply refuse high-risk individuals (risk selection). If the benefit package is standard-
ized, risk-rated premiums could range from less than V400 to 40 000 or more per enrol 
per year (van de Ven, 2011). Thus, high risks either pay an excessive premium, or remain 
uninsured if they cannot afford the premium or are rejected by the insurers (van de Ven, 
2000). Similarly to health insurers, fundholding CHCs either pass on excessive OOPs to 
the high risks or demand an excessive capitation payment from the insurers, who in 
turn charge the high risks excessive premiums. Without proper regulation, consumer 
choice cannot be combined with equity, because the high risks cannot afford the health 
insurance or healthcare they need. 
Second, there might be an inaccessibility problem. Many countries with competing 
MHPs attempt to solve the problem of unaffordability by regulating premiums and 
benefit packages (for example, community rating and standard benefit packages). 
These measures, however, create the problem of inaccessibility. An example could be 
that MHPs refuse to enrol those individuals who will lead to predicted loss. The most 
commonly used regulation to solve the inaccessibility problem is open enrolment, 
i.e. insurers are obliged to accept all applications for the benefit package in question 
(Enthoven, 1978). However, with open enrolment and community rating MHPs incur a 
predictable loss when they contract with a high-risk and make a predictable profit when 
they contract with a low-risk customer, which results in incentives for risk selection. 
134 Chapter 7 
Although straightforward risk selection is forbidden by means of the open enrolment 
requirement, there are many forms of subtle risk selection, such as selective marketing 
and intentionally avoiding a good reputation for managing chronic diseases, which are 
difficult to identify and prevent (Ackerlof, 1970). These risk selection strategies lead to 
market segmentation in the health insurance/MHP sector, i.e. high risks and low risks are 
insured with different MHPs. In the case of community rating per insurer/MHP the MHPs 
that are “specialized” in covering high risks have to charge higher than average premium. 
This is again may result in an unaffordability problem. If a flat premium across all MHPs 
is required, the MHPs with a concentration of high risks will eventually be driven out of 
the market. Anecdotal evidence of subtle forms of risk selection by CHCs has already 
been observed in China (Anonymous, 2010). As competition gives incentives to MHPs 
to avoid high-risk customers (risk selection), it becomes difficult for the latter to access 
health insurance or healthcare services (inaccessibility problem). 
Third, there might be other unfavourable effects of risk selection. The potential prob-
lem of risk selection has various other effects that are unfavourable for the society. For 
example, efficient MHPs who do not engage in risk selection may lose market share to 
inefficient risk-selecting MHPs, resulting in a welfare loss to society. Risk selection also 
wastes resources because investment purely aimed at attracting low risks through risk 
segmentation or selection produces no net benefits to society (van de Ven, 2011).
Solving problems in a healthcare sector with competitive mutual healthcare purchasers
In order to solve the problems of unaffordability and inaccessibility, it is important to 
reduce (if not remove) the MHPs’ incentives for risk selection. This can be done by imple-
menting an adequate system of risk equalization, which is a system of cross-subsidies 
among individuals with high- and low-risk profiles. For risk equalization it is essential 
to (1) calculate the expected health expenditures of individual consumers over a fixed 
period (e.g. month, quarter or year) based on relevant information, and (2) granting sub-
sidies to  consumers or health plans to equalize the risk profiles of the potential insured 
(van de Ven & Ellis, 2000). In a health insurance sector with premium and benefit-package 
regulation, a risk equalization scheme can be implemented to reduce the incentive for 
risk selection. Without such regulation, a risk equalization scheme can be adopted as a 
form of subsidizing the high risks and solving the problem of unaffordability.
China is not alone in facing these potential problems; in fact, many countries with 
a competitive health insurance sector face similar problems. Among these countries, 
5 countries are selected for discussion in this paper because governments in these 
countries have explicitly chosen to implement consumer choice among MHPs and to 
regulate the competition among MHPs: Belgium, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands, and 
Switzerland. In addressing the problems of unaffordability and inaccessibility, it is im-
portant to draw lessons from these countries. Netherlands is the only country, according 
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to our knowledge, that has explicitly adopted the model of regulated competition in 
the healthcare sector and has been consistently working on this model for more than 
two decades. Therefore, the experience of the Dutch healthcare system was given more 
emphasis in this paper.
INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE IN ADDRESSING THE PROBLEMS OF 
UNAFFORDABILITY AND INACCESSIBILITY
The problems of unaffordability and inaccessibility
The number of competing insurers in Belgium, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands and 
Switzerland ranges from four in Israel to around 400 in Germany. In most of these 
countries the insurers are fully financially responsible for their business. The exception 
is Belgium, where insurers have very low financial responsibility. New entrants to the 
health insurance market are allowed in all settings, except Belgium and Israel.
In order to solve the problems of unaffordability and inaccessibility, especially for the 
high risks, regulations such as risk equalization, community rating per insurer, benefit 
package regulation (i.e. a uniform or minimum benefit package) and open enrolment 
are enforced in all these five countries. Because the risk equalization systems in these 
countries are still imperfect, these regulations create incentives for subtle forms of risk 
selection, in particular in Israel and Switzerland. 
In these countries risk selection is indeed widely observed. The tools for selec-
tion differ according to local policy constraints and regulations. In Belgium and the 
Netherlands, where basic and supplemental health insurance packages are usu-
ally provided by the same insurer, supplemental insurance is used as a tool for selection 
(Schokkaert&VandeVoorde,2003; vandeVen, Beck,VandeVoorde, Wasem,& Zmora, 2007). 
In the Netherlands, where a discount on the premium is allowed for group insurance, 
identification of whether an individual is a member of a group insurance scheme is a 
tool for selection (van de Ven et al., 2007). In the Netherlands and Switzerland, where a 
differential deductible is allowed, a high deductible and a bonus to customers is used 
to attract favourable risks (Holly, Gardiol, Eggli, Yalcin, & Ribeiro, 2004; van de Ven et al., 
2007). Other risk selection tools, such as selective marketing and avoiding a good reputa-
tion for managing chronic illnesses, are observed in Germany (Buchnerk &Wasem, 2003).
Implementation of risk equalization schemes
Risk equalization in theory
There are two main types of variance of individual health expenditure: random and 
systematic (van de Ven & Ellis, 2000). Insurers are assumed to deal with the random 
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variation by having a large number of enrolees (‘Law of the Large Numbers’). In a risk 
equalization scheme, the factors that are used to predict the systematic variance of 
individual health expenditure are known as ‘risk adjusters’. Systematic variance can be 
attributed to two types of risk adjuster: subsidy type (S-type) and non-subsidy-type (N-
type) (van de Ven & Ellis, 2000). Age, gender and health status are generally considered 
to be S-type risk adjusters in most countries, whereas N-type risk adjusters may include 
insurers’ efficiency and health providers’ practice style and price. It is unnecessary for 
the sponsor (i.e. government, employers, or other entities that are willing and able to 
ensure efficiency and equity of the healthcare sector) to organize cross subsidization for 
all systematic variance: only variance caused by S-type risk adjusters should be cross-
subsidized. N-type variation is assumed to be reflected in the premiums. The effective-
ness of a risk equalization scheme is often judged by its power to predict the systematic 
variance of contract-level health expenditure.
Risk equalization in practice
Risk equalization schemes differ in complexity from country to country. Among those 
with risk equalization schemes, Belgium and the Netherlands have the most sophisticat-
ed set of risk adjusters. In Belgium, age, gender, employment status, disability, income, 
mortality, area of residence (urban or rural) invalidity, eligibility for social exemption, 
and chronic illness are used as risk adjusters (Schokkaert & Van de Voorde, 2003). In the 
Netherlands, age, gender, region, socioeconomic status, source of income, pharmaceuti-
cal cost group and diagnostic cost group are used as risk adjusters (van Kleef & van Vliet, 
in press). In most countries, age, gender and health-status indicators are used as risk 
adjusters (Holly et al., 2004; Nuscheler & Knaus, 2005). 
Of the five countries reviewed, Israel has the simplest risk equalization scheme: there, 
age is the only risk adjuster used. Obviously, this scheme has low predictive power; and 
indeed, the health insurers in Israel are actively engage in risk selection activities. The 
insurer that is least active in risk selection, which is a publicly oriented insurer, incurs 
huge losses each year and relies heavily on ex-post government subsidies (Shmueli, 
Chernichovsky, & Zmora, 2003). 
Even in those countries with the most sophisticated set of risk adjusters, risk equaliza-
tion schemes are not effective enough to remove insurers’ incentives for risk selection. 
In the countries reviewed, various methods of risk sharing are implemented to further 
reduce the insurers’ incentive for risk selection. For example, in Israel there is 100% risk 
sharing for five specific chronic conditions (Shmueli et al., 2003); in the Netherlands, 
the government shares a certain (and decreasing) percentage of the insurers’ loss (van 
de Ven & Schut, 2011); in Germany, insurers can voluntarily participate in risk-sharing 
schemes organized by the government (Nuscheler & Knaus, 2005).
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Risk sharing not only reduces insurers’ incentives for risk selection, it also reduces their 
incentives for efficiency. Therefore, all countries reviewed are making efforts to improve 
their risk equalization schemes and reduce the extent of risk sharing. However, there are 
several major obstacles to implementing an effective risk equalization scheme.
Practical obstacles to implementing a risk equalization scheme
In the countries reviewed, we have observed two main practical obstacles to the process 
of implementing a risk equalization system. The first obstacle is a lack of consensus 
among stakeholders, either on the desirability of competition in the health insurance 
sector or on the necessity of an effective risk equalization scheme. In some countries, 
this is seriously hampering the implementation of a risk equalization system. Resistance 
may come from various sources. In Belgium, there is no political consensus on the need 
for competition and a risk equalization scheme (Schokkaert & Van de Voorde, 2003). In 
Israel, there is a lack of public interest in a risk equalization scheme (Shmueli et al., 2003). 
In Switzerland, the implementation of a risk equalization scheme is resisted by certain 
insurers who engage in risk selection (Holly et al., 2004). The second practical obstacle 
is that the necessary data on the health status of individuals is not available, either 
because of legally enshrined confidentiality principles or because of the high costs of 
collecting such data. The latter obstacle can be observed in all the five countries.
Potential obstacles to creating consumer choice and implementing a risk equalization scheme in China
There are at least four potential obstacles to creating consumer choice among MHPs and 
implementing a risk equalization scheme in China.
There is a lack of political consensus on the need for competition among MHPs
Although the Chinese government, in the 2009 blue print of healthcare reform, declared 
its intention to introduce competition in the health insurance sector (State Council of 
China, 2009), that cannot be achieved overnight.
In government reports and statements on organization of the three social health-
insurance schemes, ‘efficiency’ is a frequently used term, rather than ‘competition’ or 
even ‘consumer choice’. Indeed, policymakers in the healthcare sector tend to avoid the 
term ‘competition’ because they naturally link competition to the problem of unafford-
ability. This linkage is based on unfavourable experiences with unregulated competition 
in China’s healthcare system since the 1990s.
Stakeholders in the healthcare system hold various and often contrasting opinions on 
a system with competitive MHPs. As previously stated (Eggleston, Li, Meng, Lindelow, 
&Wagstaff, 2008), there are at least six major stakeholders: (1) the MOH, which repre-
sents the insurer of NRCMS and all public healthcare facilities; (2) the MOHRSS, which 
represents the governmental agencies that operate the UEBHI and the URBHI; (3) the 
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Ministry of Finance (MOF), which is responsible for granting subsidies to the MOH and 
the MOHRSS; (4) private healthcare facilities; (5) private health insurers; and (6) patients. 
The three most influential stakeholders e the MOH, the MOHRSS and the MOF e rarely 
cooperate with each other in making policies. 
The MOH’s attitude towards competition is heavily influenced by the opinions of the 
public healthcare facilities, especially large public hospitals, which often oppose com-
petition due to their dominant position in the market and the perceived threat of being 
challenged by new entrants to the envisaged competitive market. This makes it difficult 
for the MOH to openly allow competition among CHCs (or alternatively, to give consum-
ers a choice among CHCs). However, as governmental subsidies account for only 10% 
of the revenues of public healthcare facilities on average, care providers are in practice 
competing for market share and revenue (Eggleston et al., 2008). Furthermore, the MOF 
can also powerfully influence the MOH’s decision-making processes because it channels 
huge subsidies for public healthcare facilities and the NRCMS to the MOH. As a result of 
these influences, the MOH’s opinion on competition remains equivocal. 
The MOHRSS is currently making a great effort to enhance the efficiency of the local 
HIBs. As the MOF finances both the MOH and the MOHRSS, the concept of ‘internal com-
petition’ may be attractive to both of these ministries. Allowing private health insurers to 
step into the social health insurance sector and creating a ‘level playing field’ for them to 
compete with the HIBs entail entitling them to the same level of subsidies from the MOF. 
As this challenges the dominant position of, and therefore the benefit for, the MOHRSS, 
it may be difficult to achieve in the near future. Against this complex background, the 
Chinese government has not yet determined a roadmap for introducing market mecha-
nisms in the health insurance sector.
Policymakers largely neglect the problem of risk selection
Chinese policymakers often assume that because social health insurance agencies and 
CHCs are not-for-profit organizations, there is little incentive for them to engage in risk 
selection (Anonymous, 2009b). Although current policies emphasize the not-for-profit 
nature of the potential MHPs, this does not necessarily exclude their incentives for risk 
selection. 
In China, social insurance agencies do not pursue profits but political achievements 
such as the number of insured covered or the financial reserves held by an HIB or local 
health authority. Therefore, even social insurers are motivated to engage in risk selection, 
because the more affluent or healthy their risk pool, the greater the financial reserves 
they can accumulate, and more “sustainability” the officers can claim. 
Fund-holding CHCs can spend the revenue that they obtain - after deducting the 
costs - on improving equipment and awarding bonuses to their staff. Thus, even as not-
for-profit organizations, the CHCs are strongly motivated to maximise their revenue and 
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minimize their costs. The most straightforward way for fundholding CHCs to achieve a 
large difference between revenue and costs is to register low-risks and avoid high-risks. 
Without in-depth knowledge of risk equalization schemes, policymakers tend to be con-
flicted between, on the one hand, providing incentives to CHCs to increase efficiency 
and, on the other hand, sacrificing efficiency for equity. In most cities, the problem of risk 
selection is largely neglected by policymakers.
It is difficult to implement the ‘English PCT budget’ model in China
In China, CHCs are owned and managed by district-level health authorities. Most sec-
ondary hospitals are owned and managed by city-level health authorities, and most 
tertiary hospitals are owned and managed by provincial-level health authorities or the 
MOH. If CHCs are empowered to use the risk equalized capitation budgets of their reg-
istered patients to purchase healthcare, and if these capitation budgets are to (partially) 
account for the patients’ expenditures in higher-level hospitals e as in the English PCT 
budget model e this will potentially pose a threat to the power of higher-level health 
authorities. Therefore, adoption of this model might face political obstacles in China.
In Zhenjiang, vertical integration of CHCs, secondary hospitals and tertiary hospitals 
has recently emerged (Anonymous, 2009a). Two medical groups, each composed of 
various CHCs, several secondary hospitals and a tertiary hospital, were established in 
November 2009. However, in addition to the administrative contract between health 
facilities and medical groups, the former are still officially owned and managed by vari-
ous tiers of local government. Therefore, this kind of integration does not provide a solid 
base for implementing the English PCT budget model.
There is a lack of necessary data in China
Data deficiency is a major problem faced by most countries that have a risk equaliza-
tion scheme or are considering implementing such a scheme. In China, data on the 
individual health expenditure of the insured population has been available since early 
2000 (in some cities since mid-1990s), whereas data on the health status of individuals is 
limited to information on a dozen chronic diseases and around five severe diseases (the 
numbers of chronic and severe diseases differ from city to city).
Another major problem with the data on individual health expenditure is that Chinese 
citizens currently pay a large portion of their medical expenditure out-of pocket. OOPs 
are not always recorded in insurers’ databases and can only be obtained from healthcare 
facilities. It is extremely difficult to obtain the OOP of a specific individual over a fixed pe-
riod of time: individuals may switch from one provider to another for different episodes 
of treatment, and it is as yet technically impossible to link expenditures incurred by a 
single individual in different healthcare facilities, especially for OOP and for uninsured 
people.
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CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
Conclusions
The Chinese government is considering creating competition within its health insurance 
sector (State Council of China, 2009). It is important that the government considers seri-
ously not only the advantages, but also the disadvantages of allowing consumer choice 
among health insurers, including the key problems of unaffordability and inaccessibility, 
as well as potential methods to solve these problems.
Because a major advantage of a competitive health insurance market is that insurers 
can act as well-motivated prudent purchasers of healthcare on behalf of their enrolees, 
we analysed in this paper potential ways of allowing consumer choice among ‘Mutual 
Healthcare Purchasers’ (MHPs) in China, including the advantages and disadvantages. 
MHPs need not only be insurers, but can also be provider organizations that fulfil the in-
surance function, e.g. fundholding Community Health Centres (CHCs). We also examined 
the experiences of five countries in addressing the unaffordability and inaccessibility 
problems posed by competitive health insurance markets and highlighted some lessons 
that are relevant for China.
Our main conclusion is that although allowing consumer choice among MHPs presents 
clear benefits, negative side-effects such as the unaffordability and inaccessibility prob-
lems should not be underestimated. One way to attempt to address these problems is 
by implementing premium regulation, benefit-package regulation and open enrolment. 
However, such measures provide incentives for MHPs to indulge in risk selection, which is 
a severe problem because it may harm the accessibility of health insurance and in some 
cases healthcare, especially among high-risk individuals. In theory risk selection can be 
counteracted by an effective risk equalization scheme, but in practice most equalization 
systems appear to be still imperfect. In five reviewed countries with competitive health 
insurance markets, we have found that risk selection occurs in practice, albeit to different 
extents. In Israel and Switzerland, where the predictive power of the risk equalization 
scheme is poor, risk selection is a serious problem. In three other countries - Belgium, 
Germany, and the Netherlands – more sophisticated risk equalization schemes have 
been implemented, but all three countries still experience the risk selection problem to 
some extent. China is not likely to be an exception if a competitive health insurance sys-
tem is allowed and encouraged. In addition, practical difficulties and obstacles are also 
likely to be encountered in the context of China. Ex-post risk sharing is widely used to 
compensate for the ineffectiveness of risk equalization schemes. In addition, in all these 
five countries that operate risk equalization schemes, political and technical obstacles 
have been encountered during or before their implementation. Similar obstacles exist 
in China. For successful implementation of a risk equalization scheme, relevant data at 
the level of the individual consumer must be made available. This seems to be a big 
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challenge for China because the availability of such data is not clear, and even if the data 
is available, the stakeholders’ willingness to share such data is unknown. If China is going 
to create consumer choice of MHP, the improvement of the data and the development of 
a sufficiently refined risk equalization scheme is a major challenge. The implementation 
of an effective risk equalization scheme in practice, which is a necessary precondition to 
create competition among MHPs, may be a politically and technically complicated issue 
in the context of the Chinese healthcare sector.
Discussion
Creating consumer choice among MHPs in the Chinese healthcare sector and imple-
menting an effective risk equalization scheme may take years or even decades. Three key 
issues in the implementation would be: 1) who is the regulator of the health insurance 
market; 2) who organizes the risk equalization scheme; and 3) who collects the funds. As 
the governmental agencies, i.e. the local HIBs and the health authorities, have been in-
tensively involved in the social health insurance market in China for more than a decade, 
they are good candidates to be the regulator of the (local) health insurance market. If 
the Chinese government adopted option 1 for the reform, the entity that is responsible 
for financing health insurance (which was a part of the previous HIB before the separa-
tion of finance and operation) would be the best candidate to act as both regulator of 
the market as well as the organizer of risk equalization schemes. If option 2 was adopted, 
the HIBs and the local health authorities can cooperate with each other and become the 
regulator of the market. The HIBs can also act as the organizers of the risk equalization 
schemes. The answer to the question “who collects the funds” depends to a large extent 
on how the premiums are calculated. If premiums are calculated according to the in-
come of the enrollees, it would be difficult for the private health insurers to collect funds 
because they normally do not have income information about their enrolees. In this 
scenario, local health authorities or the entities that are responsible for financing social 
health insurance could act as funds collectors and distribute the funds among operators 
of health insurance. Because there are currently two major social MHPs (namely local 
HIBs and local health authorities) in China in basically any specific administrative areas, it 
would be difficult to implement a risk equalization scheme in one area without intensive 
cooperation between these two MHPs (which would be difficult) or combining them 
into one single entity. In several cities, there have been signs of combining different 
social health insurance schemes into one universal one in an administrative area. This 
would be a helpful pre-step of implementing risk equalization schemes in the future.
Given the complex nature of the Chinese healthcare system, policymakers need to 
adopt a strategic approach in designing reforms that envisage a healthcare system with 
competitive MHPs. For example, in the potential option of gradually introducing compe-
tition of allowing qualified private health insurance companies to enter the social health 
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insurance market and compete with the existing operators of social health insurance 
schemes (MOH, MOHRSS, and their local branches), it is unnecessary to give them full 
financial responsibility in the early stages. Initially, they could be given 10% financial 
responsibility, and the percentage could be increased gradually as they adapt to a com-
petitive market and master the necessary skills to become prudent purchasers of care 
and efficient administrators. Such risk sharing provides a safety net to insurers/MHPs. In 
China, a combination of these methods may succeed in reducing fear-based opposition 
to competition among MHPs, and thus smoothen the process of stimulating competi-
tion. For UEBHI, with which premium is to a large extent income-related, one part of the 
current HIB could be turned into an independent entity that is responsible for collecting 
premium because it will be difficult for private MHPs to collect income-related premium. 
The HIB could then organize a risk equalization system that provides payments to both 
public and private MHPs. The current HIBs and local health authorities are also good 
candidates to organize risk equalization schemes because they have more than 20 years’ 
experience of operating social health insurance and have rich data about the historic 
individual level health expenditure and to a certain degree individual’s health status.
Consumer choice among MHPs may be effective in terms of reducing unnecessarily 
excessive financial reserves of the current social health insurance agencies. However, 
if healthcare providers are not motivated to compete with one other, competing MHPs 
will have little room to negotiate with them over the price and quality of care. Thus, the 
benefit of consumer choice among MHPs will be limited. In China, although healthcare 
providers are legally owned and managed by the government, in practice they are 
largely financially independent. Providers are given incentives to generate revenue. 
However, due to inappropriate price regulation and reimbursement policies, the cur-
rent competition is not increasing efficiency. The Chinese government is aware that the 
wrong incentives have been given to public hospitals and has declared its intention to 
implement reforms geared to efficiency and public interest in the public hospital sector 
(State Council of China, 2009). As yet, there is no clear roadmap for reform of the public 
hospital sector, which indicates a need for further research. 
To the Chinese government, consumer choice among MHPs seems to be an attrac-
tive proposition (State Council of China, 2009). Yet without well informed and carefully 
considered regulation, unaffordability and inaccessibility may arise as major obstacles 
to the socially desirable goal of equity in the healthcare system. As the problems of 
unaffordability and inaccessibility are the two major problems that need to be tackled 
by the Chinese government, an effective risk equalization scheme is necessary if con-
sumer choice among MHPs is allowed. It is also desirable because solidarity has been a 
deeply rooted value in China, considering the historical Cooperative Medicine in China 
during 1950s and early 1980s. Theoretically at least, with an effective risk equalization 
scheme, both solidarity and efficiency can be achieved in a competitive health insur-
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ance sector. However, establishing and consolidating such a scheme is a technically and 
politically complicated procedure. Potential modules of organizing risk equalization 
schemes are to a large extent a political choice. For example, the choice of risk factors 
and their weights depends on both data availability and political decisions. To overcome 
the potential obstacles of creating consumer choice among MHPs and implementing an 
effective risk equalization scheme, the Chinese government needs to be well prepared 
- both technically and politically.
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1. BACKGROUND
In this chapter we answer the central research question: “What are the prospects of 
competition in China’s healthcare reform?”, and offer policy recommendations.
The reform from a centrally-planned government-funded healthcare system to a 
market-oriented system during 1980s and 1990s was considered a failure by the Chinese 
government because it resulted in serious problems with affordability and accessibility 
(Ge 2005). The government announced huge amounts of additional investment in the 
healthcare system in 2009 to expand basic health insurance coverage and strengthen 
public health (State Council of China 2009). It is not yet clear whether the investment has 
realized systemic efficiency and equity. 
Competition in the health delivery and even health insurance sectors has been men-
tioned as an option to reform the Chinese healthcare system (State Council of China 
2009). The prospects of competition in the Chinese healthcare system, however, requires 
understanding of its advantages and disadvantages by policy makers, and whether 
necessary pre-conditions for effective competition are (potentially) fulfilled in China. 
Competition could take place in different sectors in a healthcare system. The model 
of van de Ven et al. (Table 1) categorizes healthcare systems according to whether price 
competition exists among healthcare providers and insurers (van de Ven, Wynand 
P.M.M, Schut & Rutten 1994). This model provides an appropriate analytical framework 
for investigating the consequences of adopting market mechanism (the same notion as 
competition in most official statement in China) in the Chinese healthcare system, as is 
being considered by the government. 
The current healthcare system in China is very close to model 2, where no price com-
petition exists among health insurers but some is allowed among healthcare providers, 
although in practice such competition is rare. Model 3 is theoretically unsound because 
the disadvantages of competition among insurers cannot be ignored (explained in Chap 
1). As explained in chapter 1, Models 1, 2, and 4 are thus relevant to future healthcare 
reform in China. 
Table 1 Models in organizing the healthcare system
 
Health Providers
Price competition No price competition
Health 
Insurers
Price competition 1 3
No price competition 2 4
Source: van de Ven, W.P.M.M., Schut, F.T., and Rutten, F.F.H., “Forming and reforming the market for third-
party purchasing of health care”, Social Science & Medicine, 1994, 39(10): 1405-1412.
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Theoretically speaking, the Chinese healthcare system could transit from model 2 to 
either model 1 or 4, or it could move closer to prototype model 2.
2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
In this thesis, the central research question is: “What are the prospects of competition in 
China’s healthcare reform?”
This question is addressed in two separate parts. In Part I, healthcare reform in England 
(model 4 to 2), Russia (model 4 to 1) and the Netherlands (model 4 to 1) are analyzed. 
Advantages and disadvantages of each prototype models 1, 2, and 4 are discussed 
based on country experiences. Experience and lessons of the reforms are learned from 
these countries. A list of necessary pre-conditions for model 1 and 2 are summarized. 
In Part II, three selected pre-conditions were investigated in-depth. The prospects of 
fulfilling these pre-conditions in China are discussed. 
Part I: International experience of healthcare reforms in three countries
Advantages and disadvantages of prototype model 1, 2, and 4 
We analyzed the experiences of the pre- and post-reform English healthcare system 
(models 4 and 2, respectively) as well as the post-reform Dutch system (model 1). (See 
chapter 2.) 
Model 4. The National Health Service (NHS) of England before the 1991 reform was 
funded through general taxation, provided mostly by government facilities and free at 
the point of service. This is basically a government provision model with no competi-
tion between any actors in the system (model 4). It was strong in controlling healthcare 
expenditure, had relatively low transaction costs, and required relatively simple legisla-
tion. The pre-reform English NHS experienced financial pressure from the outset. Such 
a system is financially vulnerable especially under the pressure of increasing healthcare 
expenditure. In addition to that, it is also difficult for the government to gain quality 
and cost information. The English government was criticized for being bureaucratic 
in decision making and inefficient in providing care. Providers had little incentive for 
efficiency; indeed they were in fact punished for efficiency because thus they attracted 
more patients with constant resources. There were not sufficient incentives for providers 
of care to provide high quality care, be responsive to consumers’ need, be innovative in 
providing care, and be accountable to the consumers. Because physicians were allowed 
to work in both public and private sectors, they had incentives to reduce quality of the 
care they provided in the public sector and increase waiting list, so that they could in-
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duce patients to their private practice. In this system, as rationing mechanisms, waiting 
list and waiting time are notorious. 
Model 2. The British government implemented an internal market reform in 1991, aiming 
at ‘regulated competition’ among healthcare providers and setting the role of health 
authorities as non-competing purchasers of care. With competing healthcare providers 
and non-competing third party purchaser(s) (TPPs), the post-reform English system be-
longs to model 2 in our typology. One major reform measure was splitting the responsi-
bility of purchasing care from providing care. General practitioners (GPs) were first given 
the opportunity to become GP fund holders, and then organized into local Primary 
Care Groups (PCGs), and later into Primary Care Trusts (PCTs). Furthermore, hospitals 
began to operate as independent entities, though the financial incentives were still soft 
because of their governmental-owned nature. In whatever forms GPs were organized, 
the principle of ‘money follows the patients’ remained. It was intended to take away the 
previous perverse incentives with respect to efficiency, quality, and responsiveness to 
consumer preferences, and encourage innovation and accountability. Though shorter 
waiting lists and times were observed, such a system required more complex regula-
tions than the pre-reform NHS. Transaction costs rose as a share of health expenditure. 
Consumers still had no choice among TPP(s). Few evidence showed that purchasers of 
care had incentives for stimulating efficient care provision, purchasing high quality care, 
being responsive to consumer preferences, being innovative, and being accountable. 
Never the less, model 2 requires relatively complex regulation and stewardship, includ-
ing competition policy, quality supervision, and consumer information compared with 
model 4. It has been criticized that the internal market reform resulted in incentives too 
weak for efficiency and constraints too strong. 
Model 1. For more than two decades, the Dutch healthcare system has been transiting 
from a central price- and capacity-controlled model towards a ‘regulated market with 
competing third-party purchasers and competing providers of care’. Since 2006, the 
Health Insurance Act has obliged each legal resident to buy individual private health 
insurance with a legally described benefits package from a private insurance company. 
Consumers are fully price sensitive and encouraged to shop among health insurers. 
Competition among health insurers is encouraged. In the meantime, competition among 
healthcare providers is being introduced by allowing insurers and providers to selec-
tively contract, and gradually removing governmental price controls of some healthcare 
services. The Dutch system is thus moving towards model 1. The major advantages of 
model 1 include consumer choice among both insurers and healthcare providers, as well 
as in theory motivated prudent purchasers. Above that, incentives are given to insurers 
and providers of care in terms of efficiency, quality, consumer-preference responsive-
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ness, innovation, and accountability. The model, however, is technically complicated, 
requiring relatively complex regulations (risk equalization and competition policies, 
for example) to avoid market failure, and leads to relatively high transaction costs of 
contracting. There are potential risks for risk rating and/or risk selection in such a model. 
The advantages and disadvantages of the three relevant models are summarized in 
Table 2. 
Table 2 Relative advantages and disadvantages of the three prototype models
Advantages Disadvantages
Model 4 - Strong ability to contain costs;
- Low administrative costs;
- Relatively simple legislation.
-  Fiscal pressure faced by the government, 
which may result in underfunding and a 
two-tier-system;
- Lack of incentives for
 - Efficient care;
 - High quality care;
 - Consumer responsiveness;
 - Innovation;
 - Accountability.
- Long waiting lists and times;
- Bureaucracy;
-  Perverse incentives for private practice 
physicians to reduce quality and increase 
waiting lists in the public system;
- Difficulty gaining central information.
Model 2 Because ‘money follows the patient’, providers 
have incentive for 
- Efficient care;




-  Relatively high transaction costs of 
contracting;
- No consumer choice among purchasers;
- Relatively low incentive for purchasers for 
 - Stimulating efficient care provision;
 - Purchasing high quality care;




-  Relatively complex regulation / 
stewardship (competition policy, quality, 
consumer information).
Model 1 - Donsumer choice;
- Motivated prudent purchasers;
-  Because of ‘voting by feet’ incentives for 
purchasers and providers for:
 - Efficient care provision;
 - High quality care;




- Relatively high contracting costs;
-  Relatively complex regulation / 
stewardship (risk equalization, 
competition policy, quality, consumer 
information);
-  Potential for “risk rating” and/or “risk 
selection”, depending on the regulation.
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Pre-conditions for competition in the healthcare system
Model 1 allows competition among both health insurers and healthcare providers. 
Model 2 allows competition only among healthcare providers. Thus, model 1 is in theory 
more complicated than model 2, and requires more pre-conditions. In this section, pre-
conditions for model 1 will be discussed based on the experiences of Dutch and Russian 
healthcare reform. Those relevant to model 2 will be listed out at the end.
In model 1, without proper regulations, both insurers and providers are likely to adopt 
strategies, which may or may not be in the interest of the consumers, to pursue profits or 
survival. Strategies include (among others) risk rating, risk selection, market segmenta-
tion, product differentiation (raising information costs), coverage discontinuity, refusal 
to insure certain individuals, coverage exclusions for pre-existing conditions, biased 
information regarding coverage and quality, and creating barriers to entry. It is difficult, 
if not impossible, for individual consumers to counteract these strategies. Regulations in 
the healthcare sector need to be carefully implemented to avoid the above-mentioned 
market failures. There needs to be a powerful, willing, and active ‘collective sponsor’ to 
regulate the health care market and counteract market failure on behalf of the demand 
side (Enthoven 1988). 
Chapter 3 and 4 discussed the experience of the Russian and Dutch healthcare reform 
towards model 1, respectively. 
Lessons from Russia (chapter 3). Before 1993, the Russian healthcare system is centrally-
planned and government-funded with no competition (model 4). Though it made 
great strides in improving the health of the Russian population, low quality care and 
inefficiency were problematic. In 1993, the Russian Health Insurance Law introduced 
mandatory health insurance (MHI) in the Russian Federation with the aim of dramati-
cally changing the healthcare system from model 4 to model 1. Healthcare purchasing 
and provision were separated by setting up health insurers, which were expected to 
become prudent purchasers of care with motivation and leverage to influence providers’ 
performance. 
The implementation produced a mixed-model. Purchasers of care are insurance com-
panies, regional MHI funds, or a mixture of the two, depending on employment status 
and geographic area. Employers choose insurers on behalf of their employees; regional 
governments choose insurers for MHI on behalf of the non-working population. Thus, 
individual-level consumer choice among health insurers is very limited and consumer 
price-sensitivity is non-existent. The government covers the financial risks of provid-
ing MHI and health care services. Neither insurers nor providers of care face financial 
risks. To make things worse, a large share of total health expenditure is channeled from 
the government directly to the providers of care. This mechanism makes the health 
insurers an additional layer in the financial flow without much function. The Russian 
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government is not prepared to let the market force work in the healthcare sector, it still 
regulates heavily on the healthcare market. Barriers to enter the market are high for 
private healthcare providers because of limitation on licenses and the premature capital 
market. In practice, the government protects existing providers from exiting the market. 
Hospitals are highly regionalized and often have natural monopoly positions, which 
seriously harm insurers’ negotiating power. A standard contract is used by all insurers 
and providers. The benefit package is not clearly defined by the Health Insurance Law. 
Product classification varies across regions. Age and gender are used as risk adjustors 
in allocating funds, indicating a long way from an effective risk equalization scheme. 
Effective quality measurement is lacking. Consumers are generally unaware of their 
entitlements under the law. Consumer information about services of health insurers and 
providers does not exist. 
Not surprisingly, health insurers in Russia are not given proper incentives to be 
prudent purchasers of care, and competition does not come naturally to the Russian 
healthcare system. After 17 years of reform in the direction of regulated competition, 
there is still no apparent evidence of competition: insurance companies do not compete 
for consumers; healthcare providers do not compete for contracts from insurers. 
The Dutch Experience (chapter 4). During the past two decades, the Dutch government 
has also gradually reformed its healthcare system from model 4 to model 1. 
In 1992 sickness funds were permitted to operate in larger areas, enrollees were al-
lowed to choose a different sickness fund annually. The health insurance market was 
also gradually opened to private health insurance companies. Consumer choice among 
health insurers was thus gradually created. Since 2006, all legal residents of the Neth-
erlands have been obliged by law to buy individual health insurance, which is a legally 
prescribed standard benefit package, from a private insurance company. The difference 
between sickness funds and private insurance companies was abolished. Open enroll-
ment and community-rated premiums are required. Consumers are expected to be 
sensitive to the price of their insurance because they pay the premium directly to their 
chosen insurance companies at various prices. Since 1993, health insurance companies 
(including the previous sickness funds) have increasingly borne financial risks for their 
operation, from 3% in 1993 to 92% in 2012. Insurers are by regulation allowed to selec-
tively contract with providers of care. Negotiation of prices of healthcare services has 
also been allowed since 1992. The Dutch government has gradually loosened control 
over price of healthcare services since 2005, especially in some specific healthcare 
services. In 2009, insurers and hospitals were allowed to freely negotiate prices and 
selectively contract for a range of products, accounting for about 34% of hospital rev-
enues. This figure was increased to 70% in 2012, which suggests increasing financial 
risks for hospitals. The Dutch government has been making efforts toward developing 
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a risk equalization scheme since 1993. From 1993 to 2002, the risk equalization scheme 
was primarily based on age, gender, indicators of disability, and social-economic status. 
In 2002 and 2004, Pharmacy-based Cost Groups, Diagnostic Cost Groups, and the self-
employed were added as risk adjustors. Along with the improvements of the risk equal-
ization scheme, financial risks borne by health insurers have been gradually increased. 
The Inspectorate for Health Care obliges hospitals to collect data on indicators of quality 
of care, such as mortality after myocardial infarction or stroke and wound infections. The 
results are publicly reported on a freely accessible website (www.kiesbeter.nl). Informa-
tion about health insurance companies, such as their price and services is available from 
this website, and is monitored by the Netherlands Healthcare Authority (NZa). Competi-
tion regulations are applicable to the health insurance and health provision markets, 
aiming to prohibit cartels and abuse a dominant position. 
The current Dutch healthcare system is not yet a perfectly regulated competitive 
healthcare system; it is, however, intending to approach this model in practice. 
From both the Russian and Dutch experience of transition from model 4 to model 1, we 
conclude that some pre-conditions need to be fulfilled to achieve effective competition, 
and thereby achieve efficiency and equity in the healthcare system, including the health 
insurance sector and the health provision sector. If any of these necessary pre-conditions 
are not fulfilled, competition will not come naturally to the system, and may not result in 
efficiency and equity. The Russian experience provides valuable lessons. Some of these 
pre-conditions are not relevant for model 2 because there is no competition among 
health insurers in model 2. Table 3 presents a list of necessary pre-conditions for model 
1, among which some are also relevant for model 2. 
Table 3 Necessary pre-conditions for model 1 and 2
Pre-conditions relevancy for Model 1 Model 2
Consumer choice among insurers √
Open entry and exit of the health insurer/provider markets √ √
Price-sensitive consumers √ √
Contracting freedom √ √
Sufficient number of healthcare providers √ √
Regulations on competition √ √
Standardized benefit package √
Effective product classification in the health provision market √ √
Risk equalization schemes √
Effective quality measurement √ √
Consumer information √ √
Appropriate government regulation √ √
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Relevancy for the Chinese healthcare reform. All the pre-conditions are examined against 
the background of the current Chinese healthcare system. There is very limited con-
sumer choice among the three major health insurance schemes in China, namely New 
Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS) for farmers, Urban Employees’ Basic Health Insur-
ance (UEBHI) for urban employees and retirees, and the Urban Residents’ Basic Health 
Insurance (URBHI) for urban unemployed residents. Consumer choice among healthcare 
providers is allowed. However, this is restricted among public hospitals, which normally 
have contracts with the major health insurers. Furthermore, as public hospitals are le-
gally owned by the government, consumer choice among providers is not effectively 
transformed by the opening/closure of hospitals. In the health insurance market, there 
is no open entry and exit to the market. Thus, social health insurers have limited incen-
tives to be efficient in purchasing care. Private investment faces high entry barrier of 
the hospital market. Even if private hospitals enter the market, they face difficulties 
in surviving because of no level playground between them and public hospitals. For 
UEBHI, one of the major health insurance schemes, premiums are a certain percentage 
of the enrollees’ salary and deducted from the gross salary of the enrollees. Consumers 
are therefore not sensitive with respect to their premium. As the government sets the 
price for public hospitals and allows little room for differentiated pricing, health insurers 
have very limited contracting freedom while negotiating with healthcare providers over 
price and quality of care. Moreover, a large share of healthcare expenditure is paid out-of 
pocket by individual patients; the negotiation power of the insurers is further harmed. 
Because the government strictly regulates the number of healthcare providers, there is 
not sufficient number of healthcare providers to generate competition, especially among 
public providers of care. Pro-competitive regulations are to a large extent unavailable in 
the current Chinese healthcare sector. There exist large discrepancies among the benefit 
package of the three major health insurance schemes, and even within the same scheme 
across regions. Effective product classification in the hospital market hardly exists, with a 
few early attempts of diagnosis-related groups in some areas. Risk equalization scheme 
is a brand new concept in China. Skills and data are still to be gained. Health insurers do 
not have official authority to organize effective quality measurement among healthcare 
providers. Currently, quality measurement is mostly taken by the healthcare providers 
themselves, results of which are rarely publicized. Consumer information about quality 
and price of healthcare providers and health insurers is scarce. 
In either model 1 or model 2, third-party payer(s) need to have sufficient motivations 
and tools to become a prudent purchaser of care on behalf of their members. 
China is obviously not well prepared for a transition towards model 1 because most 
of the pre-conditions for model 1 are not fulfilled. The prospects of model 1 in the Chi-
nese healthcare system heavily depend on the willingness and capacity to fulfill these 
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pre-conditions of the government. A major challenge for China, no matter which model 
China will choose, is to set up powerful agencies that have the incentive and ability to be 
cost-conscious third-party purchasers of care on behalf of individual consumers.
Part II: three selected pre-conditions for a competitive healthcare system in the Chinese context 
Regulations on competition (chapter 5)
Competition has been allowed and encouraged in the Chinese hospital market for more 
than two decades. However, effective competition is still very limited among public 
hospitals, which take a major share of the hospital market in China. Competition does 
not arise naturally in the market without proper regulations. 
The Chinese anti-monopoly law (AML) has come into force since August 2008. By 
examining the key elements of competition laws in several other countries, such as the 
United States (US) and the Netherlands, and their enforcement in the hospital sector, we 
conclude that the goals and key definition of the Chinese AML are consistent with those 
of the US and the Netherlands. However, the major challenges lie in the enforcement, 
rather than the issuing of the law. Public hospitals in China are in practice exempted 
from this law.
Besides this, there exist several anti-competitive regulations in the Chinese hospital 
market. Public hospitals do not have sufficient autonomy regarding capacity and pricing. 
A top-down and static plan is made every five years by the government and determines 
the number of beds per hospital and even per department of a hospital. High-tech 
medical devices or equipment are also under similar control of the government. Price 
of healthcare services is determined by the government under a screwed structure 
that favors drugs and high-tech examinations over basic healthcare services. In recent 
years, entrance regulations have been loosened for private and foreign investments in 
the hospital market. However, public hospitals face exit barriers, and this leads to an 
uncontestable market which has limited room for new enterers. Even if private hospitals 
succeeded in entering the market, they face difficulties in surviving it. Public hospitals 
have advantages in taxation, contracting with major (public) third party purchasers, fa-
vorable pricing-scheme with the major insurers, and advantages in attracting top-level 
talents. There is no level playground for private and public hospitals. 
Pro-competitive regulations largely do not exist in the current Chinese hospital 
market. Without proper product classification, major health insurers have very limited 
purchasing techniques. Consumer choice is restricted among contracting hospitals, 
which are mostly public ones, and within an administrative region. The government pays 
insufficient attention in creating and disseminating consumer information about quality 
and price of healthcare providers and health insurers. Valid consumer information about 
quality and price of health care providers is also rarely publicized.
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To summarize, room for competition in the Chinese hospital market is currently lim-
ited despite the government’s allowance for competition. There is prevailing regulated 
monopoly supported by the government in the current hospital market in China. The 
government showed, however, willingness to change in several pilot reforms such as the 
reform of changing public hospitals into shareholder-owned hospitals in Luoyang city.
If the Chinese government decides to further encourage competition in the hospital 
market, it needs to eliminate regulated monopoly in the hospital market, transit its role 
from the owner and administrator of public hospitals into a regulator who sets the rules 
of the game, and remove the hospital sector’s exemption from the AML enforcement. In-
ternational experience shows that quality of care might be harmed if price competition 
is allowed in a health provision market without sufficient information about healthcare 
quality. Because quality of care is poorly measured and publicized in the current Chinese 
healthcare system, it is important for the Chinese government to be aware of the poten-
tial negative impacts of pure price competition in the health provision market.
Consumer information (chapter 6)
In 2009, a survey on the level of consumer information about health insurance in Nan-
jing, the capital city of Jiangsu Province was conducted. A total number of 1175 insured 
people filled in a questionnaire, by which information about their insurance types, 
self-assessed health status, previous healthcare service utilization, understanding of 
their insurance, their perceived importance of relevant information, and their perceived 
difficulties in finding relevant information are collected. 
The distribution of this sample is consistent with that of the whole population in terms 
of type of health insurance schemes. Consumer information about a health insurance 
scheme is grouped in five categories: price of health insurance scheme (premium), 
copayment of healthcare service, content of the benefit package (services/medications 
covered by the scheme), right of free choice among healthcare providers, and consumer 
service of the health insurance (hot-line, user-friendly website, etc). The answers of the 
respondents were compared with the official policies of the health insurers to judge 
whether the respondents were correct. 
Results of the survey show that the current level of consumer information about their 
health insurance schemes is low. Only 25% of the respondents know correctly about 
their premiums, and only 36.8% know correctly about whether they have choice among 
healthcare providers. The level of consumer information is positively correlated with the 
subscribers’ motivation. For example, those enrolled in a mandatory health insurance 
scheme know much less about their insurance than those enrolled on a voluntary basis. 
The level of consumer information is also positively correlated with the availability of 
such information. Those who report having reliable sources of information know more 
about their insurance than those without such sources. 
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The respondents are also not active in searching relevant information. Only around 
15% of the respondents tried to search any type of information including out-of-pocket 
pharmaceutical costs, other healthcare copayment, and information about the health 
insurance scheme itself. The difficulties in finding relevant information might explain 
their inactiveness in searching: among those who searched, only around 25% actually 
found the information they looked for. 
The attitude of the respondents towards the importance of relevant information is 
quite different from what they behave in terms of searching and knowing. Most of them 
considered all five categories of information somewhat or very important. 
Comparing to the results of several similar surveys in the Netherlands, the level of 
consumer information is currently low in Nanjing. If, however, consumers are given the 
chance to choose freely among insurance plans, we expect that they will be motivated 
to obtain relevant information about their price and quality. 
If the Chinese government is determined to move to a regulated competitive health-
care system, it should take the lead in making valid and reliable information publicly 
available and accessible.
Risk equalization schemes (chapter 7)
Allowing consumer choice among health insurers might lead to risk rating and/or 
risk selection, depending on the regulations. An effective risk equalization scheme is 
essential to remove the insurers’ motivation to risk rating and selection. Besides the 
implementation of a risk equalization scheme, allowing consumer choice among health 
insurers itself is a complicated issue in China. 
In chapter 7, potential ways of allowing consumer choice among health insurers are 
discussed. The consequences of an unregulated competitive health insurance market 
are analyzed. International experiences of implementing risk equalization schemes and 
its relevancy for China is analyzed. 
Potential and practical pathways of allowing consumer choice in the health insurance 
sector are: (i) separating financing and operating of social health insurance, and allowing 
consumer choice among operating private insurers, and (ii) allowing consumer choice 
among fund-holding community health centers. Two other options were mentioned in 
the discussion part of chapter 2, including (iii) splitting the single insurer in a urban area 
into several local branches and allow them to be independent and competing agencies 
when they acquire necessary management skills and data, and (iv) allowing currently lo-
cal insurers to operate nationwide and/or to allow new insurers, including private ones 
to enter the insurance market. In chapter 7, option i and ii were replaced by option iii 
and iv. The reason is that chapter 2 is more focused on theoretical pathways of transition, 
while chapter 7 is more focused on practical feasible ways in China, and option i and ii 
were considered as difficult to be implemented because of administrative obstacles due 
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to conflict of interest among different levels of local governments (provincial, city-, and 
county-level government) and the complexity in financial flow in China. 
Unaffordability and/or inaccessibility are important negative consequences of an 
unregulated healthcare system with competing health insurers. We reviewed the 
experiences of competitive health insurance markets in Belgium, Germany, Israel, the 
Netherlands, and Switzerland. Regulations such as community ratings, benefit pack-
age regulations, and open enrolment are enforced in almost all countries to solve the 
problems of unaffordability and inaccessibility. Such regulations create incentives for 
risk selection, some of which are quite subtle. In practice, various forms of risk selection 
are widely observed. To avoid negative consequences of a competitive health insur-
ance sector (unaffordability and inaccessibility), risk-equalization schemes and open 
enrolment are proposed. Lack of stakeholder consensus and data are main obstacles in 
implementing risk equalization schemes in the reviewed settings. If the Chinese govern-
ment is determined to introduce competition in the health insurance sector, a strategy 
to implement a competitive health insurance market is needed. It is also essential to be 
technically and politically prepared for an effective risk equalization scheme. 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Three years have passed since the Blue Print of the Chinese healthcare reform was pub-
lished in 2009. Some major reforms have already been implemented (Li, 2011), which 
(potentially) fulfill some pre-conditions for a regulated competitive healthcare system. 
First, the coverage rate of basic social health insurance schemes has been significantly 
expanded. 95% of the population is currently covered by NCMS, URBHI, or UEBHI. Be-
sides the increased coverage rate of basic health insurance, the share of healthcare 
expenditure financed by social health insurers has also been significantly increased. 
Private expenditure, which is paid directly by individuals at the point of service, as a 
share of total health expenditure has been reduced. Second, the number of physicians 
and healthcare facilities has been substantially increased, especially for primary health-
care. Besides these achievements, other pro-competitive policies have been initiated 
and gradually implemented. For example, in July 2012, the State Council of China issued 
a policy that aims at encouraging the development of private hospitals (State Council 
of China, 2012). The government intends to help private healthcare facilities to obtain 
a market share of 20% (in terms of sickbeds or healthcare service provided) by 2015. 
Compared to a market share of less than 10% of the private healthcare facilities in terms 
of sickbeds before the reform, this would be a substantial increase. Along with this 
policy, the Ministry of Health issued several other policies to lower the entry barriers of 
the market for private investment, and to create a level playing field for the private and 
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public healthcare facilities in the market (Ministry of Health of China, 2012). For example, 
private healthcare facilities will be given priority when there is room for expanding 
healthcare facilities (either in terms of the number of healthcare facilities or in terms of 
sickbeds) in local healthcare planning. Private healthcare facilities will be given priority 
in hospital starring. Physicians are encouraged to work in private healthcare facilities. 
As analyzed in this thesis, more pre-conditions are necessary to ensure that regulated 
competition could achieve both efficiency and equity in a healthcare system. The three 
major social health insurance schemes still differ from each other in terms of premium 
and benefit package. Even if health insurers are motivated to be prudent purchasers of 
healthcare, they are not yet prepared to take such a role mainly because there is no ef-
fective product classification system in the health provision market so far. Risk equaliza-
tion schemes are still a brand new concept. Consumer information regarding healthcare 
providers and insurers is far from sufficient. The enforcement of anti-monopoly law in 
the healthcare system is problematic. All these call for huge efforts by policy makers and 
for further research.
If the Chinese government is determined to move towards a healthcare system with 
regulated competition, it is necessary to fulfill all the necessary pre-conditions in Table 1. 
Some policy recommendations, especially about the implementation of such a reform, 
(see the conclusions of chapters 2 through 7) are summarized below:
(1) It is essential for the Chinese government to create prudent third-party purchasers, 
who have both the incentives and ability to act on behalf of individual consumers, 
no matter China will chose model 1 or 2. 
(2) It is important for the Chinese government to understand not only the advantages, 
but also the disadvantages that may arise from a competitive healthcare system, 
such as market failures and equity problems. In the case of a healthcare system with 
none-competitive insurers and providers of care (model 4), where the government 
takes the responsibility of directly providing healthcare to the citizens, government 
failures may be a problem. 
(3) If China chooses for a competitive healthcare system, the Chinese government 
should be fully aware of all the necessary pre-conditions as mentioned in Table 3. 
The lack of any one of these pre-conditions may harm the effectiveness of competi-
tion. It is important for the government to be conscious of the technical and political 
difficulties in fulfilling the pre-conditions. If the government is determined to go for 
model 1 or 2, it needs to take the lead to fulfill the pre-conditions progressively and 
strategically.
(4) If China chooses for a competitive healthcare system, the Chinese government must 
change its role, in a gradual transition, from a player in the market to a referee who 
sets the rules of the game. It must keep itself at a reasonable distance from major 
interest groups such as public hospitals and governmental insurance agencies. It is 
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also essential to treat public and private entities equally to ensure that all entities 
compete on a level playing ground.
China is a large country, with diverse levels of economic development, local regulations, 
and culture. A ‘one size fits all’ model will not work well in every region. Competition 
among healthcare providers and among health insurers is only possible if there are 
enough providers and insurers in the market. Therefore, model 1 and 2 can be feasible 
in large parts of China with major metropolitan areas, but may not be feasible in rural 
areas of China where population density is too low and where the number of healthcare 
facilities and insurers is very limited. Necessary pre-conditions must be analyzed within 
the context of different regions. 
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ACHTERGROND
De hervorming van een centraal geleid en door de overheid gefinancierd gezondheids-
zorgsysteem naar een marktgericht systeem tijdens de jaren ’80 en ’90 werd door de 
Chinese overheid als een mislukking beschouwd omdat het resulteerde in ernstige 
problemen met betrekking tot betaalbaarheid en toegankelijkheid van zorg. In 2009 
kondigde de Chinese overheid enorme extra investeringen aan in het gezondheidszorg-
systeem om de dekking van de basisverzekering uit te breiden en de volksgezondheid 
te verbeteren. 
Concurrentie in de zorg en ook in de zorgverzekeringsector zijn genoemd als een mo-
gelijke optie om het Chinese gezondheidszorgsysteem te hervormen. Het vooruitzicht 
van concurrentie in de Chinese zorgsector vereist echter inzicht van beleidsmakers in de 
voor- en nadelen hiervan alsmede een idee in hoeverre aan noodzakelijke voorwaarden 
voor effectieve concurrentie in China voldaan is. 
Gezondheidszorgsystemenkunnen worden gecategoriseerd naar gelang er al dan niet 
prijsconcurrentie bestaat onder zorgaanbieders en onder verzekeraars (Van de Ven et 
al., 1994). Deze categorisering biedt een geschikt analytisch kader om de gevolgen van 
het toepassen van een marktmechanisme in het Chinese zorgsysteem te onderzoeken. 
Het huidige gezondheidszorgsysteem in China staat dichtbij model 2, waarin geen 
prijsconcurrentie bestaat tussen ziektenkostenverzekeraars maar er wel enige concur-
rentie toegestaan is tussen zorgaanbieders, hoewel in de praktijk zulke concurrentie 
zeldzaam is. Model 3 is theoretisch onjuist omdat de nadelen van concurrentie tussen 
verzekeraars niet genegeerd kunnen worden. Zoals uitgelegd in hoofdstuk 1, zijn 
modellen 1, 2, en 4 dus relevant voor toekomstige hervormingen in de Chinese gezond-
heidszorg. 
Theoretisch gezien zou het Chinese gezondheidszorgsysteem dus van model 2 naar 
model 1 of 4 kunnen overgaan, of het zou het prototype model 2 kunnen benaderen.
ONDERZOEKSVRAGEN EN ANTWOORDEN
In deze thesis is de centrale onderzoeksvraag: Wat zijn de vooruitzichten voor concur-
rentie bij de hervorming van de gezondheidszorg in China?
Deze vraag wordt behandeld in twee afzonderlijke delen. In Deel I worden de hervor-
mingen van de gezondheidszorg in Engeland (van model 4 naar 2), Rusland (van model 
4 naar 1) en Nederland (van model 4 naar 1) geanalyseerd. Voor- en nadelen van elk van 
de prototype modellen 1, 2, en 4 worden besproken op basis van deze landervaringen. 
Uit de hervormingen van deze landen worden ervaring en lessen geleerd. Noodzakelijke 
voorwaarden voor modellen 1 en 2 wordt samengevat. 
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In deel II worden drie vooraf geselecteerde voorwaarden grondig onderzocht en 
wordt besproken in hoeverre aan deze voorwaarden is voldaan dan wel kan worden 
voldaan. 
DEEL I: INTERNATIONALE ERVARING VAN 
GEZONDHEIDSZORGHERVORMINGEN IN DRIE LANDEN
We analyseerden de ervaringen van het Engelse gezondheidszorgsysteem voor en na 
de hervorming (respectievelijk modellen 4 en 2), evenals het Nederlandse systeem na 
de hervorming (model 1). 
Model 4. Voor de hervorming in 1991 werd de National Health Service (NHS) van 
Engeland gefinancierd door algemene belastingen, vooral verleend door overheidsin-
stellingen en was gratis voor de gebruiker van zorg. Dit is in principe een model met 
overheidsvoorziening zonder concurrentie tussen de spelers in het systeem. De sterke 
punten van dit model waren de controle van de gezondheidszorg uitgaven, de relatief 
lage transactiekosten en de relatief eenvoudige wetgeving. De Engelse NHS voor de 
hervorming ondervond vanaf het begin financiële druk. Zo’n systeem is financieel 
kwetsbaar, zeker onder de druk van stijgende uitgaven in de gezondheidszorg. Daar 
boven op kreeg de Engelse regering de kritiek bureaucratisch in de besluitvorming te 
zijn en inefficiënt in het proces van zorgverlening. Er waren niet voldoende stimulansen 
voor zorgverleners om efficiënte zorg van hoge kwaliteit te verlenen, om in te spelen 
op de behoeften van de consumenten, innoverend te zijn in de zorgverlening en om 
verantwoording af te leggen aan de consumenten. In dit systeem zijn wachtlijsten en 
wachttijden berucht als reguleringsgsmechanismen.
Model 2. In 1991 voerde de Britse overheid een interne markthervorming uit, gericht op 
een ‘gereguleerde concurrentie’ tussen zorgverleners waarbij de regionale zorgautorite-
iten optreden als niet-concurrerende zorginkopers. Met concurrerende zorgverleners en 
niet-concurrerende zorginkoper(s) als derde partij (TPPs), behoort het Engelse systeem 
na de hervorming tot model 2 in onze typologie. Eén belangrijke hervormingsmaatregel 
was het opsplitsen van de verantwoordelijkheid voor het aankopen van zorg en het 
verlenen van zorg. Huisartsen kregen de gelegenheid budgethoudende huisarts te wor-
den en werden daarna georganiseerd in lokale Primary Care Groups (PCGs), en later in 
Primary Care Trusts (PCTs). Voorts begonnen ziekenhuizen als onafhankelijke entiteiten 
te werken, hoewel de financiële stimulansen nog zwak waren vanwege hun aard als 
overheidseigendom. Hoe huisartsen ook georganiseerd waren, het principe ‘het geld 
volgt de patiënten’ bleef bestaan. Hoewel kortere wachtlijsten en –tijden vastgesteld 
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werden, vereiste zo’n systeem een meer ingewikkelde regelgeving dan de NHS voor de 
hervorming. Transactiekosten groeiden als deel van de uitgaven voor gezondheidszorg. 
Consumenten konden nog steeds niet kiezen tussen TPP(s). In vergelijking met model 4 
vereist model 2 relatief ingewikkelde regelgeving en management, inclusief mededin-
gingsbeleid, toezicht op kwaliteit en consumenteninformatie. Er was kritiek dat de 
hervorming van de interne markt resulteerde in te zwakke stimulansen en te sterke 
beperkingen voor de efficiëntie.
Model 1. Gedurende meer dan twee decennia transformeerde het Nederlandse gezond-
heidszorgsysteem van een centraal model met gecontroleerde prijzen en capaciteit, tot 
een ‘gereguleerde markt met concurrerende zorginkopers en concurrerende zorgverlen-
ers. Sinds 2006 verplicht de Zorgverzekeringswet  elke legale inwoner een individuele 
particuliere ziektekostenverzekering met een wettelijk omschreven basispakket af te 
sluiten bij een particuliere verzekeringsmaatschappij. Consumenten ondervinden sterke 
prijsprikkels en worden aangemoedigd te shoppen onder de verschillende verzekeraars. 
Concurrentie tussen zorgverzekeraars wordt aangemoedigd. Ondertussen wordt con-
currentie tussen zorgverleners geïntroduceerd door zorgverzekeraars en zorgverleners 
toe te staan selectief contracten af te sluiten en door geleidelijk overheidscontrole op de 
prijzen van sommige gezondheidszorgdiensten af te schaffen. Het Nederlandse systeem 
gaat dus in de richting van model 1. De belangrijke voordelen van model 1 zijn o.a. de 
keuze van de consument tussen zowel verzekeraars als zorgverleners, als mede in theorie 
prijsbewuste consumenten. Daar bovenop worden stimulansen gegeven aan verzeker-
aars en zorgverleners in termen van efficiëntie, kwaliteit, inspelen op de preferenties van 
de consument, innovatie en verantwoording. Maar het model is technisch ingewikkeld, 
vereist relatief ingewikkelde regelgeving (bv. risicoverevening en mededingingsbeleid) 
om het mislukken van de markt te vermijden en leidt tot relatief hoge transactiekosten 
van contracteren. Er bestaat het risico van risicoselectie in zo’n model. 
De voor- en nadelen van de drie relevante modellen zijn samengevat in Tabel 2. 
Voorwaarden voor concurrentie in het gezondheidszorgsysteem
In model 1, zonder gepaste regelgeving, zijn zowel verzekeraars als zorgverleners 
geneigd strategieën aan te nemen die wel of niet in het belang van de consumenten 
kunnen zijn, om winsten of overleving na te jagen. Voor individuele consumenten is het 
moeilijk, zo niet onmogelijk, in te gaan tegen deze strategieën. Er moet een krachtige, 
bereidwillige en actieve ‘collectieve sponsor’ zijn om de gezondheidszorgmarkt te reg-
uleren en marktfalen tegen te gaan namens de vraagzijde.
Lessen uit Rusland (hoofdstuk 3). Voor 1993 was het Russische gezondheidszorg 
systeem centraal georganiseerd, gefinancierd door de overheid en er was geen concur-
rentie (model 4). Hoewel het systeem grote vooruitgang boekte in het verbeteren van 
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de gezondheid van de Russische bevolking, waren lage kwaliteitszorg en inefficiëntie 
problematisch. Met de invoering van de Russische Ziektekostenverzekeringswet in 1993 
werd de verplichte ziektekostenverzekering geïntroduceerd in de Russische Federatie 
met als doel het gezondheidszorg systeem drastisch te veranderen van model 4 naar 
model 1. De aankoop en de verlening van gezondheidszorg werden van elkaar ges-
cheiden door het opzetten van ziektekostenverzekeraars, van wie werd verwacht dat ze 
goede zorginkopers zouden worden met motivatie en nodige invloed om de prestaties 
van de zorgverleners te beïnvloeden.
De implementatie zorgde voor een gemengd model. Zorginkopers zijn verzeke-
ringsmaatschappijen, regionale verplichte ziektekostenverzekering-fondsen, of een 
combinatie van beide, afhankelijk van de werksituatie en de regio. Werkgevers kiezen 
verzekeraars namens hun werknemers; regionale overheden kiezen verzekeraars voor 
verplichte ziektekostenverzekering-fondsen namens de niet-werkende bevolking. 
Zodoende is de consument zeer beperkt in zijn persoonlijke keuze tussen ziektekosten-
verzekeraars en is er geen sprake van prijsgevoeligheid bij de consument. De overheid 
dekt de financiële risico’s van het verstrekken van verplichte ziektekostenverzekering-
fondsen en gezondheidszorg. Verzekeraars noch zorgverleners worden geconfronteerd 
met financiële risico’s. Nog erger, een groot deel van de totale uitgaven voor gezond-
heidszorg gaat rechtstreeks van de overheid naar de zorgverleners. Dit mechanisme 
maakt van de ziektekostenverzekeraar een extra laag in de financiële stroom, zonder 
echte functie. In de praktijk beschermt de Russische overheid de bestaande zorgverle-
ners tegen het verlaten van de markt. Ziekenhuizen zijn zeer regionaal georganiseerd 
en hebben vaak een natuurlijke monopolie positie die ernstige schade toebrengt aan de 
onderhandelingspositie van verzekeraars. Zorgverzekeraars en zorgverleners gebruiken 
allemaal een standaard contract. Het zorgverzekeringspakket is niet duidelijk gedefi-
nieerd door de Ziektekostenverzekeringswet; product classificatie verschilt per regio. 
Leeftijd en geslacht worden gebruikt als risicofactoren voor het toekennen van fondsen, 
wat erop wijst dat er nog lang geen effectieve risicovereveningssysteem is. Effectieve 
kwaliteitsmeting ontbreekt. Consumenten zijn over het algemeen niet bewust van hun 
rechten binnen deze wet. En er bestaat geen consumenteninformatie over de diensten 
van zorgverzekeraars en zorgverleners.
Het wekt geen verwondering dat in Rusland de ziektekostenverzekeraars geen 
fatsoenlijke stimulansen krijgen om goede zorginkopers te zijn en concurrentie is niet 
natuurlijk voor het Russische gezondheidszorg systeem. Na 17 jaar van hervormingen 
gericht op gereguleerde concurrentie, is er nog steeds geen duidelijke bewijs van 
concurrentie: verzekeringsmaatschappijen strijden niet om klanten en zorgverleners 
strijden niet voor contracten met verzekeraars.
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De Nederlandse ervaring (hoofdstuk 4).In de afgelopen twee decennia heeft de Neder-
landse overheid haar gezondheidszorg systeem ook geleidelijk hervormd van model 4 
naar model 1.
In 1992 mochten ziekenfondsen in grotere gebieden gaan werken, en de ingeschre-
venen werd toegestaan jaarlijks een  ander ziekenfonds te kiezen. De markt voor ziekte-
kostenverzekeringen werd ook geleidelijk opengesteld voor particuliere ziektekosten 
verzekeraars. Zo ontstond geleidelijk consumentenkeuze tussen zorgverzekeraars. 
Sinds 2006 zijn alle legale inwoners van Nederland bij wet verplicht een individuele 
ziektekostenverzekering (dit is een wettelijk voorgeschreven standaard basispakket) 
te kopen bij een particuliere verzekeringsmaatschappij. Acceptatieplicht en verbod 
op premiedifferentiatie zijn vereist. Van consumenten wordt verwacht dat ze gevoelig 
zijn voor de prijs van hun verzekering, omdat ze de premie rechtstreeks betalen aan de 
gekozen verzekeringsmaatschappijen tegen verschillende prijzen. Sinds 1993 dragen 
ziektekostenverzekeringsmaatschappijen (met inbegrip van de vroegere ziekenfond-
sen) steeds meer de financiële risico’s voor hun bedrijfsvoering, van 3% in 1993 tot 92% 
in 2012. Verzekeraars zijn door regelgeving toegestaan  om selectief zorgverleners te 
contracteren. Onderhandelingen over de prijzen van gezondheidszorg zijn ook sinds 
1992 toegestaan. De Nederlandse overheid heeft sinds 2005 de controle op de prijs van 
gezondheidszorg geleidelijk aan versoepeld. In 2009 mogen verzekeraars en ziekenhui-
zen vrij onderhandelen over prijzen en zich op selectieve wijze te contracturen voor een 
reeks van producten, voor een totaal van ongeveer 34% van de ziekenhuisinkomsten. In 
2012 werd dit cijfer verhoogd tot 70%, wat wijst op toenemende financiële risico’s voor 
ziekenhuizen. De Nederlandse overheid levert sinds 1993 inspanningen betreffende de 
ontwikkeling van een risicovereveningssysteem. De volgende risicofactoren werden ge-
leidelijk toegevoegd: leeftijd, geslacht, sociaaleconomische status, farmaciekostengroe-
pen, diagnose kostengroepen en al dan niet zelfstandig ondernemer. Samen met het 
verbeteren van het risicovereveningssysteem werden ook de financiële risico’s voor de 
ziektekostenverzekeraars geleidelijk verhoogd. De Inspectie voor de Gezondheidszorg 
verplicht ziekenhuizen om gegevens te verzamelen voor indicatoren over zorgkwaliteit. 
De resultaten worden openbaar gemaakt op een vrij toegankelijke website. Informatie 
over zorgverzekeraars, zoals de prijs en aangeboden diensten, is ook beschikbaar op 
deze website, en wordt gecontroleerd door de Nederlandse Zorgautoriteit. De Mededin-
gingswet is van toepassing op de zorgverzekering- en zorgverleningsmarkten, met als 
doel om kartels en het misbruiken van dominante posities te voorkomen.
Het huidige Nederlandse zorgsysteem is nog geen perfect geregeld concurrerend 
gezondheidszorg systeem maar beoogt dit model in de praktijk te benaderen.
Uit zowel de Russische als de Nederlandse ervaring met de overgang van model 4 
naar model 1, concluderen we dat aan voorwaarden moet worden voldaan om een  ef-
fectieve concurrentie te bewerkstelligen en daarmee doelmatigheid en solidariteit in 
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het gezondheidszorgsysteem te bereiken, met in begrip van de zorgverzekeraars sector 
en de zorgverleners sector. Sommige van deze voorwaarden zijn niet relevant voor mo-
del 2 omdat er in dit model geen concurrentie bestaat tussen ziektekostenverzekeraars. 
Tabel 3 geeft een overzicht van de noodzakelijke voorwaarden voor model 1, waarvan 
een aantal ook relevant zijn voor model 2.
Toepasselijkheid voor de Chinese stelselwijziging. Er is in China maar weinig mogeli-
jkheid om te kiezen tussen de drie grote ziektekostenverzekeringen, dit zijn de “New 
Cooperative Medical Scheme“(NCMS) voor het platteland, de “Urban Employees’ Basic 
Health Insurance” (UEBHI) voor stedelijke werknemers en gepensioneerden en de “Ur-
ban Residents’ Basic Health Insurance” (URBHI) voor werkloze stadsbewoners. Er is wel 
keuzevrijheid tussen zorgverleners. Deze is echter beperkt tot de openbare ziekenhui-
zen, die meestal gecontracteerd zijn door de grote ziektekostenverzekeraars. Doordat 
de openbare ziekenhuizen eigendom zijn van de overheid leidt deze keuzevrijheid niet 
tot de opening en sluiting van ziekenhuizen. Er is geen vrije toetreding van zorgverze-
keraars tot de markt. Hierdoor hebben sociale ziektekostenverzekeraars weinig prikkels 
om efficiënt zorg in te kopen. De drempel om toe te treden tot de ziekenhuismarkt is 
hoog voor particuliere initiatieven. Zelfs als zij deze markt betreden, is het lastig om 
overeind te blijven, omdat er geen eerlijke concurrentie is tussen hen en de openbare 
ziekenhuizen. Binnen één van de belangrijkste verzekeringen (UEBHI) zijn consumenten 
niet gevoelig voor wijzigingen in hun premie, omdat deze een vast percentage van hun 
salaris bedraagt. Omdat de overheid de prijs voor openbare ziekenhuizen vaststelt en 
weinig ruimte laat voor gedifferentieerde prijsstellingen, worden ziektekostenverzeker-
aars zeer beperkt in de ruimte die zij hebben om vrij over de prijs en de kwaliteit van 
de zorg te onderhandelen met zorgverleners. Bovendien wordt een groot deel van de 
zorgkosten rechtstreeks betaald door individuele patiënten; de onderhandelingsmacht 
van de verzekeraars wordt zo verder aangetast. Doordat de overheid het aantal zorgver-
leners strikt reguleert, zijn er onvoldoende zorgverleners om concurrentie te ontwik-
kelen, vooral in de publieke sector is dit een probleem. Concurrentie bevorderende 
regelgeving is grotendeels afwezig in de huidige Chinese gezondheidszorg. Effectieve 
productindeling op de ziekenhuismarkt bestaat nauwelijks. Er is in het verleden alleen 
in een aantal regio’s geëxperimenteerd met een klein aantal diagnose-gerelateerde 
groepen in ziekenhuizen. Het risicoverveningssysteem is nog een zeer nieuw concept 
in China. Vaardigheden hiermee en gegevens over de effectiviteit ervan moeten nog 
worden verzameld. Ziektekostenverzekeraars hebben geen officiële toestemming om 
op een doeltreffende wijze kwaliteitsmetingen onder de zorgverleners uit te voeren. Op 
dit moment worden kwaliteitsmetingen meestal uitgevoerd door de zorgverleners zelf 
en worden de resultaten zelden gepubliceerd. Informatie voor consumenten over de 
kwaliteit en prijs van zowel zorgverleners als ziektekostenverzekeraars is schaars.
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China is duidelijk niet goed voorbereid op een overgang naar model 1, zo blijkt uit het 
beperkte aantal voorwaarden waaraan is voldaan. De kansen op succesvolle invoering 
van model 1 in China zijn sterk afhankelijk van de bereidheid en de capaciteit van 
de overheid om alsnog aan deze voorwaarden te voldoen. Daarbij is een belangrijke 
uitdaging voor China, los van het model dat China zal kiezen, het opzetten van sterke 
instituties die de stimulans en het vermogen hebben om voor de consument als kosten-
bewuste zorginkoper op te treden.
DEEL II: DRIE VOORWAARDEN VOOR MARKTWERKING IN DE CHINESE 
GEZONDHEIDSZORG
Regelgevingen i.v.m. concurrentie
In augustus 2008 is de Chinese anti-monopolie wetgeving  in werking getreden. We 
hebben de belangrijkste elementen van de mededingingswetgeving in verschillende 
andere landen bekeken en ook de uitvoering hiervan in de ziekenhuissector. Op basis 
van deze analyse concluderen we dat de doelen van en de definities gebruikt in de 
Chinese ANTI-MONOPOLIE WETGEVING te vergelijken zijn met die in bijvoorbeeld de 
Verenigde Staten en Nederland. De belangrijkste uitdagingen liggen echter in de uit-
voering van de wet en niet in het opstellen ervan. Openbare ziekenhuizen in China zijn 
in de praktijk vrijgesteld van deze wet.
Daarnaast bestaat  er een aantal concurrentie beperkende weten in de Chinese zie-
kenhuismarkt. Openbare ziekenhuizen kunnen niet zelfstandig beslissen over hun capa-
citeit en prijzen. Elke vijf jaar stelt de centrale overheid vast wat het aantal bedden per 
ziekenhuis en zelfs per afdeling zal zijn. Tussentijdse wijzigingen aan deze van bovenop 
opgelegde plannen zijn niet mogelijk. De overheid bepaalt de prijs van zorg binnen 
een totaal foute structuur, die zorgaanbieders perverse prikkels geeft om te kiezen voor 
geneesmiddelen en hightech onderzoeken in plaats van goedkopere basiszorg. In de 
afgelopen jaren is het makkelijker geworden voor particulieren en buitenlandse partijen 
om de ziekenhuismarkt te betreden. Openbare ziekenhuizen kunnen deze markt moei-
lijk verlaten, wat concurrentie beperkt en toetreding van nieuwe partijen bemoeilijkt. 
Als particuliere ziekenhuizen er al in slagen de markt te betreden, is het bovendien lastig 
voor hen om overeind te blijven.
Openbare ziekenhuizen hebben namelijk een aantal voordelen ten opzichte van 
particuliere ziekenhuizen. Zo betalen zij minder belasting; kunnen ze makkelijker con-
tracten afsluiten met grote inkopers van zorg; vallen ze onder gunstigere regelgeving 
met betrekking tot prijsstelling; en is het voor hen eenvoudiger om toptalenten aan zich 
binden. Er is dus geen gelijke concurrentie tussen particuliere en openbare ziekenhui-
zen.
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Momenteel is er nauwelijks wetgeving die concurrentie op de Chinese ziekenhuis-
markt bevordert. Zonder een adequate indeling van zorgproducten kunnen zorgver-
zekeraars moeilijk efficiënt zorg inkopen. Consumenten kunnen alleen kiezen tussen 
gecontracteerde ziekenhuizen, die veelal openbaar zijn en zich allemaal binnen een 
bepaalde regio bevinden. De overheid besteed onvoldoende aandacht aan het verza-
melen en verspreiden van informatie over de kwaliteit en de prijs van zowel aanbieders 
als verzekeraars. 
Op de Chinese ziekenhuismarkt zijn kortom weinig mogelijkheden om te concurre-
ren, ondanks dat de overheid dit officieel heeft toegestaan. De huidige ziekenhuismarkt 
in China blijft daardoor een gereguleerd monopolie dat wordt ondersteund door de 
overheid. De overheid heeft echter de bereidheid getoond om dit veranderen, wat blijkt 
uit verschillende pilot hervormingen die plaats hebben gevonden.
Als de Chinese overheid beslist de concurrentie in de ziekenhuismarkt verder aan te 
moedigen, dan dient zij een einde te maken aan het gereguleerde monopolie op de 
ziekenhuismarkt. Hiervoor moet ze stoppen met het beheren van openbare ziekenhui-
zen en moet zij zich nog uitsluitend richten op het opstellen van de regels waar binnen 
concurrentie plaats kan vinden. Bovendien moet ze de vrijstelling van de anti-monopoly 
wetgeving voor de ziekenhuissector intrekken. Internationale ervaring heeft uitgewezen 
dat de kwaliteit van zorg in het geding kan komen als er geconcurreerd wordt op prijs 
zonder dat er voldoende informatie beschikbaar is over de kwaliteit. Het is van groot 
belang dat de Chinese overheid zich bewust is van dit risico, aangezien de kwaliteit 
momenteel slecht wordt gemeten en beperkt beschikbaar is.
Consumenteninformatie
In 2009 is een enquête gehouden over de kennis van consumenten met betrekking tot 
ziektekostenverzekeringen in Nanjing, de hoofdstad van de provincie Jiangsu. In totaal 
vulden 1175 verzekerden een vragenlijst in.
De verdeling van deze steekproef komt overeen met die van de gehele bevolking 
ten aanzien van de type ziektekostenverzekeringen. Kennis van consumenten over 
een ziektekostenverzekering wordt gegroepeerd in vijf categorieën: de prijs van de 
ziektekostenverzekering (de premie), bijbetalingen door de patiënt, inhoud van het ver-
zekeringspakket (dekking van diensten/geneesmiddelen door de verzekering), vrijheid 
in keuze voor zorgverleners, en de klantenservice van de ziektekostenverzekering (hot-
line, gebruikersvriendelijke website, enz.). De antwoorden van de deelnemers werden 
vergeleken met het officiële beleid van ziektekostenverzekeraars om te oordelen of de 
deelnemers het bij het rechte eind hadden.
De resultaten van het onderzoek tonen aan dat het huidige kennisniveau van con-
sumenten ten aanzien van hun ziektekostenverzekering laag is. Slechts 25% van de 
deelnemers is correct op de hoogte van zijn premie en slechts 36,8% weet of ze vrij 
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zijn in hun keuze voor zorgverleners. Het kennisniveau van consumenten is positief 
gecorreleerd met hun motivatie. Ter illustratie, consumenten met een verplichte 
ziektekostenverzekering weten veel minder over hun verzekering dan degenen die 
zich vrijwillig aangemeld hebben. Het kennisniveau van de consumenten is tevens 
positief gecorreleerd met de beschikbaarheid van informatie. Personen die aangeven 
over betrouwbare informatiebronnen te beschikken, zijn beter op de hoogte van hun 
verzekering dan personen die niet over dergelijke bronnen beschikken.
Deelnemers zijn daarnaast niet actief op zoek naar relevante informatie. Slechts on-
geveer 15% van de deelnemers heeft geprobeerd zelf te zoeken naar enige informatie, 
zoals bijbetalingen voor geneesmiddelen, bijbetalingen voor medische verrichtingen, 
en informatie over de verzekering zelf. Het feit dat relevante informatie lastig is te vin-
den zou deze houding kunnen verklaren: onder degenen die op zoek gingen naar de 
gewenste informatie, vond slechts ongeveer 25% de gezochte informatie.
Als de Chinese overheid vastbesloten is om over te stappen tot gereguleerde concur-
rentie in de gezondheidszorg, dan moet zij de leiding nemen in het  publiek beschikbaar 
en toegankelijk maken van gedegen en betrouwbare informatie.
Risicovereveningssystemen
Het toestaan  van vrije keuze voor ziektekostenverzekeraar aan consumenten kan leiden 
tot premiedifferentiatie en/of risicoselectie, afhankelijk van de regelgeving. Een effectief 
systeem van risicoverevening  is essentieel om premiedifferentiatie en risicoselectie 
tegen te gaan. Naast de invoering van een risicovereveningsysteem, is het toelaten van 
vrije keuze voor ziektekostenverzekeraar aan consumenten op zich al een ingewikkeld 
onderwerp in China.
Mogelijke en praktische maatregelen voor het toestaan  van vrije keuze voor gezond-
heidszorg aan consumenten in China zijn als volgt: (i) het splitsen van de enige verze-
keraar in een stedelijk gebied in verschillende lokale afdelingen en deze onafhankelijke, 
concurrerende agentschappen te laten vormen als ze over de nodige management 
vaardigheden en gegevens beschikken en (ii) aan huidige lokale verzekeraars de moge-
lijkheid geven om op nationaal niveau werkzaam te zijn en/of het toelaten van nieuwe 
verzekeraars, met inbegrip van particuliere verzekeraars, op de verzekeringsmarkt.
Onbetaalbaarheid en/of ontoegankelijkheid zijn belangrijke negatieve gevolgen van 
een niet-gereglementeerd gezondheidszorg systeem met concurrerende ziektekos-
tenverzekeraars. We hebben ervaringen van concurrerende verzekeringsmarkten in 
België, Duitsland, Israël, Nederland en Zwitserland beoordeeld. In de praktijk zijn ver-
schillende vormen van risicoselectie op grote schaal waargenomen. Om de negatieve 
gevolgen van een concurrerende ziektekostenverzekering sector (onbetaalbaarheid 
en ontoegankelijkheid) te vermijden, wordt een risicovereveningssysteem en een ac-
ceptatieplicht voorgesteld. Gebrek aan consensus tussen belanghebbenden en een 
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gebrek aan gegevens zijn de belangrijkste belemmeringen voor de invoering van risico-
vereveningsysteem in de genoemde landen. Indien de Chinese regering vastbesloten is 
om concurrentie in de gezondheidszorg te introduceren, is een strategie nodig voor de 
invoering. Het is ook essentieel om technisch en politiek voorbereid te zijn op effectieve 
risicoverevening.
BELEIDSAANBEVELINGEN
Drie jaar zijn verstreken sinds de blauwdruk van de hervorming van de Chinese ge-
zondheidszorg werd gepubliceerd in 2009. Enkele belangrijke hervormingen werden 
al uitgevoerd, die (mogelijk) een aantal voorwaarden vervullen voor een gereguleerd 
concurrerend gezondheidszorgsysteem. Ten eerste werd de dekkingsgraad van de basis 
sociale ziektekostenverzekeringen aanzienlijk uitgebreid. 95% van de bevolking is op dit 
moment gedekt door NCMS, URBHI of UEBHI. Naast de verhoogde dekkingsgraad van 
de basis ziektekostenverzekering, is het aandeel van de zorguitgaven gefinancierd door 
sociale ziektekostenverzekeraars ook aanzienlijk verhoogd. Ten tweede is het aantal art-
sen en zorginstellingen aanzienlijk gestegen, vooral voor basis gezondheidszorg. Naast 
deze verwezenlijkingen werden ook andere concurrentie bevorderende maatregelen 
in gang gezet en geleidelijk ingevoerd; bv. In juli 2012 voerde de Raad van State van 
China een maatregel in die gericht is op het aanmoedigen van de ontwikkeling van 
particuliere ziekenhuizen. De regering is van plan particuliere zorginstellingen te helpen 
bij het verkrijgen van een marktaandeel van 20% (in termen van ziekenhuisbedden of 
medische dienstverlening) in 2015. In vergelijking met een marktaandeel van minder 
dan 10% voor de particuliere zorginstellingen op het gebied van ziekenhuisbedden 
vóór de hervorming  zou dit een aanzienlijke stijging zijn. Samen met deze maatregel 
heeft het Ministerie van Volksgezondheid verscheidene andere maatregelen ingevoerd 
om de toetredingsdrempels voor particuliere investeringen op de markt te verlagen en 
om een gelijk speelterrein te creëren voor de particuliere en openbare zorginstellingen. 
Zo zullen particuliere zorginstellingen prioriteit krijgen wanneer er ruimte is voor 
uitbreiding van zorgvoorzieningen (het zij in termen van het aantal zorginstellingen of 
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in termen van ziekenhuisbedden) in de lokale gezondheidszorg planning. Particuliere 
zorginstellingen krijgen voorrang bij aanwervingen. Artsen worden aangemoedigd om 
te werken in particuliere zorginstellingen.
Zoals geanalyseerd werd in deze thesis, zijn meer voorwaarden nodig om ervoor te 
zorgen dat gereguleerde concurrentie zowel efficiëntie als solidariteit kan realiseren 
binnen de gezondheidszorg. De drie belangrijkste sociale ziektekostenverzekeringen 
verschillen nog steeds van elkaar op het vlak van premie en basispakket. Hoewel 
ziektekostenverzekeraars gemotiveerd zijn om te handelen als goede inkopers van 
gezondheidszorg, zijn ze nog niet voorbereid om een  dergelijke rol te vervullen, vooral 
omdat er tot nu toe geen doeltreffend product classificatiesysteem bestaat in de zorgle-
veringsmarkt. Risicoverevening is nog een gloednieuw concept. Informatie voor de 
consument met betrekking tot zorgverleners en ziektekostenverzekeraars is verre van 
voldoende. De handhaving van de anti-monopolie wetgeving in het gezondheidszorg-
systeem is problematisch. Al deze elementen roepen op tot enorme inspanningen van 
beleidsmakers en  verder onderzoek.
Als de Chinese overheid vastbesloten is om over te gaan tot een gezondheidszorgsy-
steem met gereguleerde concurrentie, is het noodzakelijk aan alle nodige voorwaarden 
in Tabel 8-1 te voldoen. Een aantal beleidsaanbevelingen, in het bijzonder m.b.t. de 
uitvoering van een dergelijke hervorming, zijn hieronder samengevat:
(1) Het is belangrijk voor de Chinese overheid om effectieve zorginkopers te creëren, die 
zowel over de motivatie als het vermogen beschikken om te handelen namens de 
individuele consument, of China nu kiest voor model 1 of model 2.
(2) Het is belangrijk dat de Chinese regering niet alleen de voordelen, maar ook de 
nadelen begrijpt die kunnen voortvloeien uit een concurrerend zorgstelsel, zoals het 
falen van de markt en gelijkheidsproblemen. In het geval van een gezondheidszorg-
systeem met niet-concurrerende ziektekostenverzekeraars en zorgverleners (model 
4), waarbij de overheid de verantwoordelijkheid neemt over het direct verstrekken 
van gezondheidszorg aan de burgers, kan het falen van de overheid een probleem 
zijn.
(3) Als China kiest voor een concurrerend gezondheidszorgsysteem, moet de Chinese 
regering zich ten volle bewust zijn van alle noodzakelijke voorwaarden die vermeld 
zijn in Tabel 3. Het ontbreken van één van deze voorwaarden kan de doeltreffend-
heid van de concurrentie schaden. Het is belangrijk dat de overheid zich bewust is 
van de technische en politieke problemen voor het vervullen van de voorwaarden. 
Als de overheid vastbesloten is om over te gaan op model 1of 2, moet zij de leiding 
nemen om geleidelijk en op strategische wijze aan de voorwaarden te voldoen.
(4) Als China kiest voor een concurrerend gezondheidszorgsysteem, moet de Chinese 
regering haar rol geleidelijk veranderen van een marktspeler tot  een scheidsrechter 
die de regels van het spel bepaalt. Ze moet zich op een redelijke afstand houden van 
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belangrijke belangen groepen zoals openbare ziekenhuizen en overheidsverzeke-
ringsmaatschappijen. Het is ook belangrijk om openbare en particuliere instanties 
gelijk te behandelen om ervoor te zorgen dat alle entiteiten concurreren op een 
gelijk speelterrein.
Tabel 2 Relatieve voor- en nadelen van de drie prototype modellen
Voordelen Nadelen
Model 4 - Sterke capaciteit om kosten te beperken;
- Lage administratieve kosten;
- Relatief eenvoudige wetgeving.
-  Fiscale druk voor de overheid wat kan 
leiden tot te weinig financiering en een 
systeem met twee lagen;
- Gebrek aan stimulansen voor
 - Efficiënte zorg;
 - Zorg van hoge kwaliteit;




- Lange wachtlijsten en wachttijden;
- Bureaucratie;
-  Ongewenste stimulansen voor particuliere 
huisartsen om kwaliteit te verminderen en 
wachtlijsten te vergroten in het publieke 
systeem;
-  Moeilijkheid om centrale informatie in te 
winnen.
Model 2 Omdat ‘geld de patiënt volgt’, worden 
zorgverleners gestimuleerd tot:
- Efficiënte zorgverlening;
- Zorgverlening van hoge kwaliteit;




-  Relatief hoge transactiekosten van 
contracteren;
- Geen consumentkeuze;
-  Relatief lage stimulansen voor 
zorginkopers om
 - Efficiënte zorgverlening te stimuleren;
 - Zorg van hoge kwaliteit aan te kopen;




-  Relatief ingewikkelde regelgeving/
management (mededingingsbeleid, 
kwaliteit, consumenteninformatie).
Model 1 - Consumentenkeuze;
-  Vanwege ‘stemmen met de voeten’, 
stimulansen voor zorginkopers en 
verleners voor:
 - Efficiënte zorgverlening;
 - Zorg van hoge kwaliteit;
 - Zorgverlening van hoge kwaliteit;




- Relatief hoge contractkosten;
-  Relatief ingewikkelde regelgeving/
management (risicoverevening, 
mededingingsbeleid, kwaliteit, consument 
informatie);
-  Potentieel voor “premiedifferentiatie” 
en/of “risicoselectie”, afhankelijk van de 
regelgeving.
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China is een groot land, met verschillende niveau’s van economische ontwikkeling, loka-
le regelgevingen en cultuur. Een ‘one size fits all’model zal niet even goed werken in elke 
regio. Concurrentie tussen zorgverleners en tussen ziektekostenverzekeraars is alleen 
mogelijk als er voldoende verleners en verzekeraars op de markt zijn. Daarom zijn model 
1 en 2 haalbaar in grote delen van China met grote stedelijke gebieden, maar misschien 
niet in de landelijke gebieden van China waar de bevolkingsdichtheid laag is en waar 
het aantal zorginstellingen en verzekeraars zeer beperkt is. Noodzakelijke voorwaarden 
moeten worden geanalyseerd binnen de context van verschillende regio’s.
Tabel 3 Noodzakelijke voorwaarden voor modellen 1 en 2
Voorwaarden relevant voor Model 1 Model 2
Consumentenkeuze tussen verschillende verzekeraars √
Vrije toe- en uittreding tot zorgmarkten √ √
Prijsgevoelige consumenten √ √
Contractvrijheid √ √
Voldoende aantal zorgverleners √ √
Regelgeving betreffende concurrentie √ √
Standaard basispakket √
Effectieve product classificatie in de zorgleveraarssmarkt √ √
Risicoverevening √
Effectieve kwaliteitsmeting √ √
Consumenten informatie √ √
Gepaste overheidsregelgevingen √ √
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